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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses the nationalist rhetoric of successive Australian and New Zealand 
governments over the twentieth century. It uses political rhetoric to analyse the way that ideas 
about race, Empire and geopolitical identities were invoked, transformed and discarded in 
Australia and New Zealand. Each chapter in this thesis is a case study of an event that caused 
the two governments to articulate visions of Australia and New Zealand and their place in the 
world. It draws upon transnational and comparative historiography dealing with Australia and 
New Zealand, as well as scholarship seeking to understand nationalism and geopolitics. It uses 
these theoretical frameworks to explain the resilience and then rapid decline of British settler 
nationalism in Australia and New Zealand and analyse the post-British nationalisms that took its 
place. 
 
This thesis begins at a time when Britishness pervaded most aspects of nationalist rhetoric in 
Australia and New Zealand, and it ends in 1990 where governments adopted explicitly post-
British post-racial national identities. It explains this transformation by analysing a series of case 
studies through the twentieth century that illustrate the decline of the British Empire and the 
attempts by governments in Australia and New Zealand to define a new place for themselves 
within the world. This project places that process in comparative perspective by comparing 
their response to this challenge.  
 
This comparative and transnational approach provides an explanation for the divergence in 
nationalist rhetoric in Australia and New Zealand. By considering: Federation in 1901, World 
War One, World War II, Britain’s decline in the 1960s, new Labo(u)r governments in the 1970s, 
the ANZUS crisis in 1984-5 and national celebrations in 1988 and 1990, this thesis tracks the 
decline of the British Empire in the settler colonies. This caused the differences between 
Australia and New Zealand — apparent in 1901 and influential on the two governments’ 
responses to a range of issues — to become even more pronounced. At the same time, an 
analysis of political rhetoric in the two countries points to important ongoing similarities that 
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reflect the fact that governments on both sides of the Tasman were affected by similar 
processes and concerned with similar issues. They were both coming to terms with Britain’s 
decline and developing post-British national identities that addressed the myriad challenges the 
two countries faced.  
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Introduction 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Australia and New Zealand were remarkably similar 
colonial societies, obsessed with developing the land, dismissive of Indigenous land rights, 
fervently pro-British, and afraid of an invasion from the north. Yet while the six Australian 
colonies federated in 1901, New Zealand chose to maintain its independence from Australia. By 
the end of the twentieth century the national identity of the two nations had diverged. The 
New Zealand government promoted a policy of biculturalism while in Australia Indigenous 
issues remained comparatively peripheral. Australia maintained close relations with the United 
States (US) while New Zealand had been excluded from ANZUS. Australia was increasingly 
considering its position as an asian nation while New Zealand saw itself as a South Pacific 
nation. Yet bilateral relations between Australia and New Zealand had never been closer and 
the New Zealand government saw Australia as New Zealand’s most important international 
partner. A significant number of New Zealanders lived in Australia making the most of rights 
that no other Commonwealth citizen enjoyed, and many foreigners could still be forgiven for 
not being able to tell the difference between Australians and New Zealanders.  
This thesis sheds light upon some of the forces that created this divergence and 
convergence between Australia and New Zealand. It analyses the nationalist rhetoric used by 
Australian and New Zealand governments throughout the twentieth century, and compares 
how the two governments framed and located their nations, defined their national identities 
and invoked their nation’s national characters in order to pursue their political objectives and 
respond to changes in the world. Each chapter considers a major turning point in the two 
nations’ histories, comparing and contrasting the ways nationalist rhetoric in each country 
changed over time, and the similarities and differences between the nationalist rhetoric within 
each country. Through this process, this thesis considers the extent to which the nationalist 
rhetoric in each country has diverged and analyses the degree to which the nationalist rhetoric 
within each nation changed over the twentieth century, with particular emphasis on a shift 
from a racialist to a post-racialist conception of the nation. 
2 
 
The similarities between Australia and New Zealand in 1901 were reflected in the settler 
nationalism developed in each country. However, differing geographic position, size and ethnic 
makeup have caused the political rhetoric of each nation to diverge in a number of ways. 
Specifically, Australia’s greater size and proximity to Asia made successive governments more 
concerned about the military threat posed by European and Asian nations, while New Zealand’s 
position in the South Pacific has meant that New Zealand governments were less concerned 
about that threat. Moreover, the different position of indigenous peoples within Australia and 
New Zealand gave the two nations different attitudes towards race relations. These differences 
influenced the construction of nationalism in both countries. Although they were largely 
subsumed by their shared attachment to the British Empire during the first half of the 
twentieth century, distinct nationalist discourses emerged in Australia and New Zealand as the 
Empire declined and both nations sought to define a post-British national identity. There was a 
limit to this divergence. Both societies shared a range of similarities and, in particular, the 
ideology underwriting the settler nationalisms in each country remained remarkably alike. This 
process is described throughout the following chapters as ‘divergence within a common 
framework’, acknowledging the differences in the nationalist rhetoric without ignoring the 
underlying similarities that continued throughout the century. 
Methodology 
This thesis focuses on the construction of nationalism by successive Australian and New 
Zealand governments in the twentieth century. The primary research for this thesis was 
therefore limited to government-produced material, ensuring the thesis remained focused 
upon government rhetoric and policy, and that the project remained contained and the amount 
of primary material was kept manageable. More importantly, this focus draws upon Benedict 
Anderson’s analysis of the creation of ‘imagined communities’, which are seen as largely state-
driven processes.1 The most important primary sources for this thesis are the Australian and 
New Zealand parliamentary debates, supplemented with political propaganda, speeches and 
                                                                
1
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism(London: Verso, 2006), 224. 
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other government sources. Secondary sources inform the wider context of each chapter and 
explain the broader forces buffeting Australia and New Zealand.  
The research in this thesis combines deep analysis of significant moments in the two 
nations’ histories with broader analysis of the long-term challenges both countries faced. Each 
chapter is based upon a major event in the history of the two nations and uses that event as an 
opportunity to compare the construction of national identity by the Australian and New 
Zealand governments. Accordingly the thesis does not consider large swathes of the two 
nations’ histories. Instead, the milestones employed in this project were chosen because of 
their significance on both sides of the Tasman. Part of the challenge of this topic has been 
combining two historiographies that still largely ignore each other, so the research creates a 
clear overall picture of the nationalist rhetoric in the two governments. The thesis takes a broad 
view and is more concerned with wider process and institutional cultures than with individuals. 
These limitations are necessary to make the research manageable, but they also focus the 
research on a transnational perspective that breaks free from the national historiographies of 
both countries and provides a new perspective on issues that are too often viewed through a 
purely national prism.2 This thesis outlines connections between these two siloed 
historiographies and as a result, makes an important contribution to both and provides a new 
perspective with which to consider Australian and New Zealand history.  
By confining the analysis of government rhetoric to parliamentary debates, rather than 
also looking at newspapers and other archival material, the limits of the primary research 
remained defined, and ensure that firm conclusions could be drawn about the construction of 
national identity as reflected in the government rhetoric. This thesis does not attempt to define 
the ‘real’ national identity of each country, because doing this imposes totalising ideas onto 
diverse populations.3 Trying to define the genuine character of a nation is problematic and 
often serves to entrench and normalise national myths and perspectives that marginalise 
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 Stuart Ward provides a good example of this approach: Stuart Ward, "The New Nationalism in Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand: Civic Culture in the wake of the British World," in Britishness abroad: transnational movements and imperial cultures, 
ed. Stuart Macintyre Kate Darian-Smith, Patricia Grimshaw (Carlton, Vic: Melbourne University Press, 2007), 231. 
3
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 7. 
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alternative perspectives and identities.4 Instead, by analysing government attempts at 
constructing nationalism one can draw conclusions about the ideas and forms of identity 
governments believed were resonant, without assuming that those identities reflect reality. 
Furthermore, this approach facilitates the analysis of the relationship between policy objectives 
and the invocation of nationalist discourse. By focusing on government rhetoric and policy this 
thesis draws firm conclusions about the construction of national identity in Australia and New 
Zealand without viewing nations and national boundaries as natural or inevitable.  
This thesis treats parliamentary rhetoric as an organic discursive field, focused on the 
broader changes in the parliamentary chamber. In this context, the standing of the individual 
speaker is less important than the wider rhetorical changes that took place in each time period, 
what those changes said about nationalist rhetoric at that time and the internal and external 
forces that challenged that rhetoric. Therefore, this project is more focused on the overall tone 
of the political rhetoric in the Australian and New Zealand parliaments in each period than it is 
on specific individuals and their responsibilities.  
This focus on political rhetoric draws from James Curran’s book The Power of Speech 
and an article based on this research ‘The “Thin Dividing Line”: Prime Ministers and the 
problem of Australian nationalism, 1972-1996.’5 Curran argues that “Prime Ministerial rhetoric 
is a significant medium through which the general problem of nationalism in Australian 
intellectual life can be explored and explained.”6 Curran identifies the power of political 
rhetoric as a historical source because it so clearly reflects the power of, and challenges, to 
nationalism in its various forms.  Through the parliamentary debates governments are often 
forced to explicitly comment upon and articulate their understanding of the nation and its 
national identity. In particular, if nationalism is treated as a social and political construct, a 
malleable ideology used for political ends, then the appropriateness of parliamentary debates 
as the main historical source for this thesis becomes readily apparent. It was in parliament that 
                                                                
4
 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1780, programme, myth, reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 8. 
5
 James Curran, The power of speech: Australian Prime Ministers defining the national image (Carlton, Vic: Melbourne 
University Press, 2004); James Curran ‘The “Thin Dividing Line”: Prime Ministers and the Problem of Australian Nationalism, 
1972–1996’, Australian Journal of Politics & History, 48,  4, (2002) 469. 
6
 Ibid., 470 
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these ideas were most often expressed and the objections, or silence, of the opposition also 
spoke volumes about the political climate at any given time. Thus, through their speeches the 
government and the opposition provide a great deal of evidence that this thesis uses to 
interpret and deconstruct nationalist rhetoric in Australia and New Zealand in the twentieth 
century.  
While Curran provides the clearest example of the approach this thesis adopts, this 
thesis also draws upon a wider theoretical foundation. Academics who use critical discourse 
analysis in Australia and New Zealand have created a body of work that is founded on the 
analysis of political rhetoric.7 They use this approach to analyse and deconstruct political 
cultures and seek to understand the forces that reinforce and destablise different forms of 
political rhetoric in Australia and New Zealand.8 Another example is Russell McGregor whose 
consideration of Britishness in Australia provides a good example of the powerful conclusions 
that can be drawn by making political rhetoric the centre of an analysis of nationalism.9 
There is also an established international literature that uses political rhetoric to analyse 
nationalism.10  Claire Sutherland provides a good summary of this approach: 
Discourse theory is valuable in describing how the ideological construction of 
the nation aims to achieve a hegemonic rearticulation of the national ‘nodal 
point’. In turn, nationalist ideology can be placed within the epistemological 
context of discourse theory and approached methodologically through the 
rhetorical analysis of texts. Tapping away at nationalism in this way is rather 
                                                                
7
 For example: Martha Augoustinos, Amanda Lecouter and John Soyland, “Self-sufficient arguments in political rhetoric: 
constructing reconciliation and apologizing to the Stolen Generations” Discourse & Society, 13, 1 (2002), 105; M. Wetherell and 
J. Potter, Mapping the Language of Racism: Discourse and the Legitimation of Exploitation (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992); Mark Rapley, “‘Just an ordinary Australian ’ : Self-categorization and the discursive construction of facticity 
in ‘new racist’ political rhetoric” British Journal of Social Psychology, 31 (1998), 326.  
8
 Augoustinos, 107. 
9
 Russell McGregor, "The necessity of Britishness: Ethno-cultural roots of Australian nationalism". Nations and Nationalism, 12, 
3 (2006) 494. 
10
 For example: John Dickie, ‘Sententiousness and Nationalist Discourse: The Case of Alfredo Rocco’ Nations and Nationalism, 6, 
1 (2000); Roger Van Reekum, ‘As nation, people and public collide: Enacting Dutchness in public discourse’ Nations and 
Nationalism, 18, 4 (2012). 
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like cracking open an egg; the outer shell of rhetoric surrounds the ideological 
core.11 
In a similar vein, this thesis will ‘crack open’ the shell of Australian and New Zealand nationalist 
rhetoric in order to expose the ideological assumptions at their centre.  
Literature Review 
Since the 1970s, a number of academics have reconsidered the relationship between the British 
Empire and Australia and New Zealand. Humphrey McQueen in his book A New Britannia 
(1972) argued that the Australian nationalists were not necessarily anti-imperialist and in fact 
successive generations of Australian politicians adopted nationalist discourse alongside wider 
imperial identities.12 This work was influential in challenging widely held assumptions about the 
supposed inherent tension between Australian nationalism and British Imperialism. Yet this 
work also worked with the assumption that there was a latent national identity that had been 
denied by Britishness.13 
J. G. A. Pocock provided a far more fundamental reassessment of British history and he 
did much to broaden the scope beyond traditional English history. Pocock’s British history 
moves away from the idea that British history is centred on English culture and political 
achievement. Instead British history should be understood as a web of interconnections that 
are constituted of and based in both the metropole and the periphery. From this perspective, 
colonies and dominions are more than an appendage of Empire. Instead they form and integral 
part of British history and as such have greatly contributed to its development and definition. 
The significance of this “plea for a new subject” is that it called for the reconsideration of the 
role that the British Empire played in New Zealand and Australia, and for a more nuanced 
analysis of the role that British imperial identities played in Australia and New Zealand history.14 
Rather than thinking of British imperial identities as being an alien ideology imposed upon the 
                                                                
11
 Claire Sutherland, “Nation-building through discourse theory” Nations and Nationalism, 11, 2 (2005) 185. 
12
 Humphrey McQueen, A New Britannia (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2004). 
13
 Ibid., 25. 
14
 J. G. A. Pocock, ‘British history: a plea for a new subject’, Journal of Modern History, 47 (1975), 601. 
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dominions he argued that the dominions played an important role in the Empire’s development 
and as such contributed to its form and structure.15 
In 1979, Jim Davidson coined the term ‘de-dominionisation’ to describe how the decline 
of the British Empire had affected Australia and New Zealand. He used this term to differentiate 
de-dominionisation from post-colonialism. He points out that just as the two parts of Empire 
were administered in different ways, so too did they end in different ways. In an essay in 2005 
he reconsiders the term: 
[It] provides a framework which can handle the contradictions and 
ambivalences in the relationship between settlement colony/dominion and 
the mother country. This is because, as Sara Wills writes in this issue, 
Britishness “became both the foundation upon which notions of 
Australianness were constructed and also that against which Australian 
nationalism sought to define itself.” De-dominionisation, being about 
disentanglement, expects ambivalence. It needs to, in order to pick up the 
elements of reluctance — and truculence — the process entails.16 
He argues that before the 1960s Australians were generally content to see “Australian-ness as 
an inflection or a regionalism within a wider Britishness.”17 Davidson pithily identifies the 
ambivalent relationships within the Empire, on one level the Australian and New Zealand 
governments were growing in confidence and asserting their growing power and autonomy, 
while also fiercely resisting Britain’s attempts to withdraw from its Imperial commitments. The 
way this ambivalence manifested in the political rhetoric in Australia and New Zealand is one of 
the central issues this thesis addresses.  
Duncan Bell provides an interesting discussion of the late Victorian desire to create 
British federal government that would incorporate the dominions and other colonies formally 
                                                                
15
 J. G. A. Pocock, ‘The Limits and Divisions of British History: In Search of the Unknown Subject’ The American Historical Review, 
87, 2 ( 1982), 311.  
16
 Jim Davidson, De-Dominionisation Revisited, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 51, 1, (2005), 109. The original article 
was: Jim Davidson ‘The De-Dominionisation of Australia’, Meanjin, 38, 2 (1979). 
17
 Jim Davidson, De-Dominionisation Revisited, 108. 
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within a single government.18 While the movement was a failure, the desire for a federal 
empire was indicative of the way that ideas about the structure of the British Empire evolved in 
the late nineteenth century. Perhaps more importantly these ideas fed directly into the formal 
structures of the Commonwealth that were developed in the first half of the twentieth century. 
This work shares with Pocock and others the desire to create a more nuanced understanding of 
the British Empire and how the colonies fitted within it. 
John Darwin’s The Empire Project (2010) provides a good discussion of how the 
Australian and New Zealand governments framed their nations as a part of the British Empire 
and that: 
Dominion politicians declared over and over again that Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand and Newfoundland were ‘British countries’, or ‘British nations’ ... 
[T]he ‘Empire’ was not an alien overlord, but a joint enterprise in which they 
were, or claimed to be, partners.19 
This provides an overt critique of the idea that the Empire was imposed upon the dominions. 
Instead he argues that the British Empire was made up of networks and it was only once these 
networks disintegrated “that [British] world soon ended.”20  
Alongside these issues a number of academics have reconsidered the relationship 
between nationalism and Britishness. Britishness has occupied an ambivalent position in the 
historiography in Australia and New Zealand. In the first half of the twentieth century most 
academics saw Australia and New Zealand’s relationship with Britain and empire as 
unproblematic and mutually supportive.21 Australia and New Zealand’s history was often cast as 
                                                                
18
 Duncan Bell’s, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the future of world order, 1860-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007). 
19
 John Darwin, The Empire Project: The rise and fall of the British world-system, 1830-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) 11. 
20
 Magee and Thompson also provide a good perspective on this issue and describe the British Empire as a mutually supporting 
systems with the Dominions as active agents within it. Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, Empire and Globalisation: 
Networks of people, goods and capital in the British world, c.1850-1914 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010). 
21 
For example: William Pember Reeves, The Long White Cloud: Aotearoa (H. Marshall & Son: London, 1899) 5. Jacob Pollock 
also made this argmuent in: Jacob Pollock, ‘From Colony to culture: Historiographical discourse and historical identity in 
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the continuation of the inexorable march of British civilisation. Russel Ward in Australia and, to 
a lesser extent, Keith Sinclair in New Zealand challenged this approach. They both posited that 
Britishness and nationalism were opposed and that, therefore, Britishness had inhibited the 
development of a genuine nationalism and national identity in Australia and New Zealand. They 
portrayed the history of Australia and New Zealand as the progression from colonial 
subservience to national independence.22 
This narrative has a stronger tradition in Australia and these radical nationalist ideas 
found expression in Stephan Alomes and David Day’s work.23 David Day in particular chastises 
successive Australian governments for their colonial subservience, which he argues meant they 
subordinated Australia’s national interests in favour of the empire.24 This perspective clearly 
illustrates the interplay of identities in Australia and New Zealand and rightly identifies the fact 
that Britishness played a hugely significant role in Australia and New Zealand throughout most 
of the twentieth century. However, the assumption that there was a latent non-British national 
identity dormant within Australia and New Zealand, waiting for its chance to emerge is 
problematic. Moreover, the scholarship outlined thus far provides a more nuanced 
interpretation of the relationship between the Dominions and the mother country.  
Governments in the first half of the century saw no tension between their emergent 
nationhood and their place within the empire.25 They expressed a clear understanding of their 
nation’s distinct position within the world. For them, rather than thwarting their development, 
they saw the empire as they means by which their nations would develop and gain influence in 
the world.  Russell McGregor argues that:  
Britishness was neither inimical nor incidental to Australian nationalism. It 
was integral to, even necessary for, that nationalism. To embed their nation 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Aotearoa/New Zealand, 1883-2003’, Thesis-MA (University of Auckland: 2005), 60. For Australia see Greenwood as an example: 
Gordon Greenwood, Australia: A social and political history (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1974).  
22
 Keith Sinclair. A Destiny Apart: New Zealand's Search for National Identity (Wellington: Allen and Unwin: 1986). And Russel 
Ward, A Nation for a Continent: The history of Australia, 1901-1975 (Richmond: Heinemann Educational Australia, 1988). 
23
 Stephen Alomes, A Nation at Last? (Sydney: Angus & Roberts, 1988). 
24
 David Day, John Curtin: A life (Pymble, N.S.W: Harper Collins, 1999), 564. 
25
 Russell McGregor, "The necessity of Britishness: Ethno-cultural roots of Australian nationalism". Nations and Nationalism, 12, 
3 (2006) 494. 
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and foster popular sentiments of collective solidarity, Australian nationalists 
had no option but to turn to the Britannic heritage ... Britishness provided an 
ethnic core into which were infused civic/territorial elements to produce a 
nationalism that was distinctively Australian while simultaneously and 
fervently British: a composite nationalism that could be, and in the federation 
era often was, more accurately designated ‘British-Australian’.26 
This thesis draws upon this approach and views this “composite nationalism” through a 
transnational lens by comparing the rise and fall of this nationalism in Australia and New 
Zealand.  
 These ideas have been extended by other academics who provide the wider theoretical 
foundation for this thesis. A.G. Hopkins proposes the idea of ‘post-colonial globalisation’ as a 
way of understanding the collapse of imperial culture and rethinking the process of 
decolonisation. Hopkins argues that the experience of Australia and New Zealand must be 
considered a part of the wider process of decolonisation: 
Decolonization was a response to changes in the process of globalization after 
the Second World War ... The propagation and implementation of principles 
of human and civil rights undercut systems of domination based on claimed 
ethnic superiority; profound changes to the world economy reduced the value 
of colonial forms of integration and created new alignments; principles of civic 
nationality were adopted to meet the needs of an increasingly cosmopolitan 
world. The result was a novel synthesis, post-colonial globalization, which 
washed over and eventually eroded the boundaries that had marked out both 
Greater Britain and the colonial dependencies.27 
He points out that even after the Second World War there was a genuine attempt in Great 
Britain itself and in the Dominions to re-strengthen the empire. It was only after the extent of 
Britain’s decline had become clear by the early 1960s that the Dominions embarked upon what 
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 Ibid. 
27
 A. G. Hopkins, Rethinking Decolonization, Past and Present, 200, 1 (2008): 216. 
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he describes as their own form of decolonisation.28 “The central development, which was 
clearly visible by 1960, was the shrivelling of the concept, and the reality, of the British world. 
After 1960 there was very little talk of ‘pride of race’, and less still of the ‘pure fire of imperial 
patriotism’.”29 Again this fits in with the central thrust of this thesis which is that Britishness 
formed a central part of the nationalisms’ espoused by successive Australian and New Zealand 
governments until the 1960s.30 It was only when the decline of the British Empire was beyond 
dispute that they were forced to attempt to provide alternative national identities and 
geopolitical understandings of their place within the world.  
Neville Meany provides a number of useful insights into the relationship between 
nationalism and Britishness. He makes a powerful case for the need to interrogate: 
[N]ationalism's own teleological view of history, namely that all history is a 
struggle by 'peoples' towards achieving self-realisation, most commonly in 
independent sovereign states. This treatment of nationalism in Australian 
history ignores the broadly agreed conclusions of contemporary scholars of 
nationalism, who have rejected nationalism's own claims that it is an innate or 
given dynamic in human societies and contrariwise have argued that 
nationalism is a historically contingent, socially constructed idea or myth 
about a 'people'.31 
Furthermore, Meaney outlines the idea that in the first half of the century in Australia (and 
New Zealand) the tension between ‘community of culture’ versus ‘community of interest’ is at 
the core of the tension between Australian nationalism and Britishness. In the first half of the 
century the Britishness of both societies seemed clear, but whether the two nations had the 
same interests as Britain was not. This was a constant source of anxiety for Australian and New 
Zealand governments. Meaney argues that British nationalism in the antipodes must be 
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 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid., 228. 
30
 Buckner also makes this argument in relation to Canada. Phillip Buckner, Canada and the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 2008) 6. 
31
 Neville Meaney, Australia and the Wider World: Selected essays of Neville Meaney edited by James Curran and Stuart Ward 
(The University Of Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2013) 25. 
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understood through the contradiction of those two ideas.32 The purpose, conscious or 
unconscious, of much of the political rhetoric in Australia and New Zealand can be seen as an 
attempt to reaffirm the idea that Britain and Australia and New Zealand had the same 
interests.33 Once it was clear that this no longer the case it did not take long before the 
foundation of the idea of a ‘community of culture’ were also undermined.34 This is one of the 
central arguments that inform this project’s analysis of political rhetoric in Australia and New 
Zealand. It explains the importance of both the wider political and economic forces that 
changed the world and how this affected the specific political rhetoric successive Australian and 
New Zealand governments invoked. 
 James Curran and Stuart Ward’s work further developed these ideas on the end of 
empire in Australia. They argue that, because of the decline of the British Empire, the 1960s 
were an important point of no return for Australia because notions of Britishness were 
inextricably linked to the strength of the British Empire and the community of interest it 
embodied.35 This thesis adopts the approach taken by Meaney, Curran and Ward. It 
interrogates how it was that these wider notions of Britishness existed alongside more 
pariticularist political identities in the two countries for so long and it treats the 1960s as an 
important point of no return for Australia and New Zealand because of Britain’s decline. The 
strength of Britishness in the political rhetoric was a marker of both the influence that Britain 
had on Australia and New Zealand and the extent to which the governments in the first half of 
the century defined their imagined communities as a part of the British Empire. As the utility of 
this British identity diminished both governments were forced to reshape their political rhetoric 
and the way they framed the nations’ position in the world. Therefore, like Ward et al this 
thesis treats Britishness as concept that was central to the development of nationalist political 
rhetoric, as a marker of the power of imperial identities, and treats its decline as the most 
significant turning point in the development of nationalist political rhetoric in Australia and 
New Zealand in the twentieth century.  
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Alongside the literature relating to Britishness this thesis also draws upon the latest 
theoretical approaches to understanding nationalism – in particular the works of Benedict 
Anderson and Anthony Smith – and engages with a constructivist and ethno-symbolist 
approach to the study of nationalism. Constructivism emphasises the artificial nature of 
nationalism and identifies the growth of nationalism with the advent of modernity, primarily in 
Europe in the nineteenth century.36 This approach privileges the role of the state as an active 
agent engaged in the creation of nationalism in order to legitimise its own power. Ethno-
symbolism, on the other hand, questions whether nationalism is purely contrived and proposes 
that nationalism has deeper historical and cultural roots than constructivists allow.37 This thesis 
uses both approaches. Successive Australian and New Zealand governments engaged in explicit 
processes of nation-building, promoting the nation-state above all other forms of identity. 
However, this process did not occur in a vacuum and it is important to consider the context in 
which the governments operated. It is this wider historical context that led to a number of 
important differences in the nationalisms espoused by Australian and New Zealand 
governments.  
The definition of nationalism used in this thesis draws upon Anderson’s interpretation. 
Anderson argues a nation “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will 
never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds 
of each lives the image of their communion”.38 Michael Billig expands on this in his description 
of ‘banal nationalism’, arguing that nationalism is not just about extremism or ethnic conflicts. 
He insists on “stretching the term ‘nationalism’, so that it covers the ideological means by 
which nation-states are reproduced ... there is a continual ‘flagging’ or reminding, of 
nationhood ... [and] nationhood provides a continual background for [countries’] political 
discourses.“39 Nationalist rhetoric from this perspective defines the boundaries of the nation 
and seeks to describe what is and what is not representative of the nation. Nationalism and 
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nationalist rhetoric are therefore less about racism and xenophobia and more about the way 
governments define and invoke ideas of the nation, whether for dangerous or benign purposes. 
 Scholars of Australian and New Zealand history provide this thesis with a framework 
with which to understand nationalist rhetoric in each context. Richard White, David Day and 
James Curran have all produced works that emphasise the constructed nature of identity and 
the relationship between identity, nationalism and power.40 Specifically, they explore the ways 
groups in society use conceptions of the nation to pursue their own ends. Stuart Ward’s 
analysis of Australia’s attitude towards Britain joining the EEC (European Economic Union), and 
the way Australia had to reconceptualise its place within the world, offers valuable insights into 
the importance of the British Empire. This thesis extends Ward’s analysis by placing this 
approach in a comparative perspective with New Zealand.41 James Belich’s emphasis on the 
importance of the British Empire in New Zealand’s history also informed this thesis’ focus on 
the rise and fall of British settler-nationalism in Australia and New Zealand.42 Finally, Phillipa 
Mein Smith and Donald Denoon and others have assessed New Zealand’s position in the world 
and the importance of the trans-Tasman relationship.43 These historians helped to frame the 
way in which this thesis considers the resilience of ‘Australasia’ as an idea and a form of 
identity.  
This thesis negotiates the divide between comparative and transnational histories. 
Comparative and transnational histories of Australia and New Zealand are relatively rare, but 
the field is growing with a number of scholars offering fresh perspectives on what had 
otherwise been purely national topics. The main methodological and theoretical differences 
within this field are concerned with the role of the nation-state. Those engaged in a 
comparative approach keep the nation-state as the fundamental object of analysis, and use 
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comparisons to add depth to the national historiographical tradition. The transnational 
approach, on the other hand, attempts to look beyond the structure of the nation-state, 
emphasising interconnections, both within and outside the national framework. The latter 
approach critiques the way other historians have accepted national boundaries as the 
framework in which history is written. 
 The comparative approach works within the confines of the nation-state system.44 
Scholars who use this approach compare Australia and New Zealand because they are relatively 
similar, enriching our understanding of both. Judith Smart and Tony Wood provide a good 
example of this approach: New Zealand and Australia are treated separately and the authors 
assume that by 1916 Australia and New Zealand were fundamentally different and separate 
from one another, even though they fought as an integrated military force at Gallipoli.45 Dennis 
McLean succinctly sums up this perspective : “The Australia-New Zealand story is about two 
adjacent peoples—of the same kind, and mostly from the same place on the other side of the 
world—who have grown apart rather than together.”46 
In contrast to the comparative approach, the transnational approach emphasises the 
interconnections between the two nations. Phillipa Mein Smith is one of the leading 
proponents of transnational history, and her work emphasises the importance of the trans-
Tasman connection.47 Donald Denoon has also made a significant contribution to the 
transnational perspective. He is concerned "with another, less emotive, dimension of Australian 
experience, namely relationships with some of our geographical neighbours.”48 While these 
authors explicitly question national borders, authors such as Anthony Hopkins challenge the 
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insularity of national historiography by using themes and issues that transcend national 
boundaries.49 These authors look beyond the nation in order to consider the identities and 
process that shape the world, but are often overlooked because they exist outside of the 
nation-state system.50 
This thesis synthesises these two approaches. It uses the comparative approach in order 
to create a broader and more sophisticated understanding of the nationalist rhetoric in each 
country, by comparing the two. To a certain extent the primary purpose of this project is to 
provide a more nuanced understanding of nationalism in Australia and New Zealand. At the 
same time, this thesis is structured around a series of events that were, for the most part, 
larger than Australia and New Zealand. One of the central arguments in this thesis is that these 
larger international events exerted a profound influence on Australia and New Zealand in the 
twentieth century, and particularly on the political rhetoric used by Australian and New Zealand 
governments. This thesis shows that the two governments were attempting to grapple with a 
range of issues and they invoked similar national identities to make sense of both the British 
and the post-British world and their place within it. The thesis uses a transnational perspective 
to explain the ongoing similarities between Australia and New Zealand and to consider the 
extent to which the logic of settler nationalisms that pervaded both societies were alike.  
This thesis invokes the term ‘British settler-nationalism’ to describe the nationalism that 
was in place in 1901 in Australia and New Zealand. This draws on Anthony Moran’s usage of the 
term “settler nationalism” to describe the Australian government’s nationalist ideology, the 
purpose of which was to maintain the hegemony of the white settler state. The addition of the 
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word ‘British’ reinforces the centrality of a British identity within the settler nationalisms of the 
Australian and New Zealand governments during the first half of the twentieth century.51 
The idea of Britishness also pervades this thesis. Neville Meaney defines it as “British 
race patriotism”, a discourse used to assert the Dominion’s place within the British Empire. It 
was both a backward looking assertion of shared race and culture between the antipodes and 
the metropole and a forward looking aspiration for the potential role Australia and New 
Zealand could play in the British Empire as they grew in strength. This thesis will use the term 
Britishness as short-hand for this particular form of race patriotism that invoked a particular 
vision of the world, the British Empire and the Dominion’s place within it.52 
Marian Simms has argued that “Australia and New Zealand should be viewed in an 
historical institutional context — one that is best described as path dependent.”53 Simms 
maintains that Australia and New Zealand were two independent states with the capacity to act 
autonomously and they adopted their own world views and invoked distinct political identities 
that evolved over time. Yet at the same time, there were a range of larger historical forces 
exerting a similar influence on the two nations. On a broad level, as two predominately British 
settler societies at the bottom of the Pacific, they were both affected by the same external 
challenges from the decline of the British Empire to the rise of Asia and faced many similar 
internal challenges as their population diversified and each nation was forced to reconsider the 
parameters of their national identities. This thesis uses this concept as a way to interpret the 
changes affecting Australia and New Zealand over the twentieth century and understand how it 
is that the nationalist rhetoric has on one level become much more distinct, while at the same 
time, there remain such remarkable similarities. 
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Structure of the thesis 
Each chapter in this thesis analyses a particular period in the twentieth century that was 
historically significant in Australia and New Zealand, comparing and contrasting the Australian 
and New Zealand governments’ rhetoric regarding each theme. The themes were determined 
by the most pressing issues in each time period. While there is a reasonable amount of 
consistency in the issues addressed in each chapter they also change as the twentieth century 
progresses. For example, during the first half of the century the occupation and settlement of 
land was an important part of the nationalist rhetoric and therefore the early chapters in the 
thesis consider this issue in detail, but by the end of the century this was no longer the case and 
as a result it does not receive the same attention in the later chapters. In contrast, indigenous 
issues and defence were just as important in 1901 as they were in the 1980s, thus these issues 
receive a similar level of analysis throughout the thesis.  
Chapter 1 – Federation in 1901: Defining the nation. The consolidation of the Commonwealth 
of Australia created two rhetorically divided ‘nations’ despite the persistence of trans-Tasman 
links and on-going similarities between the two societies. New Zealand defined itself as a new 
small country clinging to its sense of exceptionalism while in Australia the focus was on uniting 
the states, reshaping the imagined community, and protecting the newly formed nation from 
external threats. However, although some important differences developed between the two 
nations, both nationalisms worked within the same paradigm. Fundamentally, both 
governments attempted to assert and reinforce their control over their respective societies and 
they both attempted to stake out a prominent position for themselves within the British Empire 
and the world.  
Chapter 2 – World War One: Transnational-nationalism. World War One reaffirmed the 
importance of the imperial connection and the traditional loyalties that framed the two 
nations’ position within the world. Governments of both nations used nationalism in 
conjunction with imperialism to promote support for the war effort. They were largely 
successful. However, parts of Australian society were less than receptive towards the 
implementation of conscription. The Anzac legend was a powerful tool used to assert Australian 
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and New Zealand exceptionalism and distinctiveness within the imperial family. Despite heavy 
losses during the war, World War One caused little reappraisal of Australian and New Zealand 
interests or the viability of remaining ‘European islands’ on the edge of Asia. The governments 
of the two countries used World War One as an expression of their own unique character, even 
though the national identities they promoted were extremely similar.  
Chapter 3 — World War II: Challenges to the status quo. World War II marked a much more 
significant shift in policy for both governments. The threat of Japan, exemplified by the loss of 
Singapore and the bombing of Darwin, convinced the Curtin government to look towards the 
United States (US).This fear of invasion also led to a policy of ‘populate or perish’, prompting 
massive increases in immigration intakes, particularly the quota of non-Anglo-Celtic migrants. 
But New Zealand had a different experience of World War II. The war did not alter New 
Zealand’s sense of isolation from Asia. New Zealand continued to see Britain and, to a lesser 
extent the US, as its best source of defence. Finally, New Zealand did not significantly alter its 
immigration policy during this period, although it did receive larger numbers of migrants from 
the Pacific Islands and Māori did urbanise comprehensively during this period. Both 
governments’ response to World War II was to compromise, and to adapt their policies in order 
to maintain white hegemony in Australia and New Zealand.  
Chapter 4 —The decline of Great Britain: Threats to British settler nationalism in the 1960s. 
These two events fundamentally challenged long held assumptions in Australia and New 
Zealand about British military and economic support. It made both governments look further 
afield in order to guarantee military protection and diversify their economic opportunities. This 
period caused a great deal of concern in Australia and New Zealand. Successive governments 
attempted to draw upon well established notions of imperial solidarity in order to maintain 
British protection. This approach was ultimately unsuccessful. As the reality of British imperial 
decline was reluctantly accepted both nations began to re-imagine their relations with the 
region and the world. In doing so they were forced to re-imagine themselves.  
Chapter 5 — New Nationalism in Australia and New Zealand in the early 1970s.This period 
was dominated by an attempt to reconceptualise and challenge the notion of Australia and 
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New Zealand as white British nations. Australian and New Zealand governments faced a variety 
of new challenges and opportunities: the decline of Britain, an ethnically diversifying 
population, the rising economic importance of Asia and new international human rights 
principles and obligations, as well as increasingly assertive and effective indigenous movements 
which sought to challenge assimilationist policies. Both governments attempted to repackage 
the nation in order to address this new context, invoking an overtly nationalist approach that 
would have been inconceivable half a century earlier. In contrast to previous governments the 
Labo(u)r governments embraced the changes wrought by Britain’s decline and sought to 
encourage a new form of national identity based on progressive values. This signified a new 
willingness to allow indigenous peoples and immigrant groups to retain a distinctive identity, 
instead of being pushed to conform to the dominant culture. As both societies transformed, 
both governments attempted to create new and more inclusive forms of national identity.  
Chapter 6 — The ANZUS crisis. In 1984, the newly elected New Zealand Labour government 
placed a ban on the entry of all nuclear ships into its territories. This precipitated a crisis that 
led to the expulsion of New Zealand from the ANZUS defence agreement. The New Zealand 
government accepted its non-alignment and articulated a new geopolitical vision that 
emphasised independence, international co-operation and regional engagement. This was in 
contrast to the Australian government which remained committed to ANZUS and emphasised 
US military protection over all other foreign policy objectives. This difference reflected 
divergent perspectives in foreign policy that had existed throughout the twentieth century, but 
had become much more significant as the British Empire declined. Governments on both sides 
of the Tasman argued that their foreign policies were an extension of the national characters of 
their respective nations. This signified fundamental differences in the way the Australian and 
New Zealand governments viewed themselves and the world they lived in the 1980s. Yet the re-
emergence of close bilateral relations and a similar concern for creating a place for themselves 
within a fast changing world was also evidence of ongoing similarities.  
Chapter 7 —Celebrating the nation 1988 and 1990. This chapter provides an opportunity to 
assess the attempts of the Australian and New Zealand governments to reframe the nation at 
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the end of the twentieth century. The Australian bicentenary and the 150th anniversary of the 
signing of the Treaty of Waitangi provided opportunities for the two governments to shape 
their conception of the nation and to attempt to reconcile different groups and competing 
interests in each society. This chapter assesses the extent to which the construction of the 
nation in Australia and New Zealand has moved from a racialist to a post-racialist position. The 
differences in race relations were most stark during this period. At the same time, the two 
governments faced similar pressures and used similar strategies to address those pressures, as 
both governments attempted to define a post-racial post-British national identity.  
Clearly, this project draws upon comparative and transnational perspectives, analysing 
nationalist rhetoric in Australia and New Zealand, and assessing the extent to which their 
nationalist rhetoric diverged. This thesis places that change into a wider context and considers 
the internal and external forces that influenced this process. By doing this, this thesis will 
explain two seemingly contradictory processes wherein fundamental differences in geography 
and demography caused nationalist rhetoric to diverge in substantial ways, while the shared 
wider paradigm caused the Australian and New Zealand governments to address similar 
challenges, and as a result invoke nationalisms that reflected those broader similarities.  
The first chapter of the thesis considers Australian federation in 1901, working to both 
establish the context for the rest of the thesis, and to analyse how similar or different the 
nationalist rhetoric was in 1901 when Australia had only just become a unified nation.  
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Chapter One 
Federation in 1901: Defining the nation 
 
Introduction 
In 1901, the creation of a politically unified Australian nation marked a new stage of the nation-
building process in Australia. It presented an opportunity for the newly formed government to 
articulate the challenges and opportunities that the Australian nation faced and to construct its 
version of an Australian national identity. In New Zealand, the division of Australasia into two 
separate nations caused the Seddon government to justify New Zealand’s difference from 
Australia and engage in its own nation-building process. As a result, Federation provides a 
powerful moment through which to analyse the way the Australian and New Zealand 
governments invoked and defined their respective national identities.  
There were some obvious differences between the two. These derived from the 
differing ethnic composition of the two societies and the different geographic position, and 
hence distinct geopolitical perspectives, of the two countries.1 These differences also 
manifested in different attitudes towards their indigenous inhabitants; as a result the two 
governments had distinct attitudes towards racial conflict. The different geopolitical 
perspectives created a greater sense of insecurity and threat in Australia – primarily due to 
Australia’s greater proximity to Asia – than was the case in New Zealand. At the same time, 
however, governments in both countries used nationalist rhetoric that invoked a similar form of 
settler nationalism. This nationalism was extremely pro-British, committed to assimilation, 
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focussed on making the land productive, and was more broadly intended to maintain white 
settler hegemony in the antipodes. Both governments argued that their nations were linked by 
race and culture to Britain and this was intended to insulate them from their geographic 
realities. This chapter discusses the differences in the nationalisms used by the two 
governments and considers the underlying similarities.  
 As the starting point for this thesis, this chapter sets the scene and establishes the 
parameters in which an analysis of nationalism and political rhetoric takes place. More 
specifically, this chapter establishes the common framework described in the introduction to 
this thesis. This argument considers the extent to which the pervasive power of Britishness in 
Australia and New Zealand explains the similarities in the outlook and political rhetoric of the 
governments of the two nations in the first half of the century.2 
The first two sections of this chapter consider the main differences in the political 
rhetoric in the two parliaments and explain the underlying differences that this rhetoric 
reflected. The way the two governments portrayed their indigenous populations differed in 
important ways, and this was indicative of their different attitudes towards race relations. This 
also fostered different attitudes towards the non-white peoples of the Pacific, where the New 
Zealand government took a more inclusive attitude than the Australian government. The two 
governments also described the position of their nations differently and each invoked unique 
geopolitical perspectives. The Australian government was more likely to support the US and 
articulated larger aspirations for the Australian nation, while the New Zealand government 
framed New Zealand as an idyllic and superior British nation, whose distinctiveness derived 
from its superiority rather than its size or power.  
 Yet the two governments drew upon a similar British settler nationalism.3 This 
manifested in the equal commitment of both governments to the assimilation of their 
indigenous inhabitants and any non-British immigrant groups, and in aspirations to create 
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progressive and prosperous Dominions based on primary exports and land ownership. Despite 
the differences in geopolitical outlook, both governments framed their nations as British 
nations on the edge of Asia, defined in opposition to Asia despite their geographic position. 
Federation required both the Australian and New Zealand governments to explicitly define their 
nation, and the nationalistic rhetoric during this period reflected issues that both united and 
divided Australasia. Just as importantly, this event highlighted the constructed nature of 
national identity and the extent to which both governments were embarking upon an active 
process of nation-building.  
Race relations and perceptions of the Pacific 
The New Zealand and the Australian parliamentary debates of 1901 reveal the different 
position Indigenous peoples occupied in each country. The Commonwealth Constitution 
inaugurated at Federation prevented Indigenous Australians from featuring within the new 
federal government’s agenda.4 However, the fact that Indigenous issues were left to the states 
says much about the position of Indigenous Australians within the newly-formed nation. Most 
Australians perceived Indigenous Australians as a problem that needed to be dealt with, rather 
than as a legitimate element of Australian society.5 More importantly, the Australian 
government portrayed Indigenous Australians as relics of a previous era, their decline lamented 
yet also considered inevitable.6 The government did not portray Indigenous Australians as a 
threat to white Australia, but instead cast them as the unfortunate victims of history, unable to 
withstand the superiority of White Australia.7 White Australians were allegedly not responsible 
for this process, because Indigenous marginalisation was the result of ironclad historical laws as 
defined by Social Darwinist theory.8 In the federal government, Indigenous Australians were not 
part of the settler nationalism that influenced Australian identity, so the newly federated 
government publically ignored them.  
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 In New Zealand in 1901, by contrast, Māori occupied a much more prominent position. 
In parliamentary debates, Māori issues and policies represented a significant proportion of the 
legislation passed by the government, and the government portrayed Māori policy as an 
integral part of the discourse promoting New Zealand’s exceptionalism. Māori had four seats in 
the New Zealand Parliament in 1867.9 In Australia, Indigenous peoples were marginalised, both 
symbolically and literally.10 In New Zealand, Māori were marginalised within society, but 
symbolically they had far greater importance. The New Zealand Parliament passed a number of 
pieces of legislation relating to Māori in 1901.11 By far the most significant was an Act adjusting 
the legislation of the land courts, which determined who controlled the remaining Māori 
landholdings.12 Most academics argue that the result of the land courts proceedings was to 
wrest significant remaining land from Māori control and give it to Pakeha for ‘settlement’.13 
However, political rhetoric portrayed the action of the land courts as a progressive policy 
intended to aid Māori. William Russell’s (Hawke’s Bay), the Leader of the Opposition, 
comments reflected this: 
There are persons who, like myself, believe the Native is fully capable of high 
cultivation, and that under proper but temporary restrictions he can be 
trusted to take care of his land, and become a healthy helpful member of 
society, instead of degenerating, as he must, for in this world there is no 
standing still.14 
The Liberal government under Prime Minister Richard Seddon portrayed the land courts as 
indicative of the superior race relations in New Zealand: 
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[T]he Treaty of Waitangi … is one of the most beneficent and generous 
measures that a dominant power could give the Natives, and, if anything 
more redounds to the credit of the British people, it is that when they were 
negotiating with the Natives for the sovereignty of this country, knowing at 
the same time that if the sovereignty was not handed over to them it would 
be all the worse for the Natives, and these Islands would have fallen under the 
control of other Powers who would not have given to the Natives that 
consideration which it has been the effort of the British Government to award 
the Māoris.15 
The New Zealand government invoked their superior race relations as a way of differentiating 
themselves from other colonial projects, specifically Australia.16 
 Explicit references to Māori by the New Zealand government afford an interesting 
comparison with Australian policy. Despite enjoying full enfranchisement, it is clear that Māori 
were not equal partners with Pakeha in early twentieth-century New Zealand.The four Māori 
seats did not represent the demographic significance of the Māori population.17 Māori were 
also not in a position to substantially impact government policy and they suffered from a 
variety of forms of discrimination in New Zealand society.18 However, Māori were not silent 
within the New Zealand political establishment. During the discussion of the Māori Lands 
Administration Bill those members who criticised the effect of the Bill on Māori made an effort 
to use Māori phrases. There was an obvious intimacy between Pakeha and Maori worlds in the 
New Zealand parliament; there was no corresponding familiarity with Indigenous Australian 
culture or language in the Australian parliament. The designated Māori seats ensured that 
Māori voices were heard in the Parliament, and the creation of a special status for Māori was 
significantly different from other colonial nations: this attested to New Zealand’s supposed 
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superiority.19 The reality was that the concessions were minor and they did not inhibit the 
direction of Pakeha policy. The New Zealand government adorned itself with Māori 
iconography and culture and made countless references to the superiority of ‘our natives’, 
while not allowing any challenge to the sovereignty and absolute supremacy of the Pakeha 
colonial state.20 
 This difference in rhetoric also applied to both governments’ attitudes towards the 
Asia-Pacific region. During this period, both governments asserted the right of their nation to 
acquire colonies in the Pacific, and their attitudes towards these possessions illustrated these 
differences. The Australian government voted to extend its territory in the Pacific, while 
simultaneously expelling Pacific Island workers from Queensland by passing the Pacific Islands 
Labourers Act (1901). This Act banned all Pacific Islanders from migrating to Australia and 
legislated the deportation of all ‘kanaka’ labour in Australia.21 The government introduced this 
Bill despite significant concern that, without Pacific Island labourers, Queensland’s sugar 
industry would collapse.22 This is indicative of the strength of the rhetoric surrounding the 
White Australia policy. The federal government considered any interaction between white 
Australia and non-white peoples as damaging. The Australian Prime Minister Alfred Deakin 
argued that:  
A united race means not only that its members can intermix, intermarry and 
associate without degradation on either side, but implies one inspired by the 
same ideals, and an aspiration towards the same ideals, of a people 
possessing the same general cast of character.23 
The Australian government was willing to sacrifice economic development in order to retain the 
purity of the white race. In New Zealand, the government enacted its own policy towards the 
Pacific, but instead of excluding Pacific Islanders from New Zealand, it voted to extend the 
borders of the New Zealand colony to incorporate the Cook Islands and other neighbouring 
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Pacific territories and give New Zealand citizenship to all Pacific Islanders under the 
government’s control.24 Their understanding of the result of racial mixing contrasted with that 
of the Australian government. The Liberal government depicted Pacific Islanders as similar to 
Māori. The Minister for Education Campbell Walker (Canterbury) argued that the Pacific 
Islands have been reliant on New Zealand for most of their government, and 
certainly most of their light and leading, and, by a curious condition of things, 
the inhabitants of the islands are the first cousins, or cousins a short distance 
removed from our own Māori fellow-subjects in New Zealand.25 
The idea that Pacific Islanders were the first cousins of Māori was a common rhetorical strategy 
that justified New Zealand’s role in the Pacific.  
 The Australian and New Zealand governments’ attitudes towards racial miscegenation 
were clearly different. Both governments’ perceptions of race were rooted in Social Darwinism, 
but Indigenous Australians and Māori sat in different positions in the racial hierarchy.26 Race 
relations in Australia led the government to see all non-whites as beyond the pale, and that any 
intermixing between the races would damage White Australia. New Zealand’s experience, on 
the other hand, confirmed their belief that the nation could incorporate the indigenous peoples 
of the Pacific.27 For Australian parliamentarians, the inferiority of Pacific Islanders made them 
ineligible for citizenship, whereas in New Zealand the close genetic relationship between Māori 
and other neighbouring Pacific Islanders made it conceivable that the Pacific Islanders should 
become New Zealand citizens.  
 Within each of the parliaments, the governments created a rhetorical link between 
their attitude towards their indigenous inhabitants and their attitudes towards their non-white 
neighbours. Race relations in Australia and New Zealand affected the two governments’ foreign 
policy perspectives and this was indicative of the different self-images the Australian and New 
                                                                
24
 NZPD, Council, vol. 118 (1901): 1081. 
25
Ibid., 1076. 
26
Genevieve Lloyd, "No One's Land: Australia and the Philosophical Imagination," Hypatia, 15, 2 (2000), 33; Tony Ballantyne, 
"Race and the Webs of Empire: Aryanism from India to the Pacific," Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History, 2, 3 (2001), 12. 
27
 NZPD, House, vol. 118 (1901): 664. 
29 
 
Zealand governments promoted. William Napier (City of Auckland) provides a good example of 
this strategy: “Of course, the term ‘Māori’ will embrace our fellow-subjects of the Cook Islands, 
which are included in the extended boundaries of New Zealand.”28 This illustrates the rhetorical 
linkage between exceptional race relations in New Zealand and the extension of those superior 
race relations to Pacific Islanders. Conversely, racial antagonism was taken for granted over 
Australia’s relations with Asia and the Pacific. For Thomas Ewing (Richmond) this animosity was 
inevitable and “[t]here is between them and us that mysterious racial hatred, originating from 
no one knows where, but deep-rooted and strong.”29 Moreover, the government linked the 
fate of Indigenous Australians with the need to exclude Asian immigrants. Alexander Matheson 
(Western Australia) gives a good example of this rhetoric: “We have taken this country from the 
blacks, and we made it a white man’s country, and intend to keep it a white man’s country.”30 
Geopolitical perspectives 
This greater sense of threat in Australia was about more than racial miscegenation; it reflected 
ongoing concerns in Australia about the northern half of the continent. The tropical climate and 
proximity of northern Australia to Asia generated a great deal of anxiety about the strength of 
the white Australian settlement and paucity of population.31 The New Zealand government 
shared Australia’s concern. It felt uncertain about the capacity of the white population to 
occupy and develop the north of Australia without undergoing “racial degeneration”.32 This 
rhetoric was indicative of the different geopolitical concerns of the two governments and the 
greater immediate sense of threat and insecurity in the discourse about Australia’s geographic 
position as a sparsely-occupied continent on the edge of Asia.  
 Geopolitical factors played a part in New Zealand’s decision not to join the Australian 
Federation. Those opposed to New Zealand joining federation argued that the tropical climate 
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of Australia meant that it could never be a purely white man’s country.33 Disagreement 
surrounding this issue emerged in Australia during the passage of the Pacific Island Labourers 
Act (1901).34 Although the central aim of the Act was to exclude Pacific Islanders from Australia, 
the real debate surrounded white settlers’ occupation of the north. A number of 
parliamentarians argued that the sugar cane industry could not continue without Pacific Island 
labour. They felt that the sacrifice of the sugar industry was a small price to pay for the 
maintenance of white Australia.35 Other politicians, particularly Labor Members of Parliament 
(MPs) like James Wilkinson (Moreton), argued: 
I am sorry, indeed, to hear ... [that] there was part of this continent, in the 
northern territory of South Australia, which was unfit in certain occupations 
for the labour of white men. As an Australian native I refuse to believe that, 
because the white man can accommodate himself to any circumstance.36 
MPs disagreed about the impact that environmental factors would have on Australia’s 
development. New Zealand politicians were not so conflicted. It was an article of faith in 
colonial New Zealand that their ‘superior climate’ had created a better class of colonists.37 
Consequently, the Leader of the Opposition William Russell (Hawkes Bay), argued that 
Australia’s tropical climate meant that a white Australia was impossible:  
Man may make whatever law he chooses; he may decide there shall be no 
Chinaman, no Indian coolie ... But above the puny efforts of man there is the 
inevitable law of nature, and tropical Australia will in the future be cultivated 
and occupied by coloured races and not by Europeans.38 
New Zealand MPs contrasted Australia’s incapacity to maintain its racial purity with New 
Zealand, which they portrayed as a unique and unblemished colony. Ironically, in Australia this 
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insecurity added impetus towards Federation, believing it would settle the “northern 
question”.39 In New Zealand, the spectre of racial contamination from the unsecured north 
encouraged the government to remain aloof from federation.40 
This contrast reflected the different geopolitical outlooks of the two nations’ 
governments; differences that both shaped the way they framed the position of their nations 
within the world, and the geographic, demographic and strategic challenges the two 
governments faced. This difference was also reflected in the way the two governments 
described the future of each nation within the Pacific. The Australian government hoped 
Australia would become a great and powerful nation that could rival the United States, 
adopting its own version of the “Monroe Doctrine” in order to project the nation’s influence in 
the Pacific Islands and parts of South East Asia.41 The government’s vision for the future 
assumed that Australia would remain part of the British Empire, but that power and influence 
would shift further south and form an equilibrium with the United Kingdom.42 A number of 
elements of this vision are striking, but what is most interesting is the idea that in the future 
Australia would rival the United States.43 The government’s vision for the future of Australia 
was that of a racially pure, powerful nation in the Pacific. 
Australia was not the only new nation constructing visions of grandeur. The New 
Zealand government was also reconceptualising its place within the Empire and the world. 
Central to this new position for New Zealand was the creation of an empire of its own. Seddon 
wanted to expand the borders of New Zealand to incorporate the Pacific Islands. This empire 
would protect New Zealand from the expansion of foreign powers in the region and extend 
New Zealand’s strength and authority. In discussing the administration of the Cook Islands 
Seddon argued that: 
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The trade with the islands, I say, would be greatly improved by New Zealand 
taking control, and seeing that we have these islands administered and 
managed in the best interest of the islanders, and, as I believe, in the best 
interests of the colony, and for the good of the Empire itself.44 
This policy was indicative of the Pacific-centred policy of the Seddon government and his grand 
vision of the future of New Zealand.45 This vision was intended to counterbalance the new 
Australian federation. The projection of New Zealand’s influence in the Pacific was an effective 
way to justify New Zealand’s independence from Australia. Some New Zealanders wanted to 
join the Australian federation because they did not want to be marginalised and lose influence 
in the region.46 Seddon promoted a vision of the nation where New Zealand would equal, and 
perhaps surpass, the Australian federation, therefore there was no reason to cede 
independence to the inferior colonials across the Tasman.  
Seddon’s vision of an empire in the Pacific directly conflicted with the Australian 
government’s vision for the South Pacific. Australian politicians would not countenance the 
construction of a second empire in the Pacific. The Deputy Leader of the Free Trade party 
William McMillan (Wentworth) argued: 
[I]f we create another federation alongside ourselves in the Pacific, we create 
possible differences between two Federations in the same geographic area; 
and if there is friction between two of the outlying parts of the British Empire, 
it will be almost impossible for British conciliation to prevent a rupture. 
Therefore I do hope in the first place that a modus vivendi will be created by 
which New Zealand may be able to come into the Commonwealth of 
Australia, and that ultimately New Zealand, Fiji, Australia and the Islands of 
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the Pacific will be one great federated power, strong in itself and 
strengthening to the empire.47 
The Australian government objected to the ‘division’ of the Australasian colonies; instead they 
hoped New Zealand would join the Commonwealth.48 Australian politicians interpreted 
Seddon’s imperialism as an overt challenge to their conception of Australia as a powerful new 
nation dominating the South Pacific.49 They resisted the idea of a divided Pacific. The 
governments of New Zealand and Australia articulated different visions of the future for their 
nations. The Australian government foresaw a future Australia rivalling the established great 
powers and incorporating all British subjects in the South Pacific in a new empire.50 The New 
Zealand government constructed an alternative vision where New Zealand could remain 
happily independent of federal domination by creating its own superior federation in the 
Pacific, in opposition to Australia. 
 Australia and New Zealand were united in their commitment to the British Empire, but 
the two governments had differing foreign policy objectives, particularly in relation to defence. 
Defence was an important issue in the first year of Federation and the Australian government 
passed a Bill that signalled a willingness to shoulder more of the burden of the nation’s 
defence, and to create a more independent defence force.51 Asia loomed large as the most 
significant threat to Australia’s security.52 Senator Richard O’Connor (NSW) portrayed Australia 
as a large continent, sparsely populated, sitting on the edge of Asia with“400,000,000 Asiatics 
within a week’s sail of her shores.”53 Insecurity over the white population’s occupation of the 
vast Australian continent was clear in the debates over defence. Ever-present was the idea that 
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just as the British deprived Indigenous Australians of their land, white Australia was in danger of 
being dispossessed by the ‘Asian hordes’.54 The government was also concerned about the 
threat of other European powers, but by far the greatest concern was Asia. Senator Staniford 
Smith (Western Australia), a member of the Free Trade Party argued that: 
Self-preservation is a sentiment which touches the profoundest instincts of an 
individual or a nation, and if the question is not dealt with boldly and 
fearlessly now when the Asiatic nations are waking up, there will be an influx 
of coloured people which will mean an alteration in our national destiny, or 
possibly the obliteration of our national existence.55 
Australia’s position in the world was viewed as precarious, and as a result the Australian 
government had to be constantly on guard in order to protect the white nation from invasion. 
The New Zealand government did not share Australia’s fear of an Asian invasion. The 
major threat from its perspective was the Pacific. The Seddon government wanted to develop 
an empire or federation in the Pacific in order to keep the other great powers away from New 
Zealand. Prime Minister Richard Seddon put New Zealand’s case forcefully: 
Did not Germany feel that the holding of Samoa was of vast importance? I say, 
most decidedly she did. Did not America insist on maintaining Pagopago. And 
why? Because it was of vast importance to her. And did not our nation regard 
the holding of one of these islands as being of vast importance? Of how much 
greater importance is it to the Empire and to our colony that we should for all 
time stop any nation from taking these islands.56 
This difference in perspective was due primarily to geography. Australia is a continent very 
close to Asia, while New Zealand consists of two large islands at the southern end of the Pacific. 
Defence for Australia was a much more immediate concern and thus the Commonwealth was 
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less willing to leave defence entirely in the hands of the British government.57 New Zealand, on 
the other hand, was not as concerned with the threat of direct invasion. Furthermore, New 
Zealand’s small size meant that any attempt at creating an independent navy or defence force 
would have been extremely difficult and largely ineffective.58 Therefore, the most sensible form 
of defence for New Zealand lay with close relations with the ‘Mother Country’, while the 
Australian government felt it had to take a more independent stance.59 This difference did not 
derive out of a fundamental cultural difference between Australia and New Zealand in 1901. 
Instead, it was the result of the different geographic position of each nation. 
These themes illustrate the interplay between rhetoric and reality, between the very 
real political and strategic calculations that the Australian and New Zealand governments made 
and the ideologies and worldviews that framed and distorted the perceptions of their position 
within the world. Race relations in the two countries were different in important ways and this 
manifested in the different position of Māori and Indigenous Australians and the different ways 
the two governments viewed Asia and the Pacific. Likewise, in the Australian Parliament, 
Australia’s proximity to Asia and its supposed empty spaces caused greater anxiety and fear of 
Asia. At the same time, Australia’s larger size gave the government greater aspirations for 
Australia and they described Australia’s future as rivalling the United States as a great power in 
the region. New Zealand’s small size meant that Seddon portrayed New Zealand as a superior 
colony whose distinctiveness was based on its Britishness and its superior race relations, rather 
than its capacity to become a great power. These differences were significant in 1901; more so 
later in the century.  
Britishness through assimilation and immigration restrictions 
It is sometimes easy, when undertaking comparative research, to focus on the differences 
between two nations, ignoring the underlying similarities. This thesis shows how the 
differences outlined above existed within a similar framework. The second half of this chapter 
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argues that policies from assimilation and defence, to relations with Great Britain, indicate a 
similar set of concerns based upon a British settler nationalism that undermines simplistic 
assumptions about the differences between the nationalisms invoked by the Australian and 
New Zealand governments at the turn of the century. Despite the differences in race relations 
described above, the two governments adopted largely similar assimilationist rhetoric, focussed 
on maintaining the British character of each nation and unequivocal about the superiority of 
Britishness over all other cultures and ethnicities.60 
 The British Empire and a larger British identity underwrote all aspects of the Australian 
and New Zealand governments’ rhetoric surrounding national identity. They did not see any 
tension between their Britishness and their colonial identity; in fact, for most colonials such a 
dichotomy was absurd.61 Britishness as a concept was integral to Australian and New Zealand 
identity and was not easily separated from other local forms of identity. This fact, combined 
with both nations’ heavy reliance on Britain for defence and trade, meant that both 
governments went to great lengths to assert their loyalty to the British Empire.62 Australia had 
more of a history of radical republicanism, which was at times associated with the federation 
movement, but the Australian government unambiguously emphasised its loyalty to the 
monarchy and lauded its position within the Empire.63 Both governments linked the Britishness 
of their respective nations with their right to British military protection and access to British 
markets.64 Britishness was both a racial and cultural identity that determined the boundaries of 
the imagined community and an articulation of the particular geopolitical position of each 
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nation and the consequent policies that were required to protect each nation. Although 
Australian and New Zealand governments greatly valued their close relationship with the 
United Kingdom, this did not mean they were entirely subservient to the British government.65 
Both countries asserted and protected their right to self-government and they both identified 
areas of national policy, which they defended against imperial intervention. Each governments 
attempted expansion into the Pacific is a useful example of this process. They wished to extend 
their control over as much of the Pacific as possible and they were willing to challenge Imperial 
policy in order to achieve their objectives. However, they were not willing to threaten their 
close relationship with Britain. Some politicians in Australia and New Zealand went so far as to 
argue that there could be no conflict of interest between Britain and Australia or Britain and 
New Zealand, because they were all part of the same Imperial family.66 This shows how deeply 
ingrained loyalty to Great Britain was in Australia and New Zealand, and how British identities 
co-existed with national identities.  
 A crucial part of maintaining this British connection and protecting the British 
character of each nation required the implementation of assimilation. Both governments 
enthusiastically employed this policy and framed the nation-building process in each country as 
contingent on successful assimilation. The current literature on race relations in Australia and 
New Zealand tends to construe indigenous relations as essentially the same, because 
indigenous peoples in both settler societies were deprived of their land and the colonial state 
subordinated their interests in favour of the white majority.67 The intention of this 
transnational approach is to undermine the commonly held assumption that New Zealand had 
superior race relations and, therefore, did not need to address indigenous disadvantage.68 
However, this transnational approach can conceal the vast differences between the colonies. In 
Australia, the state and society assumed that Indigenous Australians would largely die out, and 
those who did not die would be assimilated into the white population through policies such as 
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child removal.69 Implicit within this perspective was the absolute inferiority of the Indigenous 
Australians compared to the European community.70 In New Zealand, the prevailing attitude 
was that Māori and Pakeha would continue to intermarry until there were no ‘pure blood’ 
Māori left and New Zealand was populated with ‘better Britons with a tan’.71 It is important to 
note that this theory assumed that Pakeha would be ethnically and culturally dominant, but 
there was space for a degree of hybridity in which Māori culture and ethnicity would survive. 
Many New Zealanders believed that Māori were the most advanced ‘natives’ in the world and, 
therefore, they could become a part of the white community without any racial deterioration.72 
 At the same time however, while the sentiment in the two nations was obviously 
different, the intended purpose of both policies was the cultural and political absorption of 
both indigenous groups. The New Zealand government did not recognise the tino 
rangatiratanga of Māori and wanted only to protect those aspects of Māori culture that were 
useful for tourism or museum collections.73 Both governments were committed to assimilation 
and this is indicative of the similar ideas informing settler nationalism in both contexts. In the 
end, they pursued policies to consolidate and solidify white control of Australia and New 
Zealand at the expense of their indigenous inhabitants.  
 Assimilation and the maintenance of the British character of each nation also informed 
immigration policies: in both countries immigration policy was linked with the formation of 
national identity. The New Zealand government introduced a Bill restricting Asian immigration 
in 1899 and Australia introduced a similar Bill in 1901.74 Despite the different attitudes of the 
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two governments towards Asia, they enacted almost identical policies.75 The Australian debates 
produced more vitriol than the New Zealand debates, but the rhetoric and perception of Asian 
immigration in 1901 was similar. Both governments argued that Asian immigration would 
undermine the foundation of the nation by challenging the racial character and the living 
standards of the ‘working man’s paradise’.76 Alfred Deakin (Ballarat) made the significance of 
the immigration debate clear: “We here find ourselves touching the profoundest instinct of 
individual or nation — the instinct of self-preservation — for it is nothing less than the national 
manhood, the national character, and the national future that are at stake.”77 Likewise, the 
New Zealand government was unequivocal about the relationship between the restriction of 
racial homogeneity and the maintenance of the racial character of New Zealand. Alexander 
Hogg (Masterton), a back bencher in the Liberal Party, responded to criticism of the new 
legislation: 
The intention of this Bill is to prevent the country being deluged by an alien 
race that certainly would not tend to promote the welfare of the population. 
What is the position in the City of Wellington and in some of the other large 
centres of population at the present time? They are reeking with Chinese.78 
The only noticeable difference in the political rhetoric in the two countries was the level of fear 
surrounding Asian immigration. Australian parliamentarians saw Asian immigration as an 
imminent and grave threat to the Australian nation, whereas the New Zealand government 
portrayed Asian immigration as an issue to address, rather than a serious threat to the nation.79 
The restriction of Asian immigration plays a much larger role in Australian historiography than 
in New Zealand historiography, because Asia has loomed large in Australia’s national 
imagination throughout the twentieth century.80 Despite the two governments’ differing 
perceptions of Asia, they held similar assumptions about the best way to maintain and protect 
the racial character and national identities of Australia and New Zealand.  
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 A final part of this Britishness was expressed through both governments’ reliance on 
British protection above all else and the framing of each nation as a British outpost on the edge 
of Asia. Despite the differences between the two governments’ attitudes towards their colonial 
possessions, they also invoked the same colonial rhetoric and justified their acquisitions of 
colonial possessions in similar terms. William Wilks (Dally) in the Australian Parliament argued 
“that British New Guinea would stand as a buffer between Australia and the eastern nations.”81 
Likewise, William Russel (Hawkes Bay) supported the New Zealand government’s annexation of 
Pacific Islands: 
[W]e have allowed the German Empire to come in and establish itself as a 
naval and military power in the direct track of our commerce, throwing its 
shadow over this colony ... I believe in the policy of the Government to 
incorporate as many as possible of the Islands of the Pacific with New 
Zealand.82 
Both sets of policies were primarily intended to create a buffer zone between themselves and 
the rest of the non-British world. They saw foreign powers and highly populated Asia as a 
perpetual threat to their Arcadian nation-building projects and they tried to extend their 
influence in the Pacific without raising the ire of the Home Office. This common set of concerns 
indicates both governments’ sense of geopolitical threat wherein they disavowed their 
geography in order to protect the racial character of each British nation. Despite these 
realpolitik calculations, both governments also framed their colonial projects as the fulfilment 
of the ‘white man’s burden.’83 They saw themselves at the forefront of the most advanced 
Empire in the world and thought they were fulfilling a civilising mission to uplift the backwards 
‘natives’ in the Pacific.84 This is indicative of similarities in the settler nationalisms in Australia 
and New Zealand, where the settler states could pursue their own national self-interest, while 
proclaiming their own superiority and affirming their place within the British Empire. 
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 Just as the Australian and New Zealand governments had the same fundamental 
concerns about their colonial possessions, they were both equally obsessed with ensuring 
British military protection over all other concerns. In supporting the government’s Defence Bill 
(1901) Richard Edwards (Oxley), a back bencher in the Protectionist Party, made Australia’s 
choice clear: 
[T]he expenditure that would be involved in providing a fleet adequate to the 
protection of our coasts would be utterly beyond the reach of this 
Commonwealth. For some years to come it would be wise for us to leave 
ourselves in the hands of Great Britain, so far as naval defence is concerned.85 
When Richard Seddon discussed New Zealand’s contribution to the Boer War, he asked: “The 
British flag is our protection; without belonging to the Empire where would New Zealand be?”86 
Despite Australia’s proximity to Asia, both governments equally affirmed the centrality of 
British protection for their national survival and during this period distance from Europe 
exacerbated a sense of insecurity in New Zealand, and a desire for British military protection.  
 This shared reliance on Britain stemmed from the belief that both Australia and New 
Zealand were European nations on the edge of Asia and the Pacific. This was an essential aspect 
of the settler nationalism espoused by the two governments. It was premised on the protection 
of the European — and particularly British — racial character of both nations, with the 
assumption that this required constant vigilance against the threat of invasion from ‘the North’ 
both from other great powers and from Asian nations. For example, Hume Cooke (Burke, Free 
Trade Party) in the Australian Parliament emphasised this idea that Australia was a British 
nation transplanted into the antipodes:  
[Britain] is already well aware of the sympathy which all Australia entertains 
with regard to the affairs of the Empire; she knows full well that with respect 
to any matter with which she is connected, Australia is with her heart and 
soul; and when Australia makes this demand for her preservation, for the 
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solidarity of the British people, for the successful establishment and the 
carrying on of a British nation in these southern seas, she will not refuse it.87 
This rejection of geographic realities was to become increasingly important throughout the 
twentieth century, and governments on both sides of the Tasman reconsidered the viability of 
the ongoing repudiation of their own geographic positions. This indicates the extent to which 
larger transnational forces shaped the challenges each government faced; the similarities in the 
invocation of their geopolitical identities and responses to those challenges reflected the 
broader framework in which the two governments operated, and the similar rhetorical arsenal 
available to politicians in both nations. 
Federation: Defining the nation and constructing national identities  
Australian Federation provided an opportunity for both the Australian and New Zealand 
governments to define and describe their newly founded nations. The New Zealand 
government articulated a clear vision of New Zealand society that was distinct from Australia. 
However, ambiguity and disagreement about the ideological borders that divided the Australian 
and New Zealand nations continued. Rather than merely recognising long-standing differences 
between Australia and New Zealand, both the Australian and New Zealand governments were 
involved in an active process of nation-building that required the reordering of identities in line 
with newly created national boundaries.  
 In the build-up towards Federation, the proponents of Federation strongly advocated 
the inclusion of New Zealand in the new federal government. They even held that the 
Australian Federation would not be complete until New Zealand joined the new nation. In the 
Australasian Federation Convention Nicholas Brown (Tasmania) went so far as to argue that: 
There is no doubt that it is desirable that the union to be formed should be an 
Australasian union, and it will, I think, be deplorable if one important member 
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of these Australasian communities should, for any reason, think it necessary 
to stand out.88 
In the federation conventions in 1890 and 1891, the Australian delegates were considerably 
more enthusiastic about New Zealand joining the federation than were the New Zealand 
delegates. The New Zealand delegates argued that it was preferable for the Australian colonies 
to federate as soon as possible and that in the long-run New Zealand should join. However, 
William Russell, a New Zealand delegate, felt that in the short term: 
There are very many points in which the colony which I represent would be 
glad to join in happy concord with the continental colonies, but to say 
absolutely that that colony would be prepared, at any rate for the next few 
years, to merge its young manhood in the more mature life of the Australian 
Colonies would be to lead the Conference to believe what I cannot hope.89 
This typifies the response of the New Zealand delegates. They were enthusiastic about 
maintaining close relations with Australia, but they also feared losing political independence. 
Conversely, the Australian delegates were emphatic that the correct place for New Zealand was 
within the federal embrace. They perceived New Zealand as an integral part of Australia and 
they felt that if New Zealand stayed out of federation it would damage the Australasian world. 
They argued that by isolating itself from the rest of the Australian colonies New Zealand was 
creating an artificial barrier between members of the same imperial family.90 
 The most striking example of the resilience of the trans-Tasman world during and after 
Federation was the process of legislative transfer between Australia and New Zealand. Phillipa 
Mein Smith has comprehensively analysed this process of transfer, interpreting it is as evidence 
of the state of interdependence that existed between Australia and New Zealand.91 This 
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constant interaction challenges the notion that Australia and New Zealand were two separate 
and isolated nation-states. The rhetoric surrounding the adoption of progressive legislation in 
Australia and New Zealand confirms this theory. In 1901, New Zealand was leading the way in 
progressive legislation.92 For example, in the Australian debates, the proponents of the Old Age 
Pension Act, most notably Sir John Quick (Bendigo, Protectionist Party), chairman of the first 
federal tariff commission, drew upon the New Zealand government’s success in this area as 
clear evidence that Australia should follow suit:  
I invite the attention of honourable members to the fact that a law 
substantially similar to that which is now proposed by the government has 
been operating in New Zealand, under the able administration of Mr Richard 
Seddon, one of the greatest democrats Australia has ever produced.93 
This shows the exchange of population and ideas between Australia and New Zealand and the 
strength of the Trans-Tasman community of interest.94 No one in the Parliament suggested that 
the New Zealand experience was not applicable to Australia. Even after Federation in 1901, the 
Australian government did not perceive any substantial divisions between New Zealand and 
Australia. Despite New Zealand’s obstinate refusal to join the federation, the Australian 
government considered New Zealand part of the ‘Australasian world’. The same race, culture 
and political institutions signalled New Zealand’s fundamental similarity with Australia, despite 
New Zealand’s political independence. 
 The Australian government was quite explicitly trying to reorder the population’s 
loyalties by placing the concept of the Australian nation at the centre of their identity. In order 
to achieve this, politicians had to redefine the importance of state loyalties, diminishing the 
importance of the dearly-held pan-British identities of most Australians.95 The federal 
government did not create the concept of an Australian identity out of thin air. Instead, it acted 
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to prioritise this identity above all other identities. Even after the creation of the 
Commonwealth, the boundaries of the concept of Australia as a nation were still fluid; this is 
clearly exemplified by the hope that New Zealand would be included within the Australian 
nation.96 The Australian government did not simply create an official structure for an entity that 
already existed (Australia). Instead, the government embarked on a journey to “create a 
nation” and give that new nation pre-eminence over all other forms of political and cultural 
identity.97 
 Federation was a much less disruptive event for New Zealand. Seddon decided during 
the 1890s that he did not want New Zealand to join the Australian federation.98 Seddon 
constructed a vision of New Zealand as a superior colony with its own federation to rival that of 
Australia. Australian Federation in 1901 entrenched the differences that Seddon so 
emphatically promoted. The New Zealand government no longer just portrayed New Zealand as 
a superior colony, it also portrayed it as a superior nation. James Belich has argued that staying 
out of Federation was one of the most significant turning points in New Zealand’s history, 
because it reinforced New Zealand’s dependence on Britain and difference from Australia.99 
Throughout the twentieth century, successive New Zealand governments promoted their 
superiority as a more progressive and advanced nation in comparison with Australia.100 
Conclusion 
Federation did not cause the New Zealand government to reconceptualise the national identity 
it promoted, however it did establish a pattern that has been consistent in New Zealand’s 
national rhetoric ever since. New Zealand’s new position as a small nation next to a larger 
neighbour meant that Australia would be a constant source of comparison and rivalry.101 New 
Zealand would always compare itself with Australia and use Australia as a standard against 
which it must judge itself. On a superficial level, New Zealand’s lack of interest in Federation 
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was indicative of its separation from Australia, but the practical result of New Zealand’s 
independence was that Australia would now loom large in New Zealand’s national imagination. 
There was nothing natural or inevitable about the creation of the Australian federation without 
New Zealand, but once the two distinct entities came into being both governments sought to 
define and legitimatise their respective nation-states. Just as Massimo d’Azeglio said “We have 
made Italy, now we must make Italians” the Australian and New Zealand governments also set 
out on a quest to create Australians and New Zealanders.102 Rather than finally settling this 
issue, this period was only the beginning of a century of challenges and change in which both 
governments would re-imagine and redefine their respective nations. 
 The prominent position of Māori within the New Zealand government’s rhetoric 
contrasted with the ‘great silence’ in the Australian Commonwealth Parliament. Likewise, the 
Australian government portrayed Asia as the greatest threat to the Australian nation, while 
New Zealand was more worried about European expansion in the Pacific. This is indicative of 
the different geopolitical perspectives of the two governments caused by Australia’s position on 
the edge of Asia, compared with New Zealand’s position at the southern end of the Pacific. 
These differences, alongside others, caused the two governments to construct their national 
identities, and frame the challenges they faced, in different ways. Yet both governments were 
enmeshed in the British Empire. They defined themselves as British societies, both firmly 
committed to assimilation and the continuation of their settler societies as British nations 
transposed to the antipodes. The two governments, particularly the New Zealand government, 
saw their nations as separate and unique and the discourse they adopted reflected those 
differences. At the same time, the British settler nationalisms they invoked were largely similar 
and this points to the many common challenges the two governments faced and the way both 
governments adopted largely similar response to those challenges. This is significant because it 
illustrates the powerful influence the concept of Britishness had on the nationalism promoted 
by the Australian and New Zealand governments. It suggests that while the British Empire 
remained strong both nations would be heavily influenced by a similar imperial ideology. 
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Therefore, this period provides clear evidence of the common framework in which the two 
governments operated and examples of the seeds of difference that would develop greater 
significance later in the century.  
 As the New Zealand and Australian governments defined their nations and a place for 
themselves in 1901, thirteen years later the onset of the First World War would continue this 
process. The war pushed both governments to adopt a more racially circumscribed British-
centric national identity and while they both took the opportunity to proclaim the distinct 
character of their nations as superior Dominions, they also articulated similar worldviews that 
illustrated the common framework affecting both nations.  
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Chapter Two 
World War I: Transnational-nationalism 
 
Introduction 
World War I provided both new challenges and new opportunities for Australia and New 
Zealand. It was a transnational event that developed nationalist significance. Despite the 
horrors of war, both Australia and New Zealand reaffirmed their place within the British Empire 
through this war, and neither government reassessed the geopolitical implications of their 
geographic position. Just as in 1901, the Australian government showed a greater interest in 
developing relations with the United States. Similarly, Māori continued to occupy a prominent 
position in New Zealand and Māori were allowed to serve in the armed forces, unlike in 
Australia where Indigenous Australians were largely ignored. At the same time, both 
governments sought greater influence in the Pacific at the end of the war and attempted to 
reduce the influence of Japan. Both governments also invoked a range of identities to justify 
their bloody sacrifices in the trenches. These sacrifices were seen to sanctify the nation and 
affirm a superior way of life in Australia and New Zealand. The transnational experience of WWI 
gave these governments an opportunity to portray their nations as unique and exceptional. 
Ironically, the way the respective New Zealand and Australian identities were constructed was 
almost identical, and still largely determined by their relationship to the mother country.  
This chapter first considers the differences in the ways the two countries experienced 
World War I and the effect this had on the political rhetoric their governments used. It then 
describes the ways in which both nations experienced the war in similar ways and how their 
nationalist rhetoric reflected this. The different ethnic makeup of the two countries, particularly 
the larger Irish population in Australia and the prominent position of Māori within New 
Zealand, led to differences in the rhetoric from the governments of the two nations, and this 
created a different political climate in each country. Further, the Australian government 
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continued to develop closer relations with the US while the New Zealand government preferred 
to rely purely upon Britain. This was a result of the different geographic position of Australia 
and the Australian government’s aspirations for Australia to play a larger role on the world 
stage. These differences are important because they illustrate issues that were significant at 
this time, issues that were to form the basis for the biggest divergence in political rhetoric 
between the two countries over the twentieth century. While this period was dominated 
largely by similarities, it is nevertheless important to consider the differences in context and 
rhetoric between Australia and New Zealand at this time.  
Despite these differences World War I had a broadly similar influence on both 
governments and societies, and this was reflected in their political rhetoric. This reflected 
processes that were apparent in 1901 wherein their nationalisms and world views were 
intertwined with the British Empire, subsuming differences that would become highly 
significant later in the century. The war focussed both governments’ attention on Europe, then 
at the end of the war they tried to exert their influence in the Pacific. As a result, they enacted 
policies and used rhetoric that continued to frame their societies as European nations on the 
edge of Asia. Likewise, the war reemphasised the importance of British military protection, and 
so both governments continued to enthusiastically portray their nations as British, and as a part 
of the British Empire. As a result, the political discourses each government invoked to justify 
their policies were remarkably similar. The governments of both Australia and New Zealand 
framed the war as the defining moment of their nation and proclaimed the distinctiveness of 
their national experience. Yet at the same time the national identities they described were 
strikingly alike. This is indicative of the imperial environment both governments operated 
within and the power of a larger British Imperial identity that worked to subsume real 
differences between the two young nations.  
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Differences in ethnicity and political culture  
While the governments of both Australia and New Zealand invoked a similar British settler 
nationalism, their experience of the war and their use of nationalist rhetoric differed.1 The most 
significant difference between Australia and New Zealand during World War I was that New 
Zealand created a unity government and enacted conscription easily, whereas Australia kept 
the political status quo and the government was not able to introduce conscription, despite two 
conscription plebiscites. This meant the war experience in Australia was far more divisive than 
was the case in New Zealand. The Labour Party in New Zealand opposed conscription, but the 
Reform government was able to pass conscription with little resistance.2 In Australia, the 
debate over conscription caused deep emotional and political scars. 
The war also highlighted the different ethnic compositions of the two countries and 
their different attitudes towards race relations. Australia’s comparatively larger Irish population 
articulated their disapproval of the British government’s attitudes towards Ireland, and towards 
the war itself.3 Irish Australians, led by the indomitable Archbishop Daniel Mannix, created 
much greater opposition to conscription and the war effort in Australia than was the case in 
New Zealand. Perhaps even more importantly, the war emphasised the starkly different 
positions of Indigenous Australians in comparison with Māori in New Zealand. The sense of 
crisis engendered by the conflict caused both governments to more carefully demarcate the 
boundaries of national identity within each nation and as a result articulate their attitudes 
towards race relations even more clearly than before the war. This process illustrated the very 
different attitudes of the two governments towards their indigenous inhabitants and the more 
prominent position of Māori within the national imagination as defined by the New Zealand 
government. The conflict highlighted the demographic differences between the two nations, 
which in turn influenced the political issues in each nation. These differences manifested in 
different political rhetoric. 
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Paul Baker’s analysis of conscription in New Zealand offers some compelling reasons for 
the differences between Australia and New Zealand over conscription.4 Most importantly, New 
Zealand implemented conscription early, before war-weariness had set in. He also argues that 
in Australia the labour movement played a decisive role in the defeat of the conscription 
plebiscites, suggesting that the combination of the strength of the parliamentary wing of the 
movement, especially through Prime Minister Billy Hughes, and the strength of the broader 
movement, were toxic for the ‘yes’ campaign.5 This was compounded by the larger Irish 
population in Australia, which has a long history of anti-imperial and strong working-class 
sentiment. This issue is a reflection of the different political cultures and ethnic divisions of the 
two countries. 
 These differences meant that in Australia the war was framed and remembered in a 
different way. In New Zealand, war memorials commemorate those who served and died 
during World War I. In Australia, many memorials record the name of every man and woman 
who served.6 In a purely voluntary army the act of joining the armed forces was a reflection of a 
willingness to serve the nation and thus the very act of joining was worth commemorating. If 
however, men were compelled to join the army through conscription then the act of serving 
ceased to reflect a higher ideal. Instead, those who died were glorified as they were the ones 
willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for the nation.7 Voluntarism therefore provided another 
source of pride in Australia. 
The war also served to contrast the different position of indigenous peoples within the 
nationalist rhetoric in Australia and New Zealand. The Australian federal government essentially 
ignored Indigenous Australians: they were not recognised as a legitimate part of the Australian 
nation, so there was no need to accommodate the Indigenous population within the rhetoric. 
Nor were Indigenous Australians officially accommodated in the Australian Army, a point of 
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contrast with Māori in New Zealand.8 The federal government, responsible for almost all 
aspects of the war effort, spent little time considering the role of Indigenous Australians. Some 
Indigenous Australians did serve in the armed forces during World War I, but they were forced 
to hide their Indigenous identity.9 The treatment of Indigenous Australian soldiers after the war 
was similarly appalling. They were not allowed to take part in the land settlement schemes — in 
fact some the land used for the scheme came from indigenous reserves — nor were they 
entitled to the same benefits as those provided to non-Indigenous Australians.10 Discriminatory 
policies marginalised Indigenous Australians and their experience of war did little to change 
that fact.11 However, the treatment of Indigenous soldiers after the war was one of the main 
causes of the first Indigenous rights movements in the 1930s.12 These movements did not 
initially have a great deal of success, but they did set the precedent for later movements that 
would challenge the underlying logic of settler nationalism and the assumptions of indigenous 
inferiority. 
In contrast, the conflict provided an opportunity for the New Zealand government to 
incorporate Māori more closely into its settler society while, at the same time, Māori used the 
war to establish their equality with Pakeha New Zealanders. During the Boer War, Britain 
banned Māori soldiers from serving in the New Zealand contingent. However, at the outbreak 
of World War I this policy changed and Māori were allowed to serve overseas, despite official 
British opposition.13 During the initial enthusiasm at the start of World War I many Māori 
soldiers were allowed to join, and were organised into the “Native Contingent and Pioneer 
Battalion.”14 British policy at that time continued to oppose indigenous peoples serving in the 
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military, because it raised awkward questions about the unequal status of colonial subjects 
within the Empire.15 The British authorities were concerned that if colonial subjects were 
allowed to serve on equal terms with British citizens, this would break down the barriers 
between coloniser and colonised.16 It was for this very reason that the Māori members of 
Parliament (MPs) pushed for Māori to join the New Zealand force and, as Sir Apirana Ngata 
(Eastern Māori) put it, “stand shoulder to shoulder with their Pakeha fellow subjects in the 
present war.”17 The war presented an opportunity for Māori MPs to assert the equality of 
Māori with Pakeha, by proving their loyalty to the nation and Empire. Ngata and his fellow 
Māori MPs were largely successful; there was bipartisan support for Māori participation in the 
New Zealand war effort. Leader of the Opposition, Sir Joseph Ward (Awarua) contended that if 
Indian troops were allowed to serve then Māori must also be given the same rights. He believed 
that: 
[T]he great majority of the people of this country would, in the circumstances, 
be favourable to the Maoris, who have distinguished themselves in the past as 
a fine fighting force, joining in the defence of the Empire as a whole.18 
This was consistent with the assimilationist government policies of the time.19 Māori were 
considered a legitimate part of the nation, but they were expected to fit into Pakeha culture 
and society.20 Unsurprisingly, the government was more than happy for Māori to demonstrate 
their loyalty to the Pakeha state in this manner. 
 This disparity in attitudes, where the Australian government explicitly banned 
Indigenous Australians from participating in the conflict, while the New Zealand government 
actively promoted Māori enlistment, says a great deal about the different position of the two 
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groups within each settler society. More importantly, it indicates the way the New Zealand 
government used Māori as an important part of its nationalist rhetoric and as a fundamental 
aspect of New Zealand’s ‘national character’; whereas in Australia the government used the 
war to emphasise the Britishness of the Australian nation and ignored the indigenous 
component of Australian society. This is one of the most important differences in the 
nationalist rhetoric used by the two governments, and World War I made that difference 
abundantly clear.  
Different foreign policy perspectives 
Despite the remarkable similarities of the geopolitical outlooks of the two governments, they 
did differ in one important way and this was related to the United States. This was by no means 
a central political issue for either nation during the 1910s, yet the Australian government’s 
attitude towards the United States was noticeably different from that of the New Zealand 
government. This was a major difference between the two during this period, and it is 
important for that reason alone, but it is also an issue that would come to have central 
importance later in the century as the United States increasingly took the place of Britain. This 
early difference is, therefore, highly significant because it points to the ongoing importance of 
Australia’s supposedly more exposed geographic position, which was highlighted by the 
disruptions caused by World War I.  
While Australia and New Zealand remained loyally British, the events of World War I 
illustrated the growing importance of the United States. The Australian government’s drive to 
develop a closer relationship with the US showed its vision of Australia as a powerful nation. 
The Australian Parliament passed an Act calling for Australian representation in the United 
States: “[I]f the consent of the Imperial Government can be obtained to the action being taken, 
it is desirable that a High Commissioner for Australia should be accredited to the United States 
Government at Washington.”21 This motion reflected the dual policy of the Australian 
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government. It attempted to strengthen its position in the region by developing its relationship 
with the United States, without threatening its position within the Empire.  
 The Australian government portrayed the United States as a country that could offer 
significant economic and political support. More importantly, just as during the federation 
period, a backbencher for the Liberal/Nationalist Party Thomas Bakhap (Tasmania) highlighted 
the similarities between the US and the British Empire: 
It must not be forgotten in this Empire of ours, there are fewer English-
speaking people than there are in the great Republic of the United States. If 
we exclude from the calculation the black population of the latter, it must be 
confessed that there are more white English speaking people in the United 
States than there are in the British Empire.22 
A member of Labor Dr William Maloney (Melbourne) invoked the same rhetorical 
position: “In America our men would meet brothers of their race, men speaking the same 
tongue.”23 The Australian government and opposition invoked this idea of cultural and racial 
similarity in order to justify closer relations with the United States, in much the same way as 
they did with Britain. The government continually reinforced the importance of the British 
connection through references to blood ties and British civilisation.24 At the same time, 
however, the government also adopted this language when urging Australia towards closer 
relations with the United States.25 
This rhetoric echoed the ideals proclaimed by Alfred Deakin, the Australian Prime 
Minister in 1908, when the American Navy visited Australia at Deakin’s invitation: 
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[W]e look, instinctively, first and most confidently, to you Americans, nearest 
to us in blood, in character, and in purpose. It is in this spirit, and in this hope, 
that Australia welcomes with open hand and heart the coming of your sailors, 
and of the flag, which, like our own, shelters a new world under the control of 
its vital union. May the present accord between English-speaking peoples 
beget a perpetual concord of brotherhood between us.26 
Bell and Bell describe the symbolic significance of this event as an important marker of the 
Australian government’s ongoing preoccupation with the United States and its continued desire 
to frame the United States as a part of Australia’s larger racialised imagined community.27 
Neville Meaney argues that this event was caused by the ongoing insecurities in Australia that 
led it to seek guarantees of American military support.28  
 The New Zealand government did not share Australia’s enthusiasm for the United 
States. They were grateful to the United States for their part in the war, but World War I did not 
shake the beliefs of most New Zealanders that the best position for New Zealand was as the 
most loyal Dominion of the Empire.29 The government was certain (to the point of 
complacency) in the knowledge that Britain would look after New Zealand’s interests. Joseph 
Ward (Awarua), Deputy Leader of the Reform Party, argued that the United States played a 
peripheral role in the war, suggesting that the role of the US army “would have been of no 
consequence” were it not for the “backbone” and “staying power” of Great Britain.30 The New 
Zealand government expressed its thanks for the assistance provided by the United States, but 
it did not make the government reconsider its relationship with the United States or New 
Zealand’s reliance on Britain for its defence.  
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This divergence in attitudes towards the United States reflected a difference in the 
strategic perspectives of the two governments. Both justified their attitudes by using racialist 
and nationalist rhetoric. However, the Australian government portrayed the United States as a 
part of its racialised imagined community, while the New Zealand government did not describe 
the United States as a part of the English-speaking world. This is indicative of both the loftier 
aspirations of the Australian government, and the way it used nationalist rhetoric to achieve its 
foreign policy objectives. The New Zealand government framed New Zealand as the most 
British Dominion and did not see the benefit in developing closer relations with the US; MPs in 
New Zealand therefore did not portray the United States as a part of the British speaking world.  
The confrontational stance of the Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes at the Paris 
peace negotiations in 1919 provides another example of the differences between the two 
governments. Hughes advocated harsh reparations against Germany and wanted the outright 
annexation of Germany’s South Pacific territories.31 He was renowned for his abrupt and 
adversarial negotiating strategy at the peace talks, and it is partly due to this that Hughes has 
gained mythical status as an early example of an Australian nationalist unwilling to subordinate 
Australia’s interests to those of Britain.32 The implicit admiration for Hughes’ abrasive style 
which is embedded into the myth highlights the aggressive nature of Australian political culture. 
It is hard to imagine a New Zealand prime minister adopting the heated rhetoric of Hughes. 
Instead New Zealand governments achieved their objectives by portraying themselves as the 
most loyal and most British Dominion (this difference was even more obvious later in the 
century when Britain applied to join the European Economic Community). This event also hints 
at the different attitudes of the two governments and their ideas about the potential power of 
their nations. The Australian government at this time indicated a desire for Australia to become 
a middle power, significant in its own right, while the New Zealand government framed New 
Zealand as a small, superior society.  
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Yet at the same time, there were similarities. Hughes had a deep affection for the British 
Empire; he was simply negotiating for greater influence within the Empire.33 The New Zealand 
government shared Hughes’ preoccupation with Empire and the importance of strengthening 
New Zealand’s defence.34 The New Zealand government also wanted greater influence within 
the Empire and supported Australia’s call for the annexation of Germany’s colonial possessions. 
Despite the differences exemplified by Hughes’ aggressive style, similar concerns were felt on 
both sides of the Tasman.  
Totalising and racialised British settler nationalism 
World War I reaffirmed the importance of the British Empire in both Australia and New Zealand 
and this was reflected in the British settler nationalism of each government. Despite the 
appalling loss of life and the futility of the Gallipoli campaign, neither country questioned its 
place within the Empire. Instead, the threat of emerging Great Powers, who challenged the 
hegemony of the British Empire, pushed the Australian and New Zealand governments to 
reaffirm their loyalty to the ‘mother country’.35 They framed their role within the conflict as 
protecting the national interests of Australia and New Zealand by keeping Britain strong, 
effectively closing ranks by reasserting their Britishness.36 This was compounded by the fact 
that throughout the Empire governments and national medias were largely reliant on British 
sources of information. It was unavoidable then that in both New Zealand and Australia the war 
was portrayed in similar ways. Furthermore, as the war dragged on attitudes towards Germany 
hardened and both governments portrayed Germany in racialised terms and as inherently 
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different from British societies.37 This process also involved cementing the racial boundaries of 
both antipodean nations as ethnically pure British nations, defined in opposition to the 
autocratic Prussian racial character. An important effect of the war was therefore the adoption 
of a more clearly circumscribed and racially defined British settler nationalism by both 
governments. 
Political rhetoric and propaganda in Australia and New Zealand is a compelling example 
of this process. In both countries propaganda focussed on the need to protect the nation and 
Empire from the threat of autocratic Prussianism. Political discourse in the Australian and New 
Zealand parliaments constantly re-emphasised the freedoms and liberties that made the 
Dominions both unique and superior to most other nations in the world. This rhetoric is 
reminiscent of the discourse associated with American exceptionalism. Senator Findley, 
speaking in federal Parliament, described Australia as “the freest under the sun”.38 Politicians 
used notions of freedom and liberty to differentiate and glorify the nation, illustrating what 
made the nation unique, and justifying their political agenda. Both the Australian and New 
Zealand governments described themselves as ‘the most loyal’ and ‘the most British’ nation.39 
This focus on an Imperial racial identity denied geographic and other racial differences; it thus 
made sense that the two governments would frame their nations in similar ways. This rhetoric 
also existed in a wider imperial context where Britain provided the benchmark against which 
both countries compared themselves. The Dominions were developing increasingly 
sophisticated paradigms of their own distinctiveness, while simultaneously portraying 
themselves as loyal to the Empire and its liberal traditions.  
Similarly, the Australian and New Zealand governments defined their nations and their 
war efforts in terms of ‘British civilisation’. Both countries fought to protect British civilisation 
and their place within it. The governments believed that the Empire was in need of protection, 
besieged on all sides by authoritarian rivals and by the hordes of non-white peoples waiting for 
                                                                
37
Andrew Francis, 'To Be Truly British We Must Be Anti-German': New Zealand, Enemy Aliens and the Great War Experience, 
1914-1918(Oxford: Peter Lang, 2012); Sarah Gregson, "War, Racism and Industrial Relations in an Australian Mining Town, 
1916-1935," Economic and Labour Relations Review, 18, 1 (2007), 81. 
38
APD, Senate, vol. 80 (1916): 8821. 
39
 APD, House, vol. 84 (1918): 3600; NZPD, House,  vol. 175 (1916): 545. 
60 
 
their opportunity to overwhelm the coloniser.40 For example, Prime Minster Billy Hughes 
described the “terrific instrument of destruction by which [Germany] now seeks to batter all 
who dare withstand her, into submission.”41 Wartime rhetoric portrayed the war as a sacred 
duty to protect the ‘British genius’ against the barbarous hordes intent on spreading chaos and 
violence.42 At the same time, the Australian and New Zealand governments portrayed 
themselves as products of British civilisation, asserting their superiority on the battlefield and 
on the homefront; as well as assuaging insecurities about the authenticity and permanence of 
the Australian and New Zealand settlements.43 Being the progeny of British civilisation provided 
ample evidence to most settlers that Australia and New Zealand were superior colonies and 
that both societies could look forward to ever greater futures, as long as they remained close to 
their roots and expressed appropriate levels of filial piety.44 
This Imperialism also shaped war propaganda in Australia and New Zealand. From 1914-
1918 they were almost wholly reliant on British sources of information. Although most war 
propaganda was locally produced in the two countries it was unsurprising that the tone and 
context was remarkably similar. All newspaper accounts of the landing at Gallipoli first quoted 
British praise of the Australian and New Zealand troops and then described their heroic 
exploits.45 The Australian and New Zealand newspapers invoked a range of identities. The Argus 
described the landing at Gallipoli as Australasia achieving great military feats against stiff 
opposition. In other accounts it was described as a “gallant British exploit”.46 The Ashburton 
Post did not distinguish between the nationalities of the different national units, pointing out 
that “The Britishers” fought on the European coast, while the French held the “Asiatic side of 
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the Dardanelles.”47 There was a strong mixture of parochial pride and greater British 
exceptionalism, demonstrating the imperial influence of World War I in Australia and New 
Zealand. The only minor difference was that the Australian press tended to adopt a more 
boisterous tone, while the New Zealand press was more reticent.48 Propaganda in both 
countries portrayed the withdrawal from Gallipoli as a success, quoting Lord Asquith’s praise of 
the Anzac troops, despite the failure of the campaign.49 Furthermore, there was absolutely no 
criticism of the British handling of the campaign. The similarities in war propaganda therefore 
illustrates the shared framework that underpinned the political rhetoric in Australia and New 
Zealand. 
The portrayal of Germany in the Australian and New Zealand parliaments and 
newspapers is further evidence of the strengthening of the British racial identity in the two 
nations. Both governments began the war portraying Germany as a gallant foe: the real enemy 
was defined as Prussianism, rather than the German nation.50 In 1914 the Kaiser was used to 
symbolize Prussianism and bore the blame for causing the war.  Liberal Party member Thomas 
Wilford (Hutt) argued that it was “the Kaiser” who was responsible for “driving the world into 
this great war.”51 This attitude was repeated in Australia. Opposition MP Edward Jolley 
(Grampians) blamed the “dreadful” war on “The unbridled arrogance and tyranny of one 
European monarch” who was simply “anxious to try his pet army … without considering the 
lives of his own people, or their material welfare, and without regard for the well-being of the 
world at large.”52In both Australia and New Zealand MPs clearly cast blame for the war at the 
feet of the Kaiser who betrayed his own people by forcing them into a war they did not want.  
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This tone changed markedly by the end of the war. As war weariness increased public 
opinion and government rhetoric hardened such that the governments no longer portrayed the 
German people as civilised Europeans who had been betrayed by the Prussian oligarch.53 
Instead, they were transformed into the ‘Hun’, a barbarous and callous creature that 
epitomised the authoritarian German nation.54 Both governments portrayed the war as a life 
and death struggle between two mortally opposed races, with the British race forced to protect 
its liberty against the onslaught of the German war machine.55 
 
The Australian government produced a number of posters that depicted Germans as dehumanized monsters 
wrecking havoc on the world.56 
Nationalist Party MP Edward Heitman (Kalgoorlie) vividly illustrated the transformation of 
attitudes towards the German nation in the Australian parliamentary debates. Germany was 
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“[A] nation that, through its spokesmen, its statesmen, its university professors, and its 
preachers has proclaimed as a virtue every crime that a people could commit.”57 The Australian 
government saw the German nation as the source of the conflict, supposedly reveling in the 
sins it committed throughout the war. A similar transformation occurred in the New Zealand 
Parliament. New Zealand was no longer fighting a war against the Kaiser, but was now fighting 
a war against the German people. This change in rhetoric racialised both antipodean nations 
and it further entrenched the identities of both nations as purely British societies.  
These attitudes were also reflected in greater concerns about the influence of ‘aliens’ 
within Australia and New Zealand; of particular concern were those people of non-British origin 
(primarily German) who lived in the colonies. Before World War I German migrants were 
welcomed as fellow Europeans who possessed a strong work ethic and were seen as good 
settler stock.58 As attitudes towards Germany hardened though, both governments were 
increasingly concerned about what they saw as the insidious influence of Germans in Australia 
and New Zealand. As the New Zealand Social Democrat MP for Grey Lyne, John Payne, pointed 
out: “[T]he difficulty was owing to the dastardly tactics of Germany and her system of 
espionage, to sort them out — to know who was who; and we should not take any chances with 
Germans.”59 Germans were increasingly characterised as disloyal, and the governments applied 
this label to those people who had lived in Australia and New Zealand for most of their lives.60 
In both countries, there were earnest parliamentary debates about the extent to which 
naturalised Germans could be considered loyal to the nation and Empire.61 This issue became 
pressing when parliaments in both nations passed legislation determining who could serve in 
the armed forces. In both instances, Australians and New Zealanders of German birth were not 
allowed to serve. Heated debate ensued, concerning the extent to which citizenship was 
determined by loyalty or heritage. This discussion was in many ways a prelude to the 
disagreements between ethnic and civic understandings of the nation that gained prominence 
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in Australia and New Zealand at the end of the century. While both countries were sympathetic 
to the idea that fellow Europeans who were obviously loyal to the nation could be considered 
loyal citizens, there was also an overtly ethnic understanding of the nation.62 This is most clearly 
exemplified by the characterisation of Germans living in Australia and New Zealand as 
fundamentally foreign. At the same time, both countries pursued aggressive immigration 
programmes to attract Britons from the other side of the world to settle the land in Australia 
and New Zealand. These British immigrants were not considered to be, in any meaningful 
sense, foreign.63 
Convergence in geopolitical outlook 
Although there were differences in their geopolitical outlook, World War I caused the 
Australian and New Zealand governments to invoke a largely similar geopolitical vision. This was 
a shift from 1901, when Seddon’s vision of New Zealand’s South Pacific contrasted with the 
Australian government’s greater concern with invasion and their aspiration to create a 
federation that included New Zealand. The Great War caused the Australian and New Zealand 
governments to become concerned with similar issues and perceive threats from similar 
sources. Thus the geopolitical challenges they invoked were similar, as were their solutions. 
During the war both governments were preoccupied with war in Europe, and this diminished 
the importance of Australia’s proximity to Asia. At the end of the war they argued for similar 
roles for themselves and the Empire within the Pacific. They both fought for control of 
Germany’s colonies and tried to keep the Japanese Empire at bay. They tried to solve the 
problem of their isolation through support for the Empire and expansion of their own colonial 
interests within the Pacific. The war was also the long awaited opportunity for both nations to 
prove their loyalty through their willingness to sacrifice “the flower of youth” in defence of the 
Empire.64 Both governments explicitly framed this sacrifice as the quid pro quo necessary to 
ensure ongoing British protection of both Australia and New Zealand. This geopolitical vision 
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was a central part of the constant assertion of a British identity in the political rhetoric in 
Australia and New Zealand.  
This geopolitical perspective was ostensibly about foreign policy and defence, but it was 
also about defining their relationship with the Asia-Pacific region and their place within the 
British Empire, and the world. The rhetoric then was just as much about defining the character 
of the nation as it was about foreign policy. This rhetoric of sacrifice, used to ensure Imperial 
defence, demonstrates their commitment to a colonial and imperial world view, in which the 
Britishness of Australia and New Zealand eclipsed all other concerns. Rhetoric framing foreign 
policy challenges were underwritten by a similar set of ideological assumptions in both nations. 
This synchronicity illustrates the extent to which the Australian and New Zealand governments 
viewed the world in largely the same way and, therefore, a discussion of their foreign policies 
shows that the two governments operated within a similar paradigm. This is an important 
element of the similar nationalisms the two governments invoked.  
Initially the governments of both New Zealand and Australia focussed on the great 
events in Europe and Asia, and the Pacific did not occupy much of their attention. The war 
confirmed the centrality of great power rivalries for the future of both Australia and New 
Zealand.65 As the war progressed however, both governments were much more concerned 
about Germany’s position in the Pacific, and therefore, the perceived threat from the teeming 
millions in Asia was deemed less important. Australian and New Zealand governments treated 
Japan, as an ally of Britain, with respect. They were, in fact, reliant on Japanese naval power in 
the Pacific. Japan provided escorts for all of the Anzac troops sent from Australia and New 
Zealand to Egypt and later Europe.66 Both governments had a grudging respect for Japan and its 
development into an industrial power.67 They saw China as less of a threat, both because 
Germany posed a clear danger, but also because they had successfully enacted immigration 
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restrictions which had effectively barred all new non-white migrants from Australia and New 
Zealand.68 Throughout the course of the war, they portrayed Asia in a less negative light. 
This new-found attitude did not survive the defeat of Germany and the Paris peace 
negotiations. The post-war settlement was an opportunity for the two Dominion governments 
to assert their status as largely independent nations. They wanted to limit the influence of 
Germany and Japan in the Pacific and extend their own spheres of influence.69 Both 
governments argued that Germany should be stripped of its colonial possessions and they also 
maintained that the Dominions should gain control of Germany’s South Pacific colonies. At the 
same time they tried to limit the expansion of Japanese power in the Pacific, whilst also 
extending their own sphere of influence to create a buffer zone.70 However, Hughes and 
Massey were pursuing conflicting objectives: if New Zealand and Australia gained control of 
German territories south of the equator, then Japan would be accorded the same rights north 
of the equator. The two governments achieved their main objective by gaining mandates in the 
Pacific but in the process they also ensured that Japan would increase its military reach in the 
Pacific, while simultaneously souring relations with the emergent Asian power.71 
During the peace negotiations both governments were concerned about their exposed 
position in the South Pacific. Both countries wanted to gain control of the islands surrounding 
their coastlines in order to protect themselves from future aggression. John West (East Sydney) 
made the Australian government’s position clear, maintaining that “we should be allowed to 
retain a hold upon these islands” so that they would not become “enemy storehouses of 
destruction”.72 The New Zealand government adopted a similar tone. Independent MP William 
Veitch (Wanganui), for example, argued that if Germany retained control over Samoa then New 
Zealand would need to be “armed to the teeth night and day” in the face of “those dangerous 
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enemies” on “adjoining shores”. He therefore felt duty-bound to “support … the proposal that 
New Zealand should retain control of Samoa”.73 In taking this approach the government 
subordinated the right to self-determination to the defence of the nation. This approach to the 
Pacific represents both a continuation of similar anxieties and aspirations of the two 
governments about the future of the Pacific and the role Australia, New Zealand and the 
Empire would play. At the same time both governments expressed a new confidence and a 
sense of entitlement, which they had apparently earned on the slopes of Gallipoli. 
The desire to control the South Pacific came primarily from a desire to protect Australia 
and New Zealand from invasion, but this was not the only argument the governments used to 
justify their positions. Both advocated the expansion of their benevolent colonial rule over a 
larger area using the rhetoric of the ‘white man’s burden’.74 They accused Germany of enacting 
inhumane policies in both nations’ colonies and they argued that the inherently warlike and 
aggressive German character made them poor colonial masters compared to the liberal and 
humanitarian British administrations.75 Germany was accused of flagrant and consistent acts of 
violence against their ‘native charges’ and of not giving their colonial subjects economic 
opportunities.76 New Zealand in particular used its superior race relations as evidence of her 
capacity to govern humanely various Pacific islands.77 The Australian and New Zealand 
governments considered their interests in the Pacific to be a reflection of their benign 
paternalism, where both countries discharged their moral duty by ‘lifting up’ their colonial 
subjects from the ‘savagedom’ which had stunted their development and kept them trapped in 
a ‘primitive’ state.78 This position was convenient for both countries as it cloaked their colonial 
expansion in an altruistic garb.  
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The governments also emphasised the sacrifices their nations had made on the 
battlefields in order to assuage their insecurities as exposed European outposts on the edge of 
Asia. A recurring theme in the colonial histories of the two countries was the desire to ensure 
that Britain would come to their aid if they were threatened or attacked by another European 
or Asian power.79 Both governments believed the best way to guarantee their own security was 
through enthusiastic contributions to British military campaigns. This argument was premised 
on the idea that if the Dominions enthusiastically supported the United Kingdom, then the 
United Kingdom would be compelled to support Australia and New Zealand. This partly explains 
the Dominions’ contribution to previous expeditions. From Sudan to South Africa, both 
governments went out of their way to show their loyalty. At the outset of World War I Australia 
and New Zealand once again went to great lengths to show their willingness to fight and die for 
the protection of the British Empire. As the war progressed and as casualties increased the 
losses suffered by Australia and New Zealand were portrayed as a moral debt owed to the 
colonies by the United Kingdom.80 These deaths both helped to ensure Allied victory in the war, 
but also obliged Britain to acknowledge and consider the needs of the Dominions in the future. 
Thus, the war was framed as a way to ensure once and for all that Britain would come to the aid 
of Australia and New Zealand and guarantee their national survival.  
Transnational-nationalism 
Benedict Anderson argues that the true power of nationalism is premised on the idea that 
citizens can be called upon to make the ultimate sacrifice for the nation: to die for their 
country.81 Within nationalist rhetoric the ‘diggers’ fought for a variety of imagined 
communities. They fought for Australia and New Zealand, they also fought for Australasia and 
the Dominions. They fought for the British nation and Empire and they even fought to protect 
the ‘British genius’. From 1914 to 1918, the Australian and New Zealand governments invoked a 
wide range of nationalist tropes in order to justify the ongoing and bloody conflict. 
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The war pushed nationalist rhetoric in Australia and New Zealand in a similar direction.82 
Both governments used the emerging Anzac mythology to confirm the national characteristics 
of Australia and New Zealand as egalitarian, manly and ruggedly individualist, and as evidence 
that that the antipodean soldiers were superior because they came from superior societies. 
This was particularly important in order to justify loss of life and because both governments 
portrayed their soldiers as representatives of the nation. This process was enshrined through 
the building of war memorials, which functioned as nation-building projects in both countries.  
 These common experiences shaped a shared nationalist rhetoric in both New Zealand 
and Australia. Governments in both nations invoked multiple identities within their political 
discourse and these identities ranged from the narrowly parochial, through to the thoroughly 
imperial. Both governments also used the sacrifices and heroics of their troops to assuage 
doubts about the immaturity of each nation, arguing that their nations were truly born at 
Gallipoli. In other words, the governments of Australia and New Zealand took an event that was 
imperial and placed it within their own nationalist narrative, and used this rhetoric to assert 
their distinctiveness. The governments had a clear sense of their own distinctiveness and 
marshalled rhetoric that promoted it, and it was in that sense quite parochial. Yet the ongoing 
similarities in the rhetoric is evidence of larger internal and external forces that exerted a 
similar influence on both governments and societies.  
This explains a number of things. It explains the paradox of transnational-nationalism 
wherein the political rhetoric used by governments to tell their national story and build their 
nation is drawn from a wider intellectual culture and constrained by similar geopolitical 
necessities. In this way, the national narratives that germinated in New Zealand and Australia 
were also part of the international transfer of ideas, ideas that helped bind the Dominions and 
the Empire together. It also explains why both governments so easily drew upon multiple 
identities and easily shifted from national to imperial imagined communities. It further explains 
why both governments commemorated the conflict by peppering the landscape with 
memorials to the dead. And finally, it explains why the two official histories of the war in 
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Australia and New Zealand were both intended to tell their national story, yet the story they 
each told was remarkably similar. 
The most commonly discussed aspect of Australia and New Zealand’s experience of 
World War I was the role of Anzac soldiers in Gallipoli and on the Western Front, with particular 
emphasis on the performance of the soldiers and how this reflected the characters of both 
nations.83 At the outbreak of the war the Australian and New Zealand governments were 
concerned about the quality of their soldiers and whether they could match the British regulars, 
who were seen to be the epitome of the professional soldier.84 These concerns reflected 
uncertainty about the training of the soldiers and the efficiency of the colonial militia systems.85 
The portrayal of the Anzac soldiers by both Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett and CEW Bean in the British, 
Australian and New Zealand press quashed these anxieties. Both journalists portrayed the 
Anzac soldiers as not just equal to the British soldiers, but as superior to them. They promoted 
a nationalist discourse, which still holds sway over Australia and New Zealand. They argued that 
the climate and the ‘healthy outdoor lifestyle’, combined with high wages and purchasing 
power of the working class in Australia and New Zealand, had created a subspecies of the 
British race that was physically superior to the original.86 Moreover, these men were practical 
and independent and had not been stunted by the oppressive class system still in existence in 
the United Kingdom. The Australian and New Zealand governments used this mythos as they 
sought to define distinctive national identities.  
The Australian and New Zealand governments were also focussed on the positive 
aspects of the war and the perceived constructive influences on the two young nations. In the 
parliamentary debates, there was a palpable sense of insecurity over the immaturity of the two 
nations and their lack of martial experience. Twenty five years earlier during the debates over 
federation in Australia a number of politicians lamented that the nation was not forged in war. 
                                                                
83
John Connor, "The Empire's War Recalled: Recent Writing on the Western Front Experience of Britain, Ireland, Australia, 
Canada, India, New Zealand, South Africa and the West Indies," History Compass, 7, 4 (2009), 1125. 
84
Mark David Sheftall, Altered Memories of the Great War: Divergent narratives of Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, 
vol. 14. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), 49. 
85
Christopher Pugsley, The Anzac Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War(Auckland: Reed, 2004), 
64. 
86
Sheftall, 35. 
71 
 
In the Australasian Federation Convention Thomas Playford (South Australia) highlighted this 
anxiety: 
We have difficulties to encounter they never had. We have no enemy at our 
doors who is likely to burn our cities, to levy contributions upon us, to kill a 
number of our people. We have nothing of that sort to fear although all those 
countries which have federated in the past have had it to fear. Therefore we 
have to build up; and to build up slowly and carefully, a public opinion in the 
colonies, without being able to appeal to any catastrophe that might occur 
through war.87 
Most Western nations that provided examples of successful nationalist projects were forged 
through war, either by expelling a foreign power, as in the case of the United States, or through 
a war of unification, as happened in Italy and Germany. The Australian government had no urge 
to fight a war of independence against Britain and thus Australia had lacked that central 
national experience.88 Similarly, the New Zealand government portrayed World War I as the 
most important war New Zealand had been involved in and it was seen as rectifying New 
Zealand’s lamentable lack of military experience.89 It was the act of dying in the trenches that 
assured Australian and New Zealanders that they were members of a genuine nation; or at least 
that was how both governments portrayed the conflict. They framed the conflict in this way to 
justify the ongoing loss of life.90 War was both a necessary evil, and a glorious adventure which 
would assure Australia and New Zealand a place in the international community. The blood of 
Australian and New Zealand soldiers “sanctified” the nation, elevating the Dominions into 
sacred objects that embodied the people and ensured their fulfilment of an ever greater 
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destiny.91 Even when an individual died his legacy would live on through the exploits of the 
nation. In both Australia and New Zealand the war was portrayed as a seminal event in each 
nations’ history, where the ‘nation was born’.92 
War memorials also served an important and similar function in Australia and New 
Zealand. They represented more than a list of those who had served and died for their nation. 
They were invested with sacred status and were irreversibly linked with the nation-building 
process.93 The messages and images on the memorials were designed to promote the primacy 
of the nation-state as a main source of identity in each country, achieving what Benedict 
Anderson describes as the creation of ‘imagined communities’: 
It is ‘imagined’ because the members of even the smallest nation will never 
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in 
the minds of each lives the image of their communion.94 
It is the creation of this ‘image of communion’ which makes a memorial so effective. Their 
existence in every city and every town, their similar design and familiar range of motifs, their 
very capacity to blend into the background in all communities creates a sense of familiarity and 
sameness, which is essential to the nation-building project.  
 Ken Inglis and Jock Phillips produced a quantitative analysis of war memorials in 
Australia and New Zealand. They concluded that there were some differences between the two 
sets of memorials. First, the drive to promote volunteers in Australia meant that there was a 
greater rush to put up memorials in Australia than in New Zealand.95 Secondly, there were a 
greater number of Anglican crosses on New Zealand memorials than in Australia, reflecting the 
larger Anglican population in New Zealand. Thirdly, forty percent of Australian memorials had a 
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utilitarian function compared to twenty percent in New Zealand.96 Each of these differences 
reflects the demographic makeup of the two countries and their unique experiences of the war, 
and in that sense they are highly significant. None of this overrides the underlying sameness 
reflected in the war memorials.97 In a sense then, the war memorials say the same thing about 
the national identities invoked by the Australian and New Zealand governments during that 
period. 
Australian and New Zealand soldiers were constantly called upon to give their lives 
during World War I. The two governments shifted seamlessly between national and imperial 
identities. For some Australian parliamentarians the position was clear. For instance, Senator Sir 
Albert Gould (NSW) made his opinion clear on the responsibility of citizens: “A duty rests on 
every man in the Commonwealth to defend it. No sacredness of life can justify any man in 
refusing to give his services for the protection of the country to which he owes his allegiance.”98 
Likewise, in the New Zealand debates Henry Okey (Taranaki) made his case in emotive terms: 
“Sir, there is scarcely a home in New Zealand to-day where there is not a woman who weeps, or 
children who cry for their beloved ones who have so heroically gone forth to fight and die for 
their country.”99 Both governments argued that it was the duty of all male citizens to give their 
lives for the protection of the nation and that this sacrifice was both glorious and just. This is 
typical nationalist rhetoric during times of war; however, this was not the only rhetoric the 
Australian and New Zealand governments used. 
Alongside these national identities were a range of imperial identities that the 
governments also engaged with to encourage Australians and New Zealanders to fight and die 
during World War I. Specifically, both governments argued that the British Empire and the 
British race were worth protecting with the lives of their soldiers. The Prime Minister of New 
Zealand made the following statement on the anniversary of the declaration of war in 1916:  
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[M]any New Zealanders have fallen since the war commenced. New Zealand 
has poured out blood and expended treasure in its endeavour to assist the 
Empire ... They are determined that whatever the cost may be, in either life or 
treasure, they are going to assist the Empire.100 
As an example of the strength of these multiple identities Liberal Senator Sir Albert Gould 
(NSW) provides a justification for Australia’s loyalty to Britain: “Australians recognise that the 
Commonwealth is but a portion of the great Empire, that the success or failure of Australia, 
and, therefore, that Australia is necessarily a participant in the war equally with Great 
Britain.”101 Both Australia and New Zealand saw themselves as fundamentally connected to the 
British Empire and the governments used this source of identity to justify the ultimate sacrifice. 
This shows the strength of a pan-British identity in the Dominions, which co-existed with other 
local identities.102 
 The Australian and New Zealand governments linked the portrayal of the Gallipoli 
campaign with the assumed national characteristics of both countries. This framing of the 
campaign in the Australian and New Zealand media offered a vivid insight into the two 
countries’ self-conceptions. The coverage of the military campaign was almost identical in both 
countries. Both countries were reliant on the same British-approved dispatches and both 
governments had a similar agenda in promoting the valour of the Anzac troops. This is not to 
say that they had no understanding of their separate national identities. It was quite the 
opposite, as the two governments framed the campaign as a seminal event in their own 
nationalist narratives, even though the ‘unique’ nationalist narrative was essentially the same 
in Australia and New Zealand. Representations of the Gallipoli campaign reflected the 
contradictions in the path towards nationhood in both countries.103 They took an event that 
was Australasian and cast it as a nationalist event. Furthermore, both countries were wholly 
reliant on the United Kingdom for information and thus both ‘national’ medias portrayed the 
events through a distinctively imperial lens. This led to a central paradox in the nation-building 
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process, as both Australia and New Zealand attempted to claim ownership of events that were 
fundamentally greater than any individual nation. Australia and New Zealand saw themselves 
as distinctive national entities, even if those distinctions were obvious only to themselves. 
 
Conclusion 
The experience of World War I and the way it was framed in Australia and New Zealand 
illustrates the similar overarching effects of the Empire on the construction of nationalism. Both 
governments sought protection through the British Empire. They embraced imperial as well as 
transnational and local identities, they continued to regard themselves as European outposts in 
the Pacific and they sought glory and affirmation through their participation in the European 
war. At the same time, the Australian government expressed its different geopolitical outlook 
by establishing diplomatic relations with the US and the New Zealand government allowed 
Māori to serve in the armed forces in order to illustrate New Zealand’s superior race relations. 
Likewise, the conflict over conscription in Australia meant that the two nations experienced war 
differently. These differences, however, existed within a similar ideology of British settler 
nationalism. The war provided ample opportunities for each nation to define who they were 
and what made them distinctive. The irony is that, despite some differences, the elements the 
Australian and New Zealand governments used to invoke their respective and supposedly 
unique national characteristics were almost identical. While both governments sought to instil a 
clear sense of national identity, these identities were still largely Australasian, even as they 
came to be conceived in more narrowly nationalistic terms.  
 World War I affirmed the centrality of a sense of Britishness in both New Zealand and 
Australia, and both governments fought to portray their nations as the most loyal and most 
British. In contrast, the next chapter will show that World War II challenged these assumptions 
about the permanence of Empire. In response these governments tried to both forestall any 
change, while also beginning to reflect upon their potentially precarious geopolitical positions. 
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As a result, they enacted policies that reflected the differences between the two nations and 
eventually undermined the central tenets of their British settler nationalisms.  
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Chapter Three 
World War II: Challenges to the status quo 
 
Introduction 
World War II altered the world in profound ways. For the Australian and New Zealand 
governments, the war and its aftermath would challenge the settler nationalisms they invoked. 
The rise of Japan and the Soviet Union and the decline of the British Empire caused both 
governments to reassess their approach to defence, their relations with the US and their 
relationship with the Asia-Pacific region. This in turn caused governments in both New Zealand 
and Australia to redefine their understandings of their geopolitical position. Both governments 
implemented policies that would transform their respective national identities in the second 
half of the century. Furthermore, the differing experiences of the war in Australia and New 
Zealand would lead the governments to adopt policies that reflected their increasingly 
divergent geopolitical perspectives. By the end of the war, Britain’s decline, the rising tide of 
anti-colonial sentiment and the rise of the United States challenged the core of the British 
settler nationalism that had pervaded both societies throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century. The Australian and New Zealand governments tried to forestall and accommodate 
these changes, while defending the British character of both nations. 
The threat posed by Japan’s expansion illustrated the uncertain position of Australia and 
New Zealand in the world. This uncertainty was compounded by Britain’s inability to come to 
their aid and by Britain’s reduced power in the post-war world. The Australian government, and 
to a lesser extent the New Zealand government, recognised Britain’s decline and tried to offset 
this by moving closer towards the United States and by actively engaging with the Asia-Pacific 
region. The first two sections of this chapter detail the different ways the war was experienced. 
The most significant effect of this was that the Australian experience exacerbated an invasion 
anxiety that was already more pronounced than in New Zealand. As a result, the Australian 
government adopted a range of policy initiatives from a vastly expanded immigration 
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programme to a foreign policy that embraced the United States and was concerned with the 
future of Asia. These policies and the geopolitical outlook they included influenced the type of 
national identity subsequent Australian governments invoked to take the place of a British 
identity as the British Empire declined. Likewise, New Zealand’s experience of the war gave 
strength to the idea that New Zealand was largely isolated from great events and that the New 
Zealand government could continue the task of creating an ideal society in the South Pacific. 
Unlike during federation and World War I, these different experiences during the Second World 
War underlined and exacerbated pre-existing differences between Australia and New Zealand. 
This period marked the beginning of a major divergence between the nationalisms the two 
governments promoted. The rest of this thesis will consider the extent of this divergence. 
 The war had a significant impact on race relations in the two antipodean nations and 
this affected the relationship between race and national identity. The effects were somewhat 
contradictory. The New Zealand government’s enthusiasm for Māori participation in the 
conflict illustrated the central position of Māori within the government’s nationalist rhetoric. 
The Australian government’s refusal to let Indigenous Australians openly serve was emblematic 
of the position of Indigenous Australians within the government’s rhetoric. However, at the 
same time the two governments adopted assimilationist policies that provided little space for 
indigenous autonomy or cultural protection. Although the Australian government enacted a far 
more radical immigration programme, both governments described their immigration policies 
in similar terms; intended to strengthen the nation and protect it from foreign invasion, while 
maintaining the British character of each society.  
 The Second World War also set a number of broader processes in motion that affected 
the governments in similar ways. This is a clear illustration of Simms’s argument that Australia 
and New Zealand are path dependent and that Australia and New Zealand continued to change 
within a common framework.1 A clear comparative appraisal of the Australian and New Zealand 
governments must simultaneously explain and understand the developing differences, while 
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also highlighting the extent to which they were both caught up in similar global and local 
currents hurtling them towards a new and uncertain future.  
The diminished influence of traditional colonial powers in Asia and the Pacific created an 
increasing move towards decolonisation. The creation of a number of independent post-
colonial states meant that the Australian and New Zealand governments could no longer ignore 
the non-European voices in the region. They were both forced to take a more activist role in the 
region, but even more importantly they had to take into account the opinion of Asian nations. 
This placed increasing pressure on the immigration policies of both settler nations. No longer 
could they ignore their regions and place all their hopes on British Imperial protection. These 
changes threatened long-held assumptions about the nature of the world and the political 
identities those governments used to position themselves in that world. In the end, neither 
government challenged the core of their British settler nationalism, but instead they tried to 
encourage the United States to take Britain’s place in order to maintain the status quo and 
protect the British character of each nation. Although this worked in the short term, as time 
passed these challenges would become more pressing, eventually rendering the core 
assumptions of both governments’ settler nationalisms untenable.  
Different War Experiences  
The war forced the governments of New Zealand and Australia to consider the strategic 
position of their nation and to articulate protective strategies. This period was particularly 
important because it illustrated the limits of British power and thus the limited utility of a policy 
that prioritised British protection and Britishness above all else. Events throughout the war 
caused both governments, but particularly the Australian government, to invoke new strategic 
priorities which challenged the foundations of a perspective that relied totally on the Empire. 
As the governments discussed the changes in the world and the new strategic environment 
they faced, they were both implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, challenging one of the core 
tenets of their British settler nationalisms. The disruption caused by the Second World War 
therefore had a profound impact on the nationalist rhetoric governments used in each country. 
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The changes were only minor at first but would become increasingly marked from the 1960s 
onwards.  
 In order to understand the impact of this period on the two nations, and how those 
effects were reflected in political rhetoric, it is important to outline the different ways in which 
the two countries experienced the war. These differences significantly influenced the historical 
trajectory of the two nations. They both reinforced and extended the different geopolitical 
considerations of the two governments and these differences had a fundamental impact on the 
nationalist rhetoric the two governments used.  
In 1939 and 1940 both governments were focussed on the European war theatre. 
However, the bombing of Pearl Harbour and the loss of Singapore shifted their focus closer to 
home and shattered their sense of distance from the conflict. As the Japanese Army moved into 
South-East Asia it became clear that Australia and New Zealand were strategically isolated. It 
was obvious that Britain could not come to the aid of either country. As Singapore fell and 
northern Australia was bombed, Australia faced the greatest potential military threat to its 
survival since European occupation. David Day, Russell McGregor and others have explored the 
history of Australian anxiety over the lack of intensive development of the north.2 This anxiety 
needs to be understood within the context of a perceived threat of invasion.3 In the nineteenth 
century threats primarily involved Great Power rivalry. In the twentieth century the threat 
emanated from Asia. Japan’s attack on Australia therefore heightened the deepest fear in 
Australian settler-society, which was that an Asian nation would look to Australia, with its 
ample open spaces, as a solution to its problems of over-population.4 Implicit within this 
concern was the fear that the nation-building project in Australia had not gone far enough to 
ensure the survival of the Australian nation.  
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 Australia was forced to confront its geography in a way that New Zealand was not. 
Australia’s proximity to Asia and the bombing of Darwin made the threat posed to Australia 
more apparent.5 At the same time Britain and the other colonial powers in Asia had been 
irreparably weakened.6 Therefore, the government perceived a far more serious threat to the 
Australian nation and thus engaged in a more radical reconceptualising of the nation’s position 
in the world. This change was recognised by the Liberal MP, Roger Dean (Robertson) who 
redefined Asia as no longer being “the ‘far East’”, but instead “is now to us the ‘near North’”.7 
From this period onwards the Australian government would show far greater concern, and 
engagement, with Asia than the New Zealand government would.  
The New Zealand government was also greatly concerned about Japan’s gains in the 
Pacific, and was forced to reconsider its strategic priorities. However, for the most part, this 
challenge was framed as an abstract issue rather than a central challenge to the 
nation.8Member of the Legislative Council Thomas Bloodworth (Auckland) provides a good 
example of this strategic outlook and contingent view of the world when he spoke of the strain 
the war was placing on Britain and the US: 
We must realise that we will be living in a changed world. Those who live in 
this remote part of the world should try to be sure that there will be no 
animosity created between them and their near neighbours.9 
The fall of Singapore certainly shook the nation’s confidence in the protection provided by the 
British Empire.10 Nonetheless, New Zealand, at the southern end of the Pacific, felt more secure 
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in its geographical isolation and did not express the same need to radically rethink their 
position within the world.11 
 The New Zealand government also continued to portray itself as the most British and 
the most loyal Dominion. Labour backbencher Phillip Connolly (Dunedin West) invoked this idea 
by quoting Winston Churchill in a British newspaper: 
Tonight, I am going to content myself with the words of the Right Hon. Mr 
Winston Churchill, who said, “New Zealand has never put a foot wrong,” and a 
statement that appeared in the London Evening Standard — “New Zealand is 
an ally as big in loyalty as it is small in numbers; New Zealand is the mighty 
atom of the British Empire.12 
The government drew on its own long tradition of portraying itself as the ‘most dutiful 
daughter’ and tried to use that rhetoric to influence Britain. The government clearly linked that 
cultural identity with its strategic objectives and continued to use British identity rhetoric to 
secure New Zealand’s future. 
David Day describes 1941 as a major turning point in Australia’s history, as a moment 
when Australia cast off the shackles of colonial subservience and asserted its autonomy.13 It is 
worth reiterating Prime Minister John Curtin’s famous statement from December 1941: 
Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks 
to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links of kinship with the 
United Kingdom. We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We 
know the constant threat of invasion, we know the dangers of dispersal of 
strength, but we know, too, that Australia can go and Britain can still hold 
on.14 
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A nationalist reading of the speech casts it as a major breakthrough, where an Australian prime 
minister discarded the cultural cringe and adopted an Australian first approach to foreign 
policy.15 Other scholars such as James Curran take a more circumspect perspective and see it as 
a reflection of the new challenges Australia faced rather than an expression of a latent cultural 
identity.16 Regardless, the speech is significant because it reflected the new concerns the 
Australian nation faced in Asia and the extent to which the Australian government would rely 
on America to assuage those fears. 
The Australian government’s withdrawal of its troops from the European theatre 
illustrated their different attitude compared with New Zealand’s government. As the Japanese 
military moved closer to Australia Churchill suggested that the Australian troops be moved 
closer to Australia, Curtin agreed. However, Churchill wanted the troops in Burma to stop the 
Japanese advance there, while Curtin wanted them back in Australia to protect Australia from 
invasion. Curtin did something that was almost unthinkable at the time. He overrode Churchill’s 
instructions and brought the troops back to Australia. The Australian government’s decision 
contrasted with the New Zealand government’s decision to keep its troops in the 
Mediterranean. James Belich argues that the troops should have been brought home. He 
criticises historians who, “As recently as 2000 … still claimed that the New Zealand 
government’s decision to fight in the Mediterranean rather than the Pacific shows a ‘strong 
grasp of strategic principle’.”17 Belich bemoans the fact that the New Zealand government was 
seduced by the desire to be the most loyal Dominion and did not follow in Australia’s footsteps. 
Nationalist historians interpret Australia’s actions as more ‘independent’ than New 
Zealand’s.18 Others argue that both countries simply engaged in a rational assessment over 
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their own national interests.19 It is worth considering at this juncture the role of Australia and 
New Zealand’s national self-conceptions. The Australian government wanted its own navy and 
greater control of its national army, while the New Zealand government was happy to leave 
Britain in charge.20 Australian governments had a more ingrained “invasion anxiety”.21 On the 
other hand, New Zealand governments felt more secure in their geographic position and they 
have always been aware of the limits of New Zealand’s power. As a small nation New Zealand 
attempted to use its status as the most loyal Dominion to gain greater influence than its 
strength would otherwise allow.22 
These different self-conceptions had significant policy implications. The New Zealand 
government was far more likely to acquiesce to British demands as long as it meant that New 
Zealand was perceived in a positive light. The Australian government was less likely to defer to 
British policy, especially when British power was clearly declining. More specifically, after the 
fall of Singapore both Australia and New Zealand were acutely preoccupied with the fear of 
invasion, but this threat was more pressing for Australia than it was for New Zealand. As British 
power waned, the different geographic position of Australia and New Zealand would become 
more important. 
At the same time, the Australian and New Zealand governments both expressed concern 
at the extended reach of the Japanese in the Pacific and “the extreme peril” into which 
Australia and New Zealand were “thrown” by the threat of “Japanese invasion.”23 The loss of 
British protection highlighted the vulnerability of Australia and New Zealand, and the 
governments of both nations responded by redoubling war efforts at home, whilst also 
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attempting to gain guarantees of support from Britain and the United States.24 Although the 
two governments enacted many similar policies and also began to co-ordinate their efforts, 
they did so for different reasons. The fall of Singapore represented the fulfilment of long-held 
fears in Australia that the country was threatened by invasion and that British military strength 
was not sufficient to protect it.25 For New Zealand, the fall of Singapore shattered the belief 
that dutiful service to the British Empire would guarantee New Zealand’s security.26 Deputy 
Chairman of the War Cabinet William Perry (Arch Hill) described New Zealand’s exposed 
position clearly: 
Now that Australia and New Zealand are the last bastions of democracy 
between Japan and the South Pole, and now that the danger of invasion of 
those two countries as the last two remaining bases from which an offensive 
can be launched against the enemy is realized, the people are beginning to 
demand more and more action.27 
This event enhanced Australia’s drive to seek out alternative forms of security and to take a 
more active role in its own defence. The shock was probably greater for New Zealand, because 
for the first time the New Zealand government was forced to divide its loyalties between great 
powers.  
The fall of Singapore was clearly a decisive moment in the history of both Australia and 
New Zealand. While geography and the proximity to the Japanese Army added immediacy and 
heightened anxiety in Australia, the event had a remarkably similar impact on both nations: 
both countries were forced to reconsider their reliance on the United Kingdom, and both 
governments felt compelled to take a more active role in Asia and the Pacific. This exemplifies 
two seemingly contradictory effects that this thesis explores. These events that disrupted the 
settler nationalisms in each country exacerbated or uncovered important fundamental 
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differences between the two nations, while the similar impacts of these events shaped the 
changes in the settler nationalism in the same broad direction. 
The fall of Singapore damaged the image of Britain as a benevolent and powerful 
protector, which in turn generated doubt about the power and permanence of the British 
Empire. Unlike the First World War, where the experience of war reaffirmed the importance of 
the Empire and Britishness within Australia and New Zealand, the Second World War had the 
opposite effect. As the Empire looked increasingly fragile this fundamentally undermined a 
central tenet of previous governments’ world views that were premised on British protection, 
above all other concerns, and that protection was guaranteed by the assertion of the 
Britishness of the Australian and New Zealand nation. These concerns about the permanence of 
Empire would only increase as the twentieth century progressed and successive governments 
were forced to find a substitute for the British Empire and, as a result, a substitute for a British 
settler identity. The Second World War did not cause the demise of British settler nationalism in 
Australia and New Zealand, but it marked the beginning of a set of processes that would end in 
its demise. As Britishness receded, the differences in geopolitical outlook of the two 
governments were far more obvious than in preceding generations.  
United States and Changing World Views 
As was the case during World War I, the Australian government had a more enthusiastic 
attitude towards the United States than did the New Zealand government. This difference in 
attitudes is a vivid example of the interplay between ideology and historical forces that 
threatened those ideologies. It illustrates the powerful effect that nationalist rhetoric and 
geopolitical visions had on government policy. The first two chapters of this thesis 
demonstrated that Australian governments tried to develop closer ties with the US. In order to 
do this they portrayed the United States as a part of the British speaking world and, therefore, 
part of Australia’s wider imagined community. This laid the discursive groundwork for closer 
relations with the US and made it easier for the Australian government to justify the United 
States taking Britain’s place as Australia’s ‘great and powerful friend’. The same was not true 
for New Zealand. As earlier chapters demonstrated, successive governments portrayed New 
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Zealand as the most British Dominion, and they largely ignored the United States. It was more 
difficult then, for the government to conceive of the United States taking Britain’s place, let 
alone justify this change to the New Zealand public. This issue is a good example of the 
importance of the influence of nationalist rhetoric and the effect that rhetoric has on the 
strategic priorities and perspectives of the Australian and New Zealand governments. In this 
instance, while both governments were equally affected by the decline of Britain, the Australian 
government unequivocally embraced the United States in a way that the New Zealand 
government did not.  
By the end of the war Australia and New Zealand were both reliant on American military 
protection and the policies the two governments enacted reflected this similarity. Yet the style 
of the two governments differed. Australia had a longer history of looking towards the US and 
there had, at times, been significant disagreement between Australia and Britain during World 
War II.28 By the end of the war both the Australian Labor and the Liberal parties had accepted 
the changed strategic situation. The ANZUS treaty was seen as both desirable and inevitable.29 
There was some concern within the Australian Parliament that Australia was undermining its 
historic relationship with Britain, but these doubts were assuaged by Richard Casey (La Trobe) 
who assured the Parliament that the proposal “had the approval and support of the United 
Kingdom.”30 New Zealand Parliamentarians were far more troubled than their Australian 
counterparts. MPs expressed grave concerns that the US, often viewed with distrust, would 
replace Britain as New Zealand’s primary ally.31 The Labour opposition tried to inflame anxiety 
about the role the United States would play in New Zealand and the extent to which it would 
eclipse Britain. The government tried to quash these concerns by framing the treaty as a 
supplement to New Zealand’s relationship with Britain, instead of a radical reorganisation of 
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New Zealand’s defence policy. Rhetorically, the Australian government was much more 
accepting of the rise of the United States than the New Zealand government. 
 Australian governments had long perceived Asian nations as a threat, and this allowed 
Australians to readily look to the United States as a protector. On the other hand, the New 
Zealand government had to, in a very short space of time, redefine its image of the United 
States. Political discourse in New Zealand up until World War II had ignored the United States, 
and this made it much more difficult for the government and society to accept America taking 
Britain’s place as New Zealand’s great and powerful friend. Nevertheless, the re-casting of the 
US in New Zealand followed much the same path as that taken by various Australian 
governments since the late nineteenth century. 
Race relations 
The Second World War caused the governments of Australia and New Zealand to define the 
nations they were fighting to defend, just as they had during World War I. One of the main 
points of contrast between the two nations was the place of indigenous peoples. The New 
Zealand government continued to proclaim the superiority of New Zealand’s race relations and 
use Māori participation in the war as evidence of the moral superiority of New Zealand. In 
contrast, the Australian government continued its tradition of ignoring the Indigenous 
population in order to proclaim the homogeneity of Australian society.  
The Second World War had an even more pronounced effect on the immigration 
policies of the two governments. Australia’s experience during the war and its long-standing 
invasion anxiety caused the Australian government to adopt a transformative immigration 
policy by drastically increasing non-British immigration into Australia. The New Zealand 
government also increased its immigration intake, but because of its different geopolitical 
outlook it was not willing to accept non-British immigrants to the same extent. This illustrates 
one of the most important impacts that the Second World War had on Australia and New 
Zealand. It was significant because it exacerbated underlying differences in the outlooks of the 
89 
 
two governments and this difference in perspective led to policies that caused a fundamental 
divergence in the demographic character of the two nations.  
The Australian and New Zealand governments were not wholly preoccupied with foreign 
policy during this period. They also had to come to terms with the growing demands of 
indigenous groups in both nations. During World War II Indigenous Australians were not 
officially allowed to serve in the armed forces. Despite this, over 3,000 Indigenous people 
joined the armed forces.32 The official policy was that any person “not substantially of European 
descent” was barred from serving.33 Yet from the very outbreak of war small numbers of 
Indigenous Australians were accepted into the army. By 1940, the policy had been readjusted 
to allow ‘half castes’ to join while still barring ‘full bloods’.34 The government resisted calls for 
the creation of an Aboriginal Division. This policy reflected the attitude of the federal 
government and the continued lack of recognition of Indigenous Australians within Australia. 
The fact that at least three thousand Indigenous Australians served in the conflict pays 
testimony to the determination and tenacity of Indigenous groups, who fought hard to try and 
gain recognition through involvement in the war, despite the Australian government’s 
obstructionism.35 
Māori did not suffer the same difficulties in New Zealand. Māori MPs promoted the 
participation of Māori in World War II and advocated the creation of a Māori Battalion, which 
was formed in October 1939.36 MPs lauded the Māori Battalion and used it as evidence of New 
Zealand’s superior race relations, just as the government had done during World War I.37 It 
portrayed Māori enlistment as Māori loyalty to the Crown, which in turn reinforced the notion 
that New Zealand was a harmonious and egalitarian nation.38 For New Zealand, the inclusion of 
Māori in the imagined community of the nation helped the government portray the nation as 
                                                                
32
Robert A. Hall, The black diggers: Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in the Second World War(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1989), 189. 
33
Ibid., 19. 
34
Ibid., 17. 
35
Robert Hall, "Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in the Second World War," in Aborigines in the defence of Australia, ed. 
Desmond Ball (Sydney: Australian National University Press, 1991), 33. 
36
Claudia Orange, "The price of citizenship? The Maori war effort," in Kia Kaha: New Zealand in the Second World War, ed. John 
Crawford (South Melbourne, Vic: Oxford University Press, 2002), 236. 
37
Rabel,252. 
38
 For example: NZPD, House, vol. 263 (1944): 148. 
90 
 
harmonious and egalitarian. The Australian government used the same rhetoric of unity and 
equality, but excluded Indigenous peoples from this rhetoric. 
Alongside indigenous policy, immigration policy was also a pressing issue in both nations 
and governments on both sides of the Tasman grappled with the desire to maintain the British 
character of their nations against other strategic and demographic imperatives. The insecurity 
created by the Second World War propelled the Australian government to increase its intake of 
immigrants in order to fill Australia’s empty spaces and protect Australia against invasion. 
Robert Menzies (Kooyong), still in opposition in 1945, neatly encapsulated this attitude: 
The risk that we shall take in the future without a large increase in population 
stares us in the face. If we are to avoid that risk by getting population, then 
we must be prepared to adopt an adventurous policy of migration. We must 
be prepared to take risks with some of our standards of perfection, with some 
of our problems, in order to get people to come here.39 
Yet this policy presumed an endless supply of British migrants.40 It quickly became clear that 
Britain could not supply the required number of immigrants and the Australian government was 
forced to look further afield.41 The government had always welcomed western and northern 
European immigrants in small numbers, but these sources alone would not fill up Australia’s 
empty spaces. Grudgingly, the government classified southern Europeans as desirable 
immigrants. World War II had created millions of displaced peoples throughout Europe and the 
Australian government accepted a massive one hundred and seventy thousand refugees from 
1947-1950.42 This policy would have a fundamental effect on the ethnic and cultural makeup of 
Australia.  
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The New Zealand government also wanted to attract more British migrants. However, 
the government did not want to allow such a large influx of non-British migrants into New 
Zealand, which could potentially threaten the British character of the New Zealand nation. The 
government did loosen its immigration criteria, and as a result New Zealand gained a small but 
distinctive Dutch community.43 However, the New Zealand government was not willing to 
follow Australia’s lead and instead remained content with a low level of ‘desirable’ immigrants. 
 Whereas the Australian government’s insecurities about Australia’s proximity to Asia 
overrode concerns about the effects non-British immigrants would have on the nation, in New 
Zealand, population increases were simply part of the nation building process. In New Zealand 
there was less urgency surrounding the immigration issue, and there was also an awareness of 
the potential negative consequences of an expansive immigration programme.44 The 
government was not willing to seriously change its immigration policy, because there was not 
the same sense of geopolitical vulnerability. 
In Australia there was palpable urgency and MPs linked immigration to the very survival 
of the nation; the rhetoric of “populate or perish” re-emerged with a vengeance.45 Billy Hughes 
(North Sydney), still as lively as he had been in World War I, argued that “We must populate 
and develop this country, and so order ourselves that the world will say, ‘The Australians are a 
people worthy of their freedom and of the right to unfettered control of this great country.’46 
European ‘control’ of the country was imperative if the expected armies of Asia were to be 
thwarted, and this explains the differing approaches to immigration taken in Canberra and 
Wellington. 
Despite the New Zealand government’s attempt at maintaining homogeneity, New 
Zealand did undergo its own demographic transformation from this period onwards. Before 
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World War II, the vast majority of Māori lived in rural areas away from the majority of the 
Pakeha population.47 However, the post-war boom meant there was increasing demand for 
workers in the cities. Māori moved to the cities in increasing numbers to make the most of the 
new economic opportunities. This process transformed Māori from a predominantly rural to a 
predominately urban group within the space of a generation.48 
The other major change was an increase in Pacific Island immigration to New Zealand.49 
Pacific Islanders were increasingly given New Zealand citizenship and while this was ostensibly 
awarded to populations under New Zealand colonial rule, Islanders outside of that rule could 
access a range of haphazardly monitored temporary work visas.50 The result was a large influx 
of Pacific Island immigration. This increase in Māori and Pacific Island population, and their 
visibility within New Zealand society, would give New Zealand a different ethnic makeup from 
that which was planned by the post-war government.51 These changes were not as 
transformational as those happening in Australia, but they were significant.  
The post-war period in Australia and New Zealand saw the most significant shift in 
immigration policy that would put the two nations on increasingly divergent demographic 
paths. The increasing ethnic diversity within Australia would give the country a multicultural 
character, while New Zealand remained more ethnically homogeneous and the Pakeha-Māori 
dynamic continued to dominate the political discourse. It is important to note that during this 
period both governments continued to define their nations as British. It was the combination of 
geography, demography and increasingly different geopolitical perspectives which caused these 
distinct population policies, rather than any natural or inevitable cultural differences between 
the two societies. Nevertheless, this policy divergence was a turning point in the history of the 
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two nations, the effects of which are still being felt today. Australia continues to grapple with 
the challenges of multiculturalism; New Zealand negotiates the implications of biculturalism.  
This policy difference also highlights a recurring paradox that has continued throughout 
the twentieth century. The Australian government has consistently drawn upon stronger 
racialist language, expressed greater antipathy towards Asia and invoked the politics of fear 
more often than the New Zealand government. Yet the Australian government also had a far 
more expansive and a less discriminatory immigration policy, and has a far more generous 
policy toward refugees. Ironically, that pervasive fear of the Asian peril led Australia on a path 
to pluralism and multiculturalism. The New Zealand government, on the other, had consistently 
reaffirmed its superior race relations, while maintaining more restrictive immigration and 
refugee programmes. From this period onwards the differences in geopolitical perspectives, 
and the consequent different demographic legacies, of the two governments would come to 
exert ever greater influence on the political rhetoric and policies of successive Australian and 
New Zealand governments.  
Assimilation 
It is important to remember that these differences in indigenous relations and immigration 
policy existed within a similar assimilationist framework. The assimilation of all non-white non-
British peoples and cultures into a core culture was the goal of both governments, and this 
policy was intended to maintain the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of both nations. Despite 
the differences in the rhetoric of the two governments they were both committed to the same 
policy and both invoked nationalist rhetoric to promote and justify their policies. In fact, the 
Australian and New Zealand governments both framed indigenous issues in a similar way by 
calling for their assimilation into mainstream society and expressing concern at their supposed 
‘delinquency’. Likewise, both governments framed immigration as a way to protect the nation, 
increase the population and maintain the Britishness of both nations.  
Previous chapters have shown the importance of assimilation in the first half of the 
century in protecting the British character of Australia and New Zealand. Both governments 
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continued their commitment to assimilation and the maintenance of British settler nationalism. 
From Federation until World War I Indigenous Australians were almost entirely absent from 
federal parliamentary debates. This reflected the priorities of the governments and the position 
accorded to Indigenous peoples within the national imagination.52 However, by 1939, a new 
level of concern about Indigenous peoples was evident in the parliamentary debates. In 1942, 
Arthur Calwell (Melbourne), Minister for Information of the newly elected Labor government, 
made a strong moral case for reform: 
The failure of the Commonwealth Parliament over a period of 40 years to 
recognise full-blooded and half-caste aborigines as human beings has 
probably no parallel in the world. We have no reason to be proud of our 
treatment of our aboriginal population.53 
The creation of the Northern Territory in 1911 was a central cause of this change, which for the 
first time gave the federal government jurisdiction over many Indigenous peoples.54 More 
importantly, Indigenous Australians were undergoing a demographic revival.55 The government 
could no longer draw upon the familiar excuse that Indigenous Australians would not survive 
and were, therefore, destined for the dustbin of history. This new reality meant that the 
treatment of Indigenous peoples and their place within the nation had to be reassessed. 
Furthermore, Indigenous advocacy groups had exposed the terrible conditions in which most 
Indigenous peoples were forced to live, and the tales of abject poverty did not easily square 
with the notions of prosperity and egalitarianism many Australians held dear.56 By the start of 
the Second World War Indigenous Australians were more prominent in the national discourse 
and the central concern shifted to the (mis)treatment of Indigenous Australians and the 
responsibilities of the state to address this issue. 
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What is significant about this shift is the change in the way indigenous disadvantage was 
conceived. In the past, the decline of Indigenous peoples and their poor treatment on stations 
was cast as a result of immutable historical processes, connected with Social Darwinism.57 By 
the end of World War II, however, parliamentarians urged the government to address past 
injustices.58 In practice, Indigenous peoples were still highly marginalised within society, but on 
a symbolic level they had moved from a footnote of a bygone era to a pressing issue of national 
importance.  
The portrayal of Māori in the New Zealand parliamentary debates also underwent an 
important change by the end of World War II. In 1940, the New Zealand government passed 
further legislation to alter the Māori Land Courts.59 They pushed for the continuing 
individualisation of Māori land in order to continue the development of rural land. By the end 
of World War II, a new demographic process had begun which caused successive governments’ 
intense anxiety. Māori had begun to move into the cities in order to seek new opportunities, 
but with urbanisation came fears about the capacity of Māori to cope with city life and the 
likelihood of increased social problems.60 As Māori moved into the cities Pakeha were 
confronted by people with whom they had previously had little contact. Increasingly, the 
discourse surrounding Māori-Pakeha relations became focussed on the ‘problems’ in 
Māoridom, which the government had to address, in the same way many Australians were 
concerned by the plight of indigenous people in their own society. 
 In both nations assimilationist ideas underpinned government attitudes towards 
indigenous minorities.61 The New Zealand government used Māori participation as evidence of 
Māori assimilation, while the Australian government was more ambivalent about Indigenous 
involvement in the war. New Zealand sought the ‘Europeanisation’ of Māori through the 
promotion of European culture and economic practices. The Australian state governments 
enacted the more extreme policy of child removal, which sought to irreparably disrupt 
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Indigenous culture and society.62 By the middle of the twentieth century, neither government 
was willing to accept the existence of any group outside of the control of the settler state. Both 
governments framed Indigenous peoples as ‘problems’ for the settler government to ‘solve’.  
  It would seem likely that different immigration policies in Australia and New Zealand 
would be reflected in the rhetoric of the two governments and their attitudes towards non-
British immigrants and refugees. The New Zealand government could have emphasised the 
otherness of non-British immigrants, while the Australian government might have highlighted 
their capacity to be good settlers. However, this was not the case. Both governments took a 
relatively benign attitude towards non-British immigrants. They were seen as a good source of 
manpower and a means to build the nation.63 Immigrants served a similar purpose in both 
nations and MPs in New Zealand and Australia positioned immigrants as outside the imagined 
community, but with the capacity to assimilate into mainstream society.64 Calwell emphasises 
‘the right type’ of immigrants; in the same address he reassured Parliament that: “Aliens are 
and will continue to be admitted only in such numbers and of such classes that they can be 
readily assimilated.”65 In New Zealand William Bodkin (Minister for Internal Affairs) criticised 
the current immigration policy because it made it difficult for immigrants to naturalise: 
It does create a problem. If that policy is allowed to continue indefinitely it 
will, as the member for Grey Lynn pointed out, tend to build up colonies of 
aliens within our country. That tendency must be discouraged. Asiatic 
immigrants who are allowed into the country — and I do believe we have to 
accept a certain proportion — must have impressed upon them that they are 
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expected as far as possible, to adapt themselves to our way of life and to 
become New Zealand citizens, not only in name but in fact.66 
This negotiation of the otherness of immigrants offers a clear insight into the Australian and 
New Zealand governments’ attitudes towards the maintenance of cultural and racial 
homogeneity. It illustrates the extent to which their policies formed a central part of their 
British settler nationalisms and was, therefore, an important part of the nation-building project 
in both countries.  
A Changing World 
Just as the differences in race relations in the two countries existed within a similar 
assimilationist paradigm both governments were affected by a similar set of global forces that 
were changing the world and pushing Australia and New Zealand in new directions. Despite the 
important differences, the Second World War is a good example of the path dependence of 
Australia and New Zealand.67 The war increased the speed of the decline of the European 
colonial powers in Asia and the Pacific, forcing them to abandon their colonial possession in the 
post-war period. This had serious effects on the political makeup of the Asia-Pacific region, 
which in turn had ramifications for Australia and New Zealand. Specifically, it was no longer 
tenable for governments on either side of the Tasman to rely upon Britain and other colonial 
powers to maintain Western hegemony in their region. This represented the most serious 
challenge to the policy of White Australia since its creation. Likewise, both governments had to 
reconsider their attitudes towards their colonial possessions and indigenous populations. For 
both governments, the effect of the Second World War was highly disruptive. It challenged long 
held assumptions about the nature of the world and the type of strategy each government 
could pursue to ensure its security. On a more fundamental level, it represented a challenge to 
their strategy of portraying themselves as European outposts on the edge of Asia and the 
Pacific. From this period onwards both governments paid much more attention to their own 
region and were much more aware of their reputation in the non-Western world. This greater 
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awareness would eventually lead governments in both nations to abandon a racially defined 
British-centric national identity.  
Both governments viewed their region with increasing disquiet. Asia, and in particular 
Japan, was still perceived as a threat to Australia, and this was clear in the discussions of the 
Japanese peace treaty. Minister for External Affairs Richard Casey (La Trobe) highlights this 
anxiety: 
It is difficult to say the greater potential threat that of a revived Japanese 
militarism, alone or in association with other aggressive forces, or of a Japan 
taken over by an aggressive power and incorporated in the Communist 
empire.68 
Japan’s role in World War II also heightened the New Zealand government’s sense of 
vulnerability. National backbencher Jack Eyre (North Shore) used rhetoric similar to the 
Australian government: 
In the Northern part of the Pacific … [there] are many countries which are 
over-populated. Our country, with its ample food, mild climate, and high living 
conditions, no doubt appears very desirable to many of the people in those 
countries.69 
Governments in Australia and New Zealand changed the way they framed the Asia-Pacific 
region and they expressed a great deal of anxiety about their geographic position. It is 
important to keep in mind the extent to which both governments had to reconsider their 
position in the world. The examples in this paragraph illustrate the rhetorical similarities, which 
reflected a similar fear of Asian invasion and a heightened awareness of their isolation as 
European nations on the edge of Asia. 
Just as at the end of World War I, the Australian and the New Zealand governments 
used their contribution to the allied war effort to pursue their interests in the Pacific. Both 
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governments continued to administer colonies in the Pacific. They described their possessions 
as useful economic and strategic resources. In the New Zealand Parliament during the 
discussion of the ANZAC Pact (discussed in detail below) the Minister of Defence Frederick 
Jones (St Kilda) claimed Australia and New Zealand’s right to control the South Pacific territories 
and Papua and New Guinea: 
We agree that Australia and New Zealand should work together in connection 
with the defence of this part of the world ... [If] that can be done, then 
certainly we are going ahead and providing greater security for our own 
country.70 
At the same time both governments portrayed the administration of their territories as a 
humanitarian obligation.71 The rhetoric surrounding these colonies reflected some continuities 
with the first half of the century. The New Zealand government spent more time describing its 
superior treatment of the Pacific peoples, while the Australian government was more 
preoccupied with the strategic significance of Papua and New Guinea.72 At the same time both 
governments wanted to maintain their colonial possessions and they portrayed the colonies as 
important strategic possessions. There was no recognition in either parliament of the potential, 
or perhaps inevitable, conflict between this humanitarianism and the desire to create a buffer 
zone between the Dominions and Asia.  
By the end of the war, it was obvious that the world was changing. The colonies were 
now called mandates and they were administered under the supervision of the United Nations, 
with the explicit intention of moving them towards self-government.73 Along with this new 
outlook came more emphasis on the welfare of the indigenous inhabitants of the colonies. This 
shift in attitude was most obvious in Australia. Individual MPs showed far greater concern for 
the treatment of the colonial subjects. However, this more enlightened attitude had clear 
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limitations and remained firmly entrenched in a colonial mindset, as this quotation from 
Minister for External Affairs in 1941 Allan McDonald (Western Australia) illustrates: 
Throughout the Territory the behaviour of the natives is wonderfully good 
considering the fact that a great many of them were taken from their home 
villages and separated from their women folk for their periods of three years 
as indentured labourers.74 
The rhetoric in the Australian Parliament had much in common with New Zealand’s political 
rhetoric.  
The New Zealand government linked its reputation on race relations with its 
maintenance of its colonial possessions. Labour backbencher Terence McCombs (Lyttleton) 
described the interrelationship between race relations and colonial possessions: “[O]ur dealings 
with the Māori people have brought admirable results. That gives New Zealand an opportunity 
to assist others from her experience.”75 Both governments expressed greater concern for their 
colonial subjects and perhaps more importantly they were more aware of how other countries 
perceived their colonial administrations. For the New Zealand government, the need to 
maintain a positive international reputation through benevolent colonial policy had a long-
standing history. The government was quick to highlight New Zealand’s superior race relations 
and civilised colonial administrations.76 MPs deployed nationalist rhetoric, using glowing 
language to portray New Zealand as an ideal society, with faultless colonial policies and 
relations with the peoples of the South Pacific. This meant the government was happy to accept 
the increasing scrutiny of colonial powers: New Zealand, the government believed, had nothing 
to hide. Both the Australian and New Zealand governments recognised that new post-colonial 
forces were taking hold around them, but the Australian government was much more 
concerned about Australia’s image in the non-western world than the New Zealand 
government was about its own international reputation.  
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This movement towards decolonisation went beyond Australia and New Zealand’s 
Pacific possessions; it also manifested in the decolonisation of Asia. This offered new challenges 
as well as new possibilities for Australia and New Zealand. Both governments felt uneasy about 
Britain’s push to divest itself of its colonial possessions.77 For Asian states decolonisation meant 
independence, whereas for Australia and New Zealand it represented abandonment. Both the 
Australian and New Zealand governments advocated the retention of European colonial rule in 
Asia and they generally supported European powers over emerging Asian nations. However, 
both governments were realistic enough to recognise the world was changing and that this 
required a new approach.  
The first sign of this different approach to Asia was Australia’s recognition of 
Indonesia.78 New Zealand supported Australia’s position, and at least some MPs recognised that 
the dynamic of colonial relations had irreparably altered, with Frederick Hacket (Grey Lynn) 
proclaiming that despite the “many problems” in Asia, “We are now living in an enlightened 
world.”79 This statement reflected the challenges and the new opportunities emerging from 
decolonisation. This new perspective also encouraged a more active and engaged attitude 
towards Asia and the Pacific. 
 Both governments re-examined the Asia-Pacific and their place within the Asia-Pacific 
region. Rather than isolating themselves from Asia, the Australian and, to a lesser extent, New 
Zealand governments recognised that they had important interests in the region, and that they 
therefore had to take a more active role. In New Zealand MPs began to take an interest in what 
was sometimes called the “world situation”.80 The seriousness of this new strategic challenge 
for Australia was enunciated by Richard Casey (La Trobe) Minister for External Affairs: 
Although Australia was colonised and developed by people of European stock, 
and although our cultural past and our present connexions are such that our 
eyes turn most naturally towards Europe, our geographical situation is such 
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that we must inevitably be brought into close touch with the peoples of 
Asia.81 
The assumptions that had underpinned the sense of security and sense of place in both 
countries were being seriously challenged. 
The final major effect of the changes taking place in the middle of the century pushed 
the Australian and New Zealand governments towards greater cooperation. The increasing 
insecurity that both governments felt pushed them to develop closer relations, and this greater 
co-operation culminated in the ANZAC Pact. This pact articulated the commitment in both 
Canberra and Wellington to greater co-operation and asserted the right of the Dominions to 
play an active role in the post-war order in the Pacific. Both governments framed improved 
bilateral relations as a response to the changing geo-strategic dynamic in the Pacific, but also as 
a reflection of the community of interest, shared history and common culture in Australia and 
New Zealand. National MP Jack Watts (Riccarton) in the New Zealand Parliament emphasised 
the importance of the two peoples coming together: 
The Australian-New Zealand Agreement is the first important agreement that 
has been entered into between the two sister-Dominions of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations ... The fact that the peoples of Australia and New 
Zealand have come together at all must receive the approval of all responsible 
people of this Dominion.82 
The ANZAC Pact is a good example of the combination of rhetoric and identity politics with 
more concrete policy issues. The Australian and New Zealand governments used this rhetoric to 
justify and legitimatise closer relations between the two countries. At the same time, the pre-
existence of ideas of British imperial unity and Australasia made co-operation (and later in the 
century economic integration) possible, when both Australia and New Zealand resisted such co-
operation with neighbouring non-European nations. 
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Britain’s decline  
As the above section has shown the Australian and New Zealand governments felt they were in 
an unstable and threatening strategic environment, no longer able to rely upon Britain to 
protect them from the outside world. The stationing of American troops in Australia and New 
Zealand was the most vivid illustration of this. Both governments recognised this new reality 
and accepted that their military protection came from the United States. This pushed the New 
Zealand government to adopt the political discourse that successive Australian governments 
had used throughout the first half of the twentieth century. The New Zealand government 
portrayed America as a part of the English speaking world and, therefore, sharing the same 
interests and reflecting a similar culture and set of values as New Zealand. In this sense the war 
pushed New Zealand’s political rhetoric closer to that of Australia, because they both framed 
the United States as a part of the same community of interest, even though it was separate 
from the British Empire. This is yet another example of the tensions and interactions between 
the geopolitical outlook that shaped each governments’ world view against the historical forces 
that challenged those assumptions. It also illustrates how inter-related the discourse 
surrounding security and foreign policy was with the discourses defining national identity in 
both nations.  
Governments on both sides of the Tasman employed rhetoric to justify their reliance on 
the United States. They both used a concept that had gained strength during the federation 
years in Australia: the idea that Britain and America were part of the same English speaking 
family and everyone within that family had essentially the same interests. They propounded the 
idea that despite America’s secession from the British Empire, America, Britain and the 
Dominions were united by shared language, culture and political institutions.83 The Australian 
government often used this rhetoric to draw the United States closer to Australia. In the first 
half of the twentieth century the New Zealand government did not engage in this rhetoric, 
preferring to emphasise New Zealand’s position as the most British of British Dominions. This 
changed after the fall of Singapore and the New Zealand government, like that of Australia, 
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sought to consolidate its relations with America. Suddenly, the New Zealand Parliament began 
to emphasise the fundamental unity of the English speaking world, as Thomas Macdonald 
(Wallace) illustrated: 
It is not a matter of Great Britain being dragged along by Uncle Sam’s coat-
tails, but rather a matter of Britain and America being partners engaged in the 
difficult and dangerous enterprise of moving along together ... They will blend 
in a way that will be invaluable to both those nations and to the world.84 
The New Zealand government paid tribute to the shared culture and traditions that 
distinguished Britain, America and the Dominions from the rest of the world.85 This sort of 
rhetoric would have been quite controversial before World War II; by the time of the signing of 
the ANZUS treaty it was commonplace.  
In 1951, Australia and New Zealand entered into a military agreement with the United 
States wherein all three nations committed to coming to the defence of each other if any one of 
them were attacked.86 For much of the twentieth century this event was interpreted in two 
ways. Radical nationalist such as Humphrey McQueen argued that Australia’s move towards the 
United States thwarted Australia’s development as an independent nation.87 A more realist 
interpretation views the ANZUS alliance as a necessary adjustment to the changing balance of 
power in the Pacific.88 David Mclean provides a more nuanced interpretation of this period that 
accords with the argument in this thesis. He argues that the former interpretation places too 
much emphasis on the 1940s as a turning point. He points out that there is a striking continuity 
in successive governments’ views of the United States and the role the United States should 
play in the Pacific.89 Mclean argues that the events in the 1940s caused major disruption and 
pushed Australia towards the United States, but rather than this being a break with the past, 
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this move must be understood as a continuation of the Australian governments’ preoccupation 
with the United States, since the turn of century, that was justified both through strategic 
necessity and because of “the ‘common heritage and tradition and way of life’ of Australia and 
America.”90 This accords with the argument developed in the first three chapters of this thesis. 
ANZUS represented the “rich prize” of a United States security guarantee.91 There was 
bipartisan support for ANZUS in Australia and New Zealand.92 Both governments recognised the 
pre-eminence of the United States in the Pacific and the necessity for good relations with the 
United States in order to fill the gap left by Britain. Japan had forced the Australian and New 
Zealand governments to accept their geographic position in the Pacific.93 However, rather than 
reducing the perceived importance of ‘great and powerful friends’, it highlighted the necessity 
of formal great-power protection.94 There was little substantive difference between Australia 
and New Zealand’s policy towards the United States in the post-war period.  
Brook Barrington’s thesis makes an important contribution to this discussion by 
comparing Australia and New Zealand’s attitude towards Asia. Barrington argues that by the 
end of World War II Australia had embraced its position as a middle power and sought to assert 
greater influence in the Asia-Pacific region.95 New Zealand, while also concerned about events 
in Asia, used the ANZUS treaty not to increase its influence, but instead to guarantee its security 
in the region so it could concentrate on its relationship with Europe. He argues that New 
Zealand tried to continue its tradition of isolation through ANZUS, but that an unintended (from 
New Zealand’s perspective) result of the treaty was greater involvement in Asia.96 This confirms 
that the different geographic position of Australia and New Zealand led them to develop 
different attitudes towards Asia and the Pacific. But Barrington’s blurry distinction between 
Asia and the Pacific does not sit well with the way New Zealand has, for most of its history, tried 
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to distance itself from Asia, while engaging with the Pacific. Successive New Zealand 
governments attempted to influence developments in the Pacific. Both Labour and National 
governments emphatically asserted their rights in the Pacific and framed the South Pacific as 
their first line of defence and as New Zealand’s legitimate sphere of influence.97 While it is 
useful and instructive to compare the differences between Australia and New Zealand, it 
becomes too easy to exaggerate the differences between the two nations, and to therefore 
obscure underlying similarities.  
Nevertheless it is important to note that despite the changes brought about by World 
War II, both the Australian and New Zealand governments continued to describe their nations 
as British. In the speech made by the Governor-General at the opening of parliament in 1952 
the New Zealand government articulated this idea in emphatic terms: 
The New Zealand Government will continue, by all means within its power, to 
strengthen still further the bonds of goodwill and kinship between this 
outpost of Empire and the Motherland ... Britain’s destiny is ours; her 
anxieties are ours; we share in her prosperity and also in her determination to 
play a worthy part in promoting the best interests and peace of our Empire, 
the Commonwealth, and the world.98 
Likewise in Australia, Country Party MP John McEwan (Indi) described Australia and New 
Zealand:  
Both [Australia and New Zealand] are sparsely occupied and are near to other 
Pacific countries occupied by teeming millions. If we were to lose, even for a 
decade, the right to control immigration, the British character of the 
population of the two Dominions would pass for ever. Australia would cease 
to be a British nation.99 
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These statements clearly illustrate the ongoing importance of a British identity in the political 
rhetoric in Australia and New Zealand at the time. Similarly, the rhetoric described in the 
previous section in which the two governments portrayed America as a part of the English-
speaking world was intended to portray America as a part of the British world rather than an 
attempt to portray Australia and New Zealand as moving into America’s sphere of influence 
The events in this period, particularly the fall of Britain and the rise of the United States, 
posed the most serious challenge to the British settler nationalisms of the Australian and New 
Zealand governments. Core aspects of this settler nationalism — including British military 
protection, membership of the British Empire, and the right to develop and protect a racially 
homogeneous population — seemed for the first time to be under threat. Despite both 
governments describing ANZUS as the means to protect the British Empire, ANZUS illustrated 
the clear limits of British power and this created a great deal of anxiety in both governments. 
Nonetheless, the two governments continued to describe their nations as fundamentally British 
and they hoped that the United States would ensure the survival of the British Empire. They did 
this in an attempt to forestall the consequences of the Second World War and they hoped that 
this would allow them to draw upon similar rhetoric and similar policies that had been 
entrenched since 1901, if not before. The Australian and New Zealand governments were 
successful in the short term. Conservative governments in the 1950s invoked nationalist 
rhetoric that would have been familiar to Richard Seddon and Edmund Barton. However, the 
cracks in the facade were widening and the challenges that may have seemed novel and 
temporary in the 1940s were endemic and confounding by the 1960s and would eventually lead 
new governments in 1972 to cast off the shackles of the British Imperial national identity and 
seek to replace it with a more inclusive, progressive, regionally focussed, and anti-colonial 
national identity. Before this could happen though, Britain and the world would have to 
undergo another set of changes in the 1960s that would make the issues raised during World 
War II impossible to ignore.  
Conclusion 
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The Australian and New Zealand governments’ responses to World War II offer some significant 
points of difference as well as some ongoing similarities. Japan’s invasion of Papua and New 
Guinea and the bombing of Darwin represented the fulfilment of Australia’s invasion anxiety. 
This led the government to seriously redefine Australia’s relationship to the Asia-Pacific region 
and the United States and frame the nation-building process as the imperative to ‘populate or 
perish’. New Zealand was not so directly threatened by Japan and as a result the New Zealand 
government did not embark on a similar radical reappraisal of New Zealand’s position within 
the world. Despite these differences, the two governments continued to draw upon similar 
settler nationalisms. They continued to define their nations as British, they both recognised the 
growing importance of the Asia-Pacific, and both understood that Britain could no longer 
protect them. This in turn meant both governments began to confront the idea that they could 
not continue as British outposts on the edge of Asia. The Second World War increased the 
importance of the different geographic positions of Australia and New Zealand. That difference 
led the Australian government to enact immigration reform that would put Australia and New 
Zealand on divergent demographic paths and increase Australia’s shift towards American 
protection.  
At the same time, the two governments continued to be concerned with the same 
challenges. They both remained committed to assimilation, they recognised Britain’s decline 
while still defining themselves as British, and they began to accept the geographic realities of 
their locations far from Europe and inexorably linked with the fate of Asia. This period vividly 
illustrates the different geopolitical challenges that influenced the construction of nationalism 
by the two governments. It also illustrates the similar forces affecting both countries and the 
extent to which this channelled both governments’ nationalisms in similar directions.  
 These geopolitical challenges caused a period of reassessment. In the 1960s, this 
process increased dramatically because Britain’s application to join the European Economic 
Community in 1961 and its withdrawal of military forces from the Asia-Pacific in 1968 signified 
the extent of its decline and the limited utility of a British-imperial identity as a means through 
which to ensure each nation’s economic, cultural and military security. This forced the 
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Australian and New Zealand governments to begin to reflect on the limitations of a racially 
based British settler nationalism.  
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Chapter Four 
The decline of Great Britain: Threats to British settler nationalism in 
the 1960s 
 
Introduction 
Two events in the 1960s would fundamentally alter the construction of national identity and 
disrupt the symbolic power of Britishness in Australia and New Zealand. The events were 
Britain’s decision to apply for entry to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1961 and its 
winding down of the majority of its military forces in Asia and the Pacific after 1968. These 
decisions made by the British government marked the end of Britain’s formal Empire and the 
decline of Britain from its position of strength. Britain’s actions challenged the core 
assumptions of the Australian and New Zealand governments which had continued to rely upon 
Great Britain and define themselves as British nations. At the same time indigenous groups in 
both nations were increasingly dissatisfied with their position in their respective countries and 
Indigenous Australians, in particular, gained greater prominence in the national debate. Both 
governments found these changes difficult to accept and were unwilling to alter the settler 
nationalism they had promoted. However, both governments began to recognise that they 
could no longer ignore the changes affecting the Asia-Pacific region. The rise of Japan as an 
economic powerhouse and the decolonisation of much of Asia and the Pacific reflected changes 
taking place in the world and these changes undermined the central assumptions of settler 
nationalism. During this period, the two governments began to come to terms with the fact 
that their explicitly racialist immigration and indigenous policies were increasingly unacceptable 
to the non-Western world. The differences between New Zealand and Australia, which the 
experience of World War II had highlighted, became even more pronounced as Britain’s power 
declined. At the same time, the two governments were preoccupied with a similar set of 
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concerns and continued to frame their nations, and the world, in similar ways and this reflected 
the continuing path dependence of Australia and New Zealand. 
The combination of these events had a profound effect on the geopolitical outlook and 
nationalist rhetoric of both the Australian and New Zealand governments. Britain’s application 
to join the EEC came as a genuine shock to these two governments which had always worked 
under the assumption that Britain prioritised its Empire over all other interests. In 1968, Britain 
wound down its military presence and was no longer in a position to provide military protection 
for Australia and New Zealand. It was clear that the Empire was not what it once was. As a 
result, Australia and New Zealand became even more reliant on the United States for military 
protection and the US fulfilled an even more important symbolic function as the ‘great and 
powerful friend’ to the two antipodean nations; although the Australian government was much 
more enthusiastic about this process than the New Zealand government was.  
Previous chapters have shown the centrality of Britishness within the political rhetoric 
of both societies. Events in the 1960s forced the beginnings of a fundamental reassessment of 
both nations’ identities and geopolitical strategies. The conservative governments in both 
countries attempted to maintain the status quo by having the United States take Britain’s place. 
Yet, at the same time, they reflected upon the importance of the Asia and the Pacific in a much 
more substantial way than had been attempted by previous governments. They also recognised 
the impact of the non-western world’s opinion of Australia and New Zealand. This led the 
Australian government in particular to reassess its attitudes towards indigenous relations and 
its racially discriminatory immigration policy. While the two governments largely resisted these 
changes they conceded ground that would become far more important in subsequent decades. 
More significantly, the events of the 1960s would exert a long lasting influence on the 
invocation of national identities in Australia and New Zealand as successive governments 
attempted to promote post-racial and post-British national identities. 
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End of the British world 
Britain’s application to join the EEC in 1961 was an event that had profound effects on both 
nations far beyond the economic implications. The Sterling Area was a core element of the 
British Empire because it signified the mutual dependence of the Dominions with Britain and it 
also signified the idea of the community of interest that existed between geographically 
separated nations.1 Britain’s application to join the EEC reflected the extent of Britain’s decline 
and its inability to fulfil both its own and its Dominions’ economic requirements. This was not 
just evidence of the weakening of the Empire; it raised serious questions about the survival of 
the British Empire and the Commonwealth. For the Australian and New Zealand governments 
this represented a major challenge to their most basic assumptions about the world and the 
policies they pursued for economic survival.  
This was the culmination of long-held fears in Australia and New Zealand, particularly 
after the Second World War, about the longevity of the British Empire. It is hard to 
overestimate the impact this had on the construction of national identity by both governments, 
which had, up until this period, relied on the concept of Britishness and used that Britishness to 
leverage influence in the UK. Instead, the Australian and New Zealand governments were now 
forced to recognise how little Britishness counted for in a post-Imperial world dominated by 
Cold War politics. Issues raised in earlier parts of this thesis became even more important 
during this period, and for the first time the governments were not able to ignore them by 
relying upon “the British embrace”.2 
Both governments responded with shock, outrage and sorrow and they described 
Britain’s actions as a calamitous event which would have dire consequences for their nations 
and for the world as a whole.3 This response showed the strength of a pan-British identity in the 
political rhetoric of both nations and that despite the many changes in the world both 
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governments were largely unprepared for, or aware of, the extent of Britain’s decline. The 
British government initially promised that it would not sacrifice its economic relations with the 
Commonwealth in order to develop economic links with Europe.4 However, as negotiations 
progressed it became clear that in order to engage with Europe, Britain would have to change 
its current relations with the Dominions. By 1963, it was clear, particularly to the Australian 
government, that if Britain joined the EEC it would not be able to maintain its preferential trade 
agreements with the Dominions.5 These external events would fundamentally alter the world 
views of the Australian and New Zealand governments and cause them to reconsider their 
ongoing support within the British Empire. This in turn began to undermine the feasibility of 
both governments framing themselves as British nations.  
As Britishness has re-emerged in the historiography of Australia and New Zealand, 
scholars have placed increasing importance upon the period 1961-63 and Britain’s decline. For 
New Zealand, Belich most clearly describes the importance of Britain’s decline (although he 
places more emphasis on 1972).6 Anthony Hopkins also makes a compelling case for 
reintegrating imperial history into the national histories of the antipodean nations.7 There is a 
stronger literature in Australia. Geoffrey Bolton provides a useful overview of the inter-
relationship between economic and identity politics.8 Stuart Ward, James Curran and Andrea 
Benveuti all provide compelling research on the centrality of this period in the shaping of 
Australia’s history.9 
These scholars argue that Britain’s application represented a calamitous event in both 
countries, which portended a range of dire consequences. The New Zealand Prime Minister, 
Keith Holyoake, described New Zealand’s economic vulnerability: “Unless adequate steps are 
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taken to protect our vital interests, Britain’s membership of EEC would be disastrous for the 
whole of New Zealand’s economy.”10 Perhaps more importantly, this event was the firmest 
indication yet that Australia and New Zealand could no longer rely on Great Britain. Thomas 
Hayman (Waitaki), the Minister of Agriculture in New Zealand, placed this idea in dramatic 
terms: “I would say that if we cannot trust the representatives of our own Mother country, 
then God help the world.”11 As was often the case, the Australian opposition, through James 
Killen (Moreton), used even more dramatic rhetoric: 
I confess that I still feel stunned with disbelief that a British Prime Minister 
and government would seek to commit the United Kingdom to an 
arrangement whereby the ancient and proud sovereignty of the British people 
would be destroyed ... These [issues] in sombre isolation apart from other 
considerations are surely sufficient torment. The Commonwealth is entering a 
twilight zone of crisis.12 
This ‘twilight zone of crisis’ would hang over both governments as they struggled to 
come to terms with the changes being wrought in the world.  
 Throughout the history of the Dominions successive governments portrayed their 
economic links with the mother country as an asset and as an explicit example of the inter-
dependence of British societies.13 Governments cultivated good relations with Britain above all 
else (particularly in New Zealand) and framed the Sterling Area as the tie that bound the 
Commonwealth together. As Stewart Ward and Deryck Schreuder note in their treatment of 
Australia’s response to this crisis, the more fundamental issue was the substantial decline of 
Britain’s role within the world.14 
It would be reasonable to expect that New Zealand’s greater attachment to Britain 
would have produced more forceful language when discussing this issue than Australia, but — 
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as Killen’s speech suggests — the opposite was true. In the Australian Parliament, the debate 
was considerably more heated and there was a greater sense of threat and urgency. Robertson 
and Singleton have undertaken an interesting comparison of the rhetoric in Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada surrounding this issue: 
[T]he umbrage taken by the members of the old Commonwealth was in 
inverse proportion to the economic interests at stake. Canada, whose trade 
with Britain was relatively small, adopted a position of violent opposition to 
British policy. New Zealand, which was still heavily dependent on the UK as a 
market for staple commodities, was careful to avoid acting in a manner likely 
to alienate the British government. Australia, which was in an intermediate 
position as regards the importance of its trade with Britain, mounted a sturdy 
defence of its commercial interests, but did not indulge in the histrionics of 
the Canadians.15 
In fact, it was New Zealand’s considerable reliance on British markets that meant that the New 
Zealand government took a conciliatory tone, while the Australian government had greater 
freedom to defend its own interests because it was less reliant on British trade.  
When considering the debate surrounding Britain’s application to join the EEC, it is 
important to keep in mind the strength of the concept of the British Imperial family. This idea 
brought both obligations and rights. This familial relationship gave Australia and New Zealand 
the right to comment on British policy and the expectation that Britain would take Australia and 
New Zealand’s opinions into account. It was in this context that Britain sought to join the EEC. 
The Australian and New Zealand governments both assumed they had the right to comment on 
Britain’s actions and expressed a sense of betrayal that the British government was repudiating 
these familial obligations. For a number of MPs, like the Leader of the Opposition Arnold 
Nordmyer (Island Bay), it was impossible to imagine that Britain would undermine Australia and 
New Zealand in order to further its own interests:  
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[New Zealand] is entitled to rely upon the assurances of Mr Sandys as 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations that if New Zealand’s vital 
interests could not be preserved Britain would not feel justified in joining the 
EEC.16 
This signified the interplay of rights and responsibilities that had underpinned the 
Australian and New Zealand governments’ attitude towards Britain since self-
government.  
 While Australia and New Zealand shared similar concerns, the way the two parliaments’ 
approached the issue was different. As previously stated, New Zealand was far more vulnerable 
than the other dominions. “In 1960, 53 per cent of New Zealand[‘s]... exports went to Britain.”17 
This dependence was compounded by the fact that 53 per cent of its total exports consisted of 
commodities for which there were few alternative markets.18 This contrasted with Australia 
whose exports to Britain had dropped to 22%.19 This greater vulnerability placed more pressure 
on the New Zealand government and this is part of the reason why the New Zealand 
government found it difficult to accept that the British government would sacrifice its relations 
with the dominions in order to the EEC. 
Even more importantly as this thesis has shown, Britishness was more engrained in New 
Zealand. Many more MPs discussed the right of New Zealand to comment on British policy in 
comparison with Australia.20 The National government found it difficult to admit that Britain did 
not always have New Zealand’s best interests at heart.21 This unwillingness to understand and 
accept Britain’s decline reflected the government’s worldview that was still so firmly enmeshed 
within the British Empire and it found it difficult to imagine a world in which Britain did not play 
the role it had always played. This is also in keeping with the settler nationalism this thesis has 
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shown New Zealand governments used successive to portray New Zealand as the most loyal 
Dominion and most British settler society.  
This was not true to the same extent in Australia. This was much less apparent in 
Australia. Australian politicians described these events as a “crisis” and were more pessimistic 
about the capacity of Australia to influence events in Europe.22 This was a vivid example of the 
power of Britishness in New Zealand, which meant they found it much harder to recognise the 
extent of Britain’s decline and harder to conceive of a world without Britain at the centre of it.  
Australia had to come to terms with the fact that if Britain were to successfully join the 
EEC it would lose most, if not all, of its trade preferences.23 This made the Australian 
government argue more forcefully because they had much to lose. The New Zealand 
government used the fact that it was the most economically vulnerable Dominion to extract a 
concession from the British government that would allow the continuation of economic 
preferences with Britain after it joined the EEC.24 Therefore, New Zealand could not afford to 
alienate the UK or the European nations during the negotiations.25 As a small nation they were 
able to argue that their circumstances required consideration while Australia’s did not. 
 The similarities in the responses of the New Zealand and Australian governments to 
Britain’s application to join the ECC indicate the power of British settler nationalism in both 
countries and the extent to which it was premised on the ongoing support of the British Empire. 
This sense of shock and betrayal shows the pervasive power of Britishness in the national 
identities promoted by the two governments into the 1960s. This is also evidence of a 
remarkable degree of continuity in the rhetoric used within and between countries over the 
twentieth century. Despite the different histories and different geopolitical and demographic 
forces affecting the two governments they were still both profoundly influenced by, and 
continued to adopt, larger transnational and imperial identities alongside more parochial and 
specific national identities. Thus both governments were profoundly affected by Britain’s 
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application to join the EEC, but the power of Britishness in New Zealand was one of the reasons 
it was harder for the government to accept the extent of Britain’s decline in comparison with 
the Australian government.  
Britain’s withdrawal ‘East of Suez’  
Just as Britain’s application to join the EEC signalled the end of Britain’s special economic 
relationship with Australia and New Zealand, Britain’s decision in 1968 to withdraw all troops 
“East of Suez” signalled the end of Britain’s military involvement in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Britain’s military withdrawal compounded the problems that were clear by 1961 and indicated 
that Britain could no longer play a major military role in Asia and the Pacific. Britain’s 
recognition of its own reduced power signalled to both Australia and New Zealand how weak 
the Empire had become and how increasingly irrelevant claims to a British heritage were for the 
two nations’ security. The Australian and New Zealand governments faced an increasingly 
unrecognisable world in which loyalty to the British Empire stood for little and the ‘crimson 
thread of kinship’ no-longer guaranteed military protection. Being an outpost of a disintegrating 
Empire must have been an increasingly unattractive proposition. However, this was not a 
watershed moment for either nation; throughout this period conservative governments 
resisted these changes and the implication for their geopolitical outlooks.  
 The two governments both hinted at a new regionalism, while largely resisting its 
implications. Instead, they became even more firmly reliant on the United States. They hoped 
that the US would take Britain’s place and that they would not have to change their foreign 
policies or racially discriminatory immigration criteria. This period also offers evidence of the 
different geopolitical outlooks of the two governments. The Australian government was 
emphatically pro-US, while New Zealand was more reticent towards the US and started to hint 
at the idea that New Zealand’s geographic isolation meant it did not face any substantial 
military threats. In the wake of Britain’s decline, both governments began to redefine the 
position of their nations within the world. Yet while they clung to a British national identity, 
which was defined in opposition to their Asian and Pacific Islander neighbours, neither 
government could adequately comprehend the changes buffeting the world.  
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On one level, Britain’s withdrawal was not that important because Australia and New 
Zealand already relied upon the United States for military protection, and it was merely the 
culmination of a process that was already well underway by the end of World War II. Its real 
significance was symbolic.26 Since the colonisation of Australia and New Zealand both nations 
were reliant upon British military power to guarantee their security. Even though both nations 
had become increasingly dependent on the United States, they continued to equip their 
militaries with British equipment, and New Zealand in particular still relied upon British military 
planning.27 The main military preoccupation in both countries in the early 1960s was Singapore 
and Malaysia; a British operation concerned with the independence of ex-British colonies.28 The 
practical implications of Britain’s military withdrawal might have been less pivotal, but its 
symbolic implications were profound, because this represented a direct challenge to one of the 
pillars of British settler nationalism.  
The Australian and New Zealand governments responded to this development with 
shock and dismay. They were forced to recognise the extent of Britain’s decline and they 
reflected upon the implications for each of them. Cabinet member Eric Holland (Fendalton) 
outlined the changed circumstance at the opening of the New Zealand Parliament: 
We will always maintain the closest ties with the United Kingdom, both 
through our trade and our common heritage. However, we can no longer look 
to Britain for the help, protection, and the preferred treatment we have had 
in the past.29 
Both governments’ responses indicated the depth of feeling towards Britain and the extent to 
which they still saw each nation as a part of the British world. Liberal backbencher Henry Turner 
(Bradfield) vividly described the historic significance of Britain’s actions: 
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We have witnessed nothing less than the fall of an Empire in our part of the 
world-something that greatly concerns us. Generations of dedicated British 
men have brought peace and justice to peoples bordering on all the seven 
seas and the oceans of the world but that is gone and finished.30 
While there were a reasonable range of responses to this event in the parliamentary debates 
there was a palpable sense that the MPs considered the world to be irreversibly changed by 
Britain’s withdrawal, and that the world was a lonelier place for Australia and New Zealand now 
that they could no longer stand shoulder to shoulder with Britain. 
Since the late nineteenth century Australia and New Zealand had been enthusiastic 
participants in numerous British military campaigns. Their enthusiasm stemmed from a variety 
of sources, but one of the most important motives was that by supporting Britain they believed 
that they were guaranteeing their own protection, if either country were threatened.31 This 
required the continuous invocation of rhetoric that used a British Imperial identity to ensure 
their military protection. Moreover, the Australian and New Zealand governments thought this 
participation gave them the right to a voice in the shaping of the international order. This 
strategy relied upon the creation of a moral debt which Britain would be obliged to honour.32 
MPs in both parliaments attempted to use this strategy when discussing Britain’s withdrawal. 
Stanley Whitehead (Nelson) from the New Zealand Labour Party quoted a British Labour MP to 
underscore this point:  
I am the last person in the world to belittle what we might call the old 
Commonwealth. When people say, ‘What did we get out of New Zealand; 
what did we get out of Australia; what did we get out of Canada? I remember 
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that they came to our aid at once in two World Wars. We, at least, do not 
intend to forget Vimy Ridge and Gallipoli.33 
However, the potency of this approach had clearly diminished. This contrasted markedly with 
earlier periods. By the late 1960s, although the idea of a moral debt may have still held weight 
in Australia and New Zealand, it clearly did not have the same currency in Britain. 
Perhaps the most important consequence of Britain’s decline was that both Australia 
and New Zealand moved even more clearly into the American orbit. Even the New Zealand 
government was forced to admit that it was now wholly reliant on the projection of US military 
power. Eric Holland (Fendalton) described Britain’s decline and the rise of the US: 
[T]oday Britain is no longer able to take an interest in the area in which we are 
most interested. Accordingly we have not the security that Britain used to give 
us; we have to rely more and more on the United States for this kind of 
security.34 
This new strategic reality caused hope and concern in government circles. The two 
governments hoped the US could replace Britain and provide the level of protection previously 
guaranteed by Britain. However, they also saw that any alliance with the United States would 
always be less reliable than the familial relationship that had defined the British Imperial 
connection. David McClean argued this point in relation to Australia: “When all was said and 
done, Australians, for all their sense of affinity with America, regarded it as a foreign country, in 
a way that was not true of Britain.”35 The New Zealand government was even more pessimistic 
about the reliability of US protection than the Australian government.36 
 This new geopolitical reality, and the challenges to traditional assumptions it 
represented, was most clear in South-East Asia. Just as Britain was removing the remnants of its 
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military presence in the region the United Sates was escalating its involvement in Vietnam. The 
US government wanted a multi-national force in Vietnam in order to give its presence 
legitimacy. Therefore, it brought increasing pressure to bear on Australia and New Zealand to 
put troops on the ground in Vietnam.37 For the first time Australian and New Zealand troops 
were involved in a military conflict without Great Britain.38 This situation, particularly for New 
Zealand, reflected a seismic shift in defence policy and a new set of challenges that both 
nations would have to come to terms with. By joining the US in Vietnam both governments 
signalled their commitment to forward defence, their prioritisation of the US alliance over all 
other considerations and their acceptance of the domino theory. This illustrated the 
continuation of the Western-centric, defensive geopolitical outlooks of the two governments. 
While both nations moved closer towards the United States, the Australian government 
was a far more enthusiastic friend than the New Zealand government. This was an ongoing 
trend, described in earlier chapters, that reflected the different geopolitical outlooks of the two 
governments and the different way they positioned themselves in relation to the United States. 
The Australian government applauded the expanded role of the US in Asia and expressed 
uncritical confidence in the US’s impact on the region.39 The New Zealand government also 
supported greater US involvement in Asia, but it was more preoccupied with Britain’s decline. 
This was evident during the discussion of foreign policy issues in both parliaments in 1967. The 
Australian government spent a significant period of time discussing Britain’s withdrawal from 
Asia; however, it quickly moved on from that issue to the escalation of the Vietnam War.40 
While it was concerned with Britain’s withdrawal it also saw the tensions in Vietnam as central 
to its own strategic position.41 This reflected the growing centrality of the US for Australian 
strategic considerations, whereas the New Zealand Parliament was preoccupied with Britain’s 
withdrawal. The New Zealand government also spent far greater time discussing the Pacific 
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region and the likely effects of Britain’s exit.42 Britain’s decline threw the growing difference in 
geopolitical thinking in Australia and New Zealand into stark relief. This difference in strategic 
outlook was intrinsically caught up with political identities in both countries. The legacy of 
successive New Zealand governments framing themselves as the most British Dominion made 
government and society particularly unprepared for Britain’s decline, whereas the long 
established fears in Australia about an Asian invasion pushed Australian governments to 
develop closer relations with the US and to frame the US as part of Australia’s wider imagined 
community. 
This shift also reflected a role reversal for New Zealand and Australia. While the British 
Empire remained strong successive New Zealand governments had always tried to be the ‘most 
loyal daughter’.43 They tried to make up for their lack of size by making the greatest 
proportional contribution to imperial defence and it is a long-running national myth in New 
Zealand that New Zealand contributed the most men to World War I per capita.44 In particular, 
they tried to outdo Australia during those periods. However, as Britain declined and New 
Zealand became less concerned about invasion the government stopped using this rhetoric. 
Instead, the Australian government was the more enthusiastic supporter of US policy and they, 
in many ways, determined the extent of New Zealand’s involvement because New Zealand had 
to match Australia’s commitment to collective security.45 Since the 1960s, Australian policy 
makers have consistently argued that New Zealand has not made an adequate contribution to 
the defence of the region and that New Zealand relied upon Australian protection.46 
Although much had changed in the way the Australian government framed its position 
in the world other things remained quite consistent. The spectre of invasion still haunted 
Australian policy makers. The ‘red threat’ fulfilled a remarkably similar political purpose as the 
‘yellow peril’.47 The solution to this threat was equally consistent: ‘populate or perish’.48 
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Despite the growth of Australia’s population and its increasing military capabilities Liberal MP 
Kent Hughes (Chisholm) described the government’s concerns:  
[T]hat there is great danger to Australia in the present international situation 
... Experts agree that the declared intention of the Communists is to overrun 
South East Asia and Indonesia, thus bringing them right to our front door.49 
This insecurity about the white settler’s occupation of the continent is a consistent theme in 
Australian history, and the rhetoric surrounding the nation and its position in the world.50 While 
that sense of vulnerability had gradually diminished, it still shaped the way the government 
framed Australia’s geopolitical reality.  
While Australia was still deeply concerned about the threat of invasion, the New 
Zealand government was worried by the lack of concern in their own country about a possible 
invasion. A number of MPs thought New Zealanders were becoming complacent about their 
position in the world and the likelihood that New Zealand could or would be invaded. In 1963, 
National MP Cyril Harker (Hawkes Bay) opined that: 
In New Zealand we take too little notice of the importance to us of the 
continued existence of a strong Commonwealth ... one of the penalties which 
we must inevitably pay as a result of our remoteness from the more populous 
parts of the world is that we become somewhat insular in our outlook.51 
This offers tantalising evidence for the developing differences between Australia and New 
Zealand. The Australian government continued to be preoccupied with military threats and with 
maintaining its relationship with the United States, whereas the New Zealand government had 
begun to develop different strategic priorities. This difference was beginning to manifest into a 
markedly different geopolitical outlook for New Zealand. This shift should not be overstated as 
it was very much in its infancy during this period. Nevertheless, this idea of New Zealand as a 
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small nation far away from global conflicts, insulated by distance and preoccupied with the 
South Pacific, continued to gain strength as the twentieth century progressed. 
While Britain’s withdrawal from east of Suez and America’s escalation of the Vietnam 
War exposed some telling differences between the Australian and New Zealand governments, 
at the same time the two nations continued to adopt strategic approaches that were 
fundamentally similar. They were primarily concerned with maintaining US and British 
involvement in the region and they emphasised relations with the West over all other 
considerations.52 Both governments were emphatic Cold-War-warriors and they believed that 
the US had the right to promote its influence in the region, by force if necessary. While they 
showed greater concern for developments in Asia they continued to portray Australia and New 
Zealand as two European nations on the edge of Asia and the Pacific “committed to the 
Western way of life and the Western ethos.”53 These similarities in geopolitical outlook 
informed the political rhetoric in both nations, which in turn affected how each government 
defined the ‘character’ of the nation and the nature of the challenges they faced.  
Colonies, Asia, the Pacific, and the Trans-Tasman world 
The Australian and New Zealand governments wanted the United States to take over the role 
Britain could no longer perform in the region, but they also recognised that if they simply relied 
upon the US they would continue to be exposed to external shocks. Therefore, they began to 
foster greater regional co-operation and, as a result, redefined their geopolitical positions. They 
recognised that there were more independent nations within the Asia-Pacific region and that 
these nations, as Australia and New Zealand’s neighbours, were becoming increasingly 
important.54 Both governments still preferred dealing with Western nations with interests in 
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Asia, but they also tried to develop closer economic and political relations with the post-
colonial nation-states. The growing importance of the non-aligned nations was the most 
obvious manifestation of this increasingly insecure strategic environment, and in this context 
the rhetorical arsenal used by the governments in Canberra and Wellington looked increasingly 
outdated and ineffective. This was the greatest challenge to the central assumption of 
successive governments’ approaches to foreign policy and the geopolitical position of each 
nation. During this period governments in Australia and New Zealand hinted at a more 
regionally focussed foreign policy, acknowledging that the future of both nations lay with their 
surrounding regions rather than with maintaining relations with Great Britain.  
Australia and New Zealand faced a changing world. The escalation of US involvement in 
Vietnam and the simultaneous withdrawal of the old colonial powers from Asia was the most 
obvious sign that the end of the colonial era was near. With the end of Western hegemony in 
Asia the Australian and New Zealand governments were forced to come to terms with a 
number of emerging post-colonial nations.55 These nations criticised Australia and New 
Zealand’s racially restrictive immigration programmes and their obsession with maintaining 
super-power dominance in the Pacific. This was largely uncharted territory for Australia and 
New Zealand. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries both societies had been 
primarily concerned with maintaining British dominance over other European colonial powers 
and later Japan.56 Emergent nations like Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and others posed a 
completely different challenge. They rejected the right of great powers to interfere with smaller 
nations. This attitude was reflected in the growing non-aligned movement that advocated 
national self-determination for ex-colonial territories.57 These developments threatened 
elements of what Paul Kelly has described as the ‘Australian settlement’, in particular the pillars 
of White Australia and imperial benevolence which had led to the idea of “‘Fortress Australia’ 
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that was ‘introspective, defensive, [and] dependent’.”58 This concept can be equally applied to 
New Zealand. The obvious decline of imperial benevolence forced Australia and New Zealand to 
take the opinions of non-Western countries far more seriously than previously. Prime Minister 
Keith Holyoake, expressed greater interest in South-East Asia than his predecessors, stating that 
in Southeast Asia: 
Viable, prosperous, progressive and democratic countries are important to 
the countries themselves and important also to our way of life, to our 
economy, and particularly perhaps to our own defence and integrity.59 
Moreover, Britain’s decline meant that both nations were more economically dependent on 
Asia while also feeling more militarily exposed because of Britain’s withdrawal. In many ways, 
these were unsettling times for Australia and New Zealand.  
 An important part of this new regionalism was that both governments recognised that 
they existed in the East as well as the West, and that they had to organise their priorities 
accordingly. This period revealed the extent to which their earlier denial of their geographic 
position and their lack of understanding of their non-white neighbours left both nations 
exposed.60 This manifested in the greater pressure placed on both Dominions over their racially 
discriminatory immigration policies. Asian nations had objected to these policies throughout 
the twentieth century, but up until this period Australian and New Zealand governments felt 
comfortable ignoring them.61 From the 1960s, MPs were swayed by this pressure and the 
Australian government in particular began to change the form, if not the substance, of its 
immigration policy in order to make it more palatable to its Asian neighbours. All of these 
changes forced the Australian and New Zealand governments to reassess their ‘colonial’ 
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attitudes towards their mandates and towards their indigenous populations. The de-
legitimisation of central elements of British settler nationalism had profound implications on 
identity construction in both nations as the governments tried to reconcile their portrayal of 
the Australian and New Zealand nations as ethnically homogenous, culturally unified, British 
societies with this new post-racial and post-colonial moral imperative.  
As with most issues during this period both governments responded in a reactive and 
conservative way, attempting to keep the status quo and change as little of their policy and 
rhetoric as possible. As the two governments articulated a clear vision of their regional 
identities however, the differences between them became more apparent. The New Zealand 
government saw a South Pacific future for New Zealand, while the Australian government was 
far more preoccupied with Asia.62 
 This new emphasis on regional engagement did not result in any significant changes in 
foreign policy. The ANZUS treaty was still the backbone of both countries’ defence planning and 
the promotion of regionalism could be seen as a tokenistic attempt to rehabilitate the image of 
Australia and New Zealand. Both governments were concerned about their international 
reputation and they hoped that by making superficial changes they could maintain the 
foundations of white settler nationalism through the protection of their ethnic homogeneity.63 
In fact, both governments hoped to maintain the Australasian settlement.64 William Aston 
(Phillip) in the Australian Parliament argued that: “No one can deny that we in Australia have 
the right to build this nation with the kind of people whom we regard as being the best for 
Australia. We have a right to protect ourselves from undesirables.”65 They presumed that they 
would be able to continue their policies of racial discrimination.  
On a symbolic level however, this emphasis on regional engagement was significant. It 
expressed pessimism over the extent to which Western powers would continue to be their 
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protectors. This also reflected a willingness to relate to Asian nations on equal terms.66 It is 
significant that both governments recognised the formal equality of Western and non-Western 
nations. Moreover, while they did not welcome the changes being wrought in Asia, they 
recognised that Australia and New Zealand’s futures were fundamentally linked to those 
developments.67 They began to recognise that Australia and New Zealand had to develop closer 
relations with the region; this forced both governments to change the way they framed their 
geopolitical position. 
Both governments explicitly linked this new perspective to Britain’s military and 
economic decline. Hallyburton Johnstone (Waipa) of the National government in New Zealand 
argued that “we are in the East as much as we are in the West”.68 The government recognised 
that New Zealand’s geographic position meant it could no longer ignore the non-Western 
world.69 However, it was largely unwilling to damage or subordinate their relationships with the 
United States and Britain in order to develop closer relations with Asian nations. The Australian 
government was even more hesitant to accept the logic of their own geography and Liberal MP 
James Forbes (Barker) did not think Australia should or could be an Asian nation:  
We may be a part of Asia, but only geographically. Culturally, we live with 
New Zealand in an alien part of the globe. I am deeply convinced that if we 
wish to preserve our culture and our conceptions of civilization, we must draw 
closer to those who share these matters with us.70 
Ironically, Australia had developed far greater economic relations with Asia than New Zealand. 
The Australian government did not think that Australia’s future lay with Asia, yet it was much 
more proactive in diversifying its economy than New Zealand.71 Both governments recognised 
that the international realignment in the 1960s had profound implications for their nations and 
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that this would shape the geopolitical position of both nations in the future. Yet both 
governments also continued to frame these challenges as a threat to the sanctity and 
homogeneity of their settler societies; they saw this development as a danger to be averted 
instead of an opportunity to be embraced.  
This new emphasis on regionalism was not restricted to Asian nations. The Australian 
and New Zealand governments also developed closer bilateral relations with each other. 
Australia and New Zealand have a history of co-operating when facing common threats. Just as 
they moved to create the ANZAC Corps during World War I, Britain’s application to join the EEC 
encouraged the two governments to combine their efforts in order to increase their influence. 
They co-ordinated their position regarding Britain’s application and they increased the level of 
inter-governmental communication in order to make sure they put forward the same 
message.72 This was largely a practical response to a common challenge, but it also had other 
consequences. In particular, it served to highlight the continued community of interest that 
existed between Australia and New Zealand at a time when the ‘crimson thread of kinship’ was 
coming under increasing strain elsewhere.73 The Australia-New Zealand relationship gained 
increasing importance, particularly for New Zealand, as they began to put to rest a long period 
of colonial rivalry and recognise the benefits of greater political and economic interchange.74 
This also marked the period in New Zealand’s history when Australia began to fill the gap left by 
Britain.75 The trans-Tasman relationship reflected both a progressive movement towards 
regional engagement and the pervasive appeal of older conceptions of military and economic 
alliances based on kinship, culture and similar political institutions.76 Just as during World War I, 
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Australia and New Zealand invoked their own distinctive national identities while also subtly 
drawing upon notions of Australasia through the assumptions of a community of interest that 
existed between Australia and New Zealand. 
Some Australian MPs took this response a step further. They proposed an idea that had 
been largely ignored since 1901; New Zealand’s entry into the Australian federation. John 
McLeay (Boothby) said of this idea: 
[W]hen we consider development in the Pacific area generally, and how we 
are placed in this part of the world which is traditionally of the West but is 
geographically in the East, I think it would be to our great benefit to 
endeavour to build a greater and stronger nation than we are building at the 
present time ... I believe that an amalgamation would be of great benefit to 
both countries.77 
For those MPs, New Zealand’s entry into the federation was a way of bolstering the population 
and influence of Australia while maintaining much of Australia’s racial and cultural 
homogeneity. This is clear evidence of the perceived similarities between Australians and New 
Zealanders and the extent to which those members saw New Zealand as a part of their own 
imagined community. Unsurprisingly, the New Zealand government was less supportive of this 
idea and it did not receive the same consideration with the parliamentary debates in New 
Zealand. Just as in 1901, the New Zealand government sought to gain the benefits of closer 
relations through bilateral relations. Labour MP Norman Kirk (Lyttleton) argued that New 
Zealand needed to 
provide some exclusive means of making known our national identity. This 
particularly applies overseas, where New Zealand is often looked upon as a 
province of Australia, or as one of its off-shore islands.78 
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New Zealand governments have always been concerned that any sort of co-operation with 
Australia would inevitably lead to Australia dominating New Zealand, yet as Britain declined 
New Zealand was inexorably drawn into Australia’s orbit.79 
In comparison with the Australian government, the New Zealand government more 
readily recognised that change was necessary and that older colonial attitudes were 
unacceptable. The New Zealand government’s acceptance of post-colonial language is 
consistent with previous periods, because this confirmed the government’s rhetoric about New 
Zealand as a progressive nation. In 1968, the Holyoake government argued that it was no 
longer appropriate for New Zealand to be a colonial power, and it was under his government 
that a number of Pacific Islands gained their independence.80 Esme Tombelson (Gisborne) 
framed these events as a part of New Zealand’s tradition of superior race relations: 
We in this House are Europeans and are mostly of British stock. The people 
we are talking about, and also our Māori people, are ethnically Polynesians. 
They are not second-class citizens, nor is one better than the other. The Māori 
has had the benefit of education and of better social hygiene, welfare, 
housing, and so on, and naturally that puts him in a different strata from that 
of a person of the island territories, but only because that person has not had 
the same opportunity as the Māori.81 
The rhetoric surrounding decolonisation drew upon familiar assumptions about New Zealand’s 
place within the Pacific, the strong relationship between Māori and Pacific Islanders, and the 
government’s imperial benevolence. At the same time it also reflected a greater concern with 
New Zealand’s reputation within the Pacific and an appreciation of the need to place relations 
with Pacific nations on a more equal footing.82 
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 The Australian governments under Robert Menzies and Harold Holt made little 
substantive progress towards granting independence to Papua New Guinea (PNG). While they 
did bring about a series of ‘modernising’ reforms they argued that PNG was not ready for 
independence. Country Party MP Wilfred Brimblecombe (Maranoa) literally put words into the 
mouths of the Papua New Guineans when asked about their desire for independence:  
[E]very one whom I heard questioned on the matter replied: “we do not want 
you to get out. We are not ready for self-government and we want you to 
help us”. When asked when they thought we should get out, the better 
educated of them said, “That is rather difficult; we would not like to state any 
definite time”.83 
This reflected the Australian government’s own preoccupation with maintaining a buffer zone 
between itself and Asia and the Australian government’s belief that its colonial subjects were 
fundamentally inferior and as such were unfit to manage their own affairs.84 This also reflected 
the Australian government’s hesitation to address the increasingly anti-colonial attitudes of 
nations in the Asia-Pacific region and its continued reliance on the concept of fortress Australia.  
 This difference in attitude towards their colonial possessions illustrates the disparate 
ways the two governments framed their national experiences of race relations. The New 
Zealand government’s self-described superior race relations encouraged a more benevolent 
attitude towards Pacific Islanders; moreover their similarity to Māori meant there was less 
emphasis on the supposed inferiority of Pacific Islanders.85 In Australia, colonial attitudes were 
profoundly shaped by indigenous relations. Just as Indigenous Australians were often framed as 
backward and separate from mainstream Australian society, so too Papua New Guineans were 
othered and portrayed as fundamentally different from white Australians.86 
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More specifically, the entrenched myth in New Zealand of racial equality and harmony 
meant that the new morality developing in the 1960s based on racial equality and 
decolonisation conformed with the government’s self-perception of New Zealand society and 
was thus less of threat to the status quo. This explains why, in the New Zealand Parliament, 
despite the conservative nature of the government’s policies, the rhetoric was far more 
sympathetic to the changes taking place in the world. The government hoped to place New 
Zealand on the right side of history and frame New Zealand as continuing its long-standing 
tradition of progressive policy.87 For Australia, however, the concept of racial equality still 
represented a far more direct challenge to a core component of their identity: White Australia. 
The Australian government was, therefore, much less enthusiastic about adopting this new 
language and embracing this new form of morality. 
Both governments promoted a form of settler nationalism that reflected remarkable 
similarities to previous eras in Australian and New Zealand history. This settler nationalism 
divided the world into the Western and non-Western world and that division was defined by 
clear racial boundaries. This rhetoric expressed a deep scepticism about the capacity of Asian 
and Pacific peoples to manage their own affairs, a deep-seated fear of invasion and a reliance 
on Britain and the United States to protect them from these threats.88 The economic 
foundation of this nationalism was based on preferential trade with Britain and this was part of 
a pan-British identity embodied in the ‘old’ British Commonwealth, which was held together by 
sentiment, culture and race. Their economic policies were both conservative and paternalistic. 
This settler nationalism was a form of ethnic nationalism in that race was seen as a key 
component of national identity. Furthermore, it was intrinsically linked to a particular world 
view and a firm assumption about both Australia and New Zealand’s geopolitical circumstance. 
Both nations waited until the 1970s to address the implications of these changes; the 
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governments in the 1960s merely tried to stem the tide of change. However, both governments 
did enact policies that represented the beginnings of a new outlook.  
Last gasp of official assimilation 
All of the external challenges described above, along with internal challenges in both nations, 
threatened the foundations of the white national identity that was maintained through 
assimilation. As in earlier periods Māori continued to occupy a more prominent position in New 
Zealand’s political discourse than Indigenous peoples did in Australia. However, indigenous 
issues were far more prominent and the Australian government linked indigenous peoples with 
the Australian nation in an unusual way. Furthermore, the Australian government’s focus on 
indigenous disadvantage had much in common with the New Zealand government’s concern 
with Māori urbanisation and there was in this sense a convergence in the way that indigenous 
groups were portrayed. The external pressure brought to bear on both governments also had 
considerable ramifications for the immigration policies of both governments, with serious 
implications on the nationalist rhetoric either government could employ. Despite these 
similarities, immigration continued to be a much greater issue in Australia than in New Zealand. 
This difference also indicates the divergent demographic trajectories of the two nations and 
goes some way to explaining why New Zealand governments have adopted biculturalism as a 
central element of New Zealand’s national identity, while Australian governments have used a 
multicultural framework to define the Australian nation in the post-British world. As with other 
issues during this period the governments on both sides of the Tasman largely resisted the 
implications of these changes, but they did make concessions that would develop greater 
significance later in the century. The degree to which the two governments responded in 
similar ways is a further indication of the similar settler nationalisms in both countries during 
the 1960s. 
These changes were taking place within a wider international context, where Australia 
and New Zealand were coming under increasing pressure over their treatment of indigenous 
peoples. This pressure manifested in a variety of forms. As more countries gained 
independence and the world decolonised, the traditional rhetoric of the ‘white man’s burden’ 
136 
 
and the inherent inferiority of colonial peoples became increasingly unacceptable. Newly 
independent states were particularly sensitive to what they construed as colonial attitudes 
within Australia.89 One of the main arguments adopted by Labor MP Kim Beazley snr 
(Fremantle) and others wanting to reform indigenous policy was that the current status of 
Indigenous Australians was adversely affecting Australia’s image overseas:  
One of the most distinguished journalists of the last 30 or 40 years in the 
United Kingdom said to a friend of mine: “What are Australians doing about 
the aboriginal? I can see the beginnings of a powerful international move to 
isolate Australia on the aboriginal question in precisely the same way as South 
Africa has been isolated internationally on the question of apartheid.”90 
This reflected an important shift within Australian politics, evidence of an increasing awareness 
of Australia’s reputation in the non-Western world.91 As Asia’s economic importance increased 
and as the reality of a having a range of independent Asian states just north of Australia’s 
border became apparent, Australian politicians showed a far greater awareness of Australia’s 
image within Asia. This was far less of a concern for New Zealand as there was still a bipartisan 
consensus that “New Zealand was second to none when it came to co-operation between the 
European and the native race.”92 The New Zealand government was very aware of the political 
changes occurring in Asia and it tried to frame its policies as in keeping with new human rights 
norms and anti-colonial attitudes; without making any substantive changes to New Zealand’s 
race relations.93 
The 1960s in Australia was a period marked by successes and frustrations for Indigenous 
Australians. Indigenous issues gained far greater prominence than in the past, and the 
Australian government came under increasing pressure to address indigenous 
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disadvantage.94During the first half of the twentieth century the Australian federal 
governments had largely ignored indigenous issues under the assumption that state 
governments could handle all Aboriginal policy until such time as it was no-longer necessary to 
have any Aboriginal policy at all.95 By the 1960s, it was clear that Indigenous Australians were 
not going to ‘die out’.96 The concept of irreparable racial difference also seemed increasingly 
problematic. This had major repercussions for the argument that Indigenous Australians were 
disadvantaged because of their inherent racial inferiority. This idea, while still popular, was 
increasingly challenged.97 As race became a less convincing excuse for indigenous disadvantage 
the government was forced to consider other explanations for the gross inequality between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. The Parliamentary debates showed increasing 
awareness of the treatment of Indigenous Australians; similarly, Aboriginal issues received a 
degree of consideration that would have been unheard of at the start of the twentieth century.  
This greater concern over the treatment of Indigenous Australians culminated in a 
referendum in 1967 to allow the federal government to govern Indigenous Australians.98 It is 
important to consider the consequences of this development on Australian nationalistic 
rhetoric. In 1901, the Australian constitution officially excluded Indigenous Australians from 
membership of the Australian nation and left all elements of indigenous policy in the hands of 
the states. They were socially excluded and framed as separate from Australian settler society. 
By doing this, the Australian government loudly proclaimed the racial boundary of the 
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Australian nation. By the 1960s, both attitudes and rhetoric were changing; this culminated in 
the overwhelming support for changes to the constitution in 1967.99 
Anthony Moran argues that assimilation in this period was a continuation of previous 
racist policies promoted by successive Australian governments.100 He argues that assimilation 
was still based on an assumption of white superiority and the goal of the policy was intended to 
maintain the dominance of white cultural and political hegemony within Australia. Russell 
McGregor rightly points out that Indigenous Australians were not content with formal equality 
and after 1967 Indigenous Australians focussed their efforts on attaining recognition of their 
position as the traditional owners of the land.101 
It is also important to note that during this period the causal relationship between race 
and culture was reversed. In the first half of the century race defined culture in Australia; every 
human being was defined by their race and as such their characteristics and culture were pre-
determined.102 This was the argument used by most politicians in Australia when they enacted 
the White Australia policy in 1901. This change in attitudes towards race and culture had long-
lasting effects. In the short term little changed, as the stated goal of cultural homogeneity 
remained the same. However, the basic concept that had justified the creation of white 
Australia had been crucially undermined, because race was no longer seen as determining 
culture. The separation of race and culture created rhetorical space in which critics could 
challenge the goal of maintaining racial homogeneity. This had profound implications for the 
nationalist rhetoric Australian governments could use from this period onwards, because it was 
less acceptable to frame the nation in explicitly racial terms.  
The New Zealand government was also committed to its own assimilation policy. The 
National government continued previous governments’ policies. It was unsympathetic towards 
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cries for greater Māori autonomy, and instead co-opted Māori institutions in order to pursue its 
own objectives.103 It continued the tradition of applauding New Zealand’s superior race 
relations while ignoring Māori opinion as much as was politically feasible.104 Most importantly, 
official policy still called for the creation of ‘one people’ in New Zealand through the absorption 
of Māori into Pakeha society. In 1961, Josiah Hanna, the Minister for Māori Affairs, 
emphatically asserted this principle: 
[E]very member of this House, and I think every right thinking citizen outside 
it, will agree on the basic principle underlying this petition — that New 
Zealand racial policy should be based on absolute equality and nothing else.105 
The National government still wanted to ‘Europeanise’ Māori and considered any attempt to 
tailor specific policies towards Māori as counterproductive and divisive. The indigenous policies 
the government adopted focussed on racial integration and the conferral of a set of values onto 
Māori based on individualism, capitalism and the nuclear family, which were seen to be the 
foundations of New Zealand’s British settler nationalism.  
 The most significant change in the portrayal of Māori issues within Parliament by 1962 
was the increasing visibility of Māori within New Zealand’s cities and concerns over their 
perceived capacity to adapt to the challenges of urban life. Since the end of World War II Māori 
had urbanised in increasing numbers. In 1926, only 9 per cent of Māori lived in cities but by 
1956 24 per cent of Māori had moved to the major urban centres.106 Māori moved to the cities 
in order to gain employment and make the most of opportunities not available in rural areas.107 
However, the urbanisation of Māori placed further strain on traditional Māori social structures 
and reduced the authority of Māori elders, because of the loss of direct influence exercised by 
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rural Marae (meeting houses).108 While the Pakeha government exaggerated the fracturing of 
Māori society, urbanisation did place considerable pressure on Māori. By the 1960s, the New 
Zealand government was concerned over the rise of Māori delinquency.109Just as in Australia, 
indigenous policy in New Zealand was largely focussed upon concerns surrounding delinquency 
and crime within Māori urban communities. This growing concern was typified by the Hunn 
Report, which was released in 1961 by the National government. It highlighted the endemic 
inequality that separated Māori from Pakeha and it detailed the unofficial discrimination 
against Māori throughout New Zealand.110 However, its recommendations essentially promoted 
further ‘integration’ through the creation of positive programmes to ‘uplift Māori’ and bring 
them closer to Pakeha society. The report, therefore, advocated the continuation of 
assimilation of Māori into Pakeha society.111 
The portrayal of Indigenous Australians and Māori within each parliament had 
converged by the 1960s. There was perhaps the greatest similarity between Australian and New 
Zealand discourse at this time. Indigenous Australians received far more attention and concern 
than they had at any other time in the twentieth century and their fate was linked with the 
future of the Australian nation. This was similar to the way the New Zealand Parliament 
portrayed Māori. Both governments were wholly committed to assimilation and the complete 
‘Europeanisation’ of the indigenous inhabitants. Finally, as both groups became more visible 
within Australia and New Zealand, both governments were largely preoccupied with indigenous 
material disadvantage. They tried to solve those problems by increasing the pace of 
assimilation, encouraging the breakdown of indigenous cultures and hierarchies, and replacing 
them with a middle-class individualist ethos.112 
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Just as both governments were coming under increasing pressure over their indigenous 
policies, their immigration policies were also heavily scrutinised. This had serious implications 
for the way the two governments framed immigrants in relation to the nation and the 
maintenance of national identities. Both governments pursued immigration policies that 
emphasised British immigration and they were proud of the high level of British immigration 
they achieved.113 They both openly relied upon assimilationist policies and as such they 
expected immigrants to conform to the mainstream culture and discard their previous 
identities. The political debates in both countries linked immigration with economic policy. 
There was a clear link between attaining productive immigrants and the successful 
management of the economy. There was also bipartisan support for immigration and for the 
selection of immigrants based on ethnic criteria.114 
Immigration was a much more significant issue in the Australian Parliament compared 
to the New Zealand Parliament. The Australian Parliament spent significantly more time 
discussing immigration and MPs placed greater emphasis on the national importance of 
immigration; in the New Zealand Parliament it received little consideration and perhaps most 
tellingly, the opposition did not raise this issue. This indicates that immigration in New Zealand 
was not a particularly pressing issue as the scale of immigration was much smaller. However, 
the Australian government continued to link immigration to the nation-building process.  
It was also during this period that another point of difference became clear. The New 
Zealand government and opposition had stopped discussing the need to fill New Zealand’s 
empty spaces through mass immigration. Concerns about making the land productive were 
reserved for Māori-owned land.115 By 1961, the spectre of invasion and the need to occupy the 
land in order to defend against New Zealand’s highly populated neighbours was largely a non-
issue. The government framed immigration purely in terms of managing the economy.116 In 
Australia on the other hand, the rhetoric was more consistent with the past. William Aston 
(Phillip) explicitly linked population growth to white Australia’s hold on the continent: 
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I think that almost everybody agrees that Australia has a dire need to 
populate. It is essential that we at least double our population and attain the 
20,000,000 mark as soon as possible, not only to exploit our natural 
resources, which in turn will improve our standard of living but also to show 
the rest of the world our desire to hold and develop this continent.117 
The cry for Australia to populate or perish still resounded in the Parliamentary chamber as the 
Australia government sought to fill Australia’s ‘empty spaces’. This reflected ongoing concern 
over the permanence of the settlement of Australia and Australia’s precarious position as a 
white nation on the edge of Asia.118 This difference illustrates the importance of Australia and 
New Zealand’s geographic positions. As the twentieth century progressed New Zealand’s sense 
of isolation from the world’s problems would become more pronounced, while Australia 
continued to grapple with its own geopolitical insecurities.  
Ironically, Australia’s expansive immigration policy, based largely upon its fear of 
invasion by highly populated Asian countries, caused it to adopt a more liberal immigration 
policy than New Zealand. As has been previously stated, the drive to ‘populate or perish’ 
caused Australia to substantially increase its immigration intake.119 Australia received a massive 
influx of non-British migrants who retained elements of their own culture and, while they were 
generally considered good settlers, did not fully assimilate into British-Australian culture.120 As a 
result, Australia underwent a profound demographic transformation, which meant that by the 
1960s Australia had increasingly large and visible ethnic minorities.121 New Zealand did not 
undergo an equivalent transformation. The government maintained much stricter immigration 
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criteria and New Zealand maintained a more homogeneous population, although New Zealand 
received a relatively large number of Pacific Island immigrants throughout this period.122 The 
importance of this difference was not widely recognised at the time, but from the 1960s 
onwards these differences would have profound effects on the makeup of the two societies.  
Conclusion 
During the 1960s, a number of events marked the terminal decline of the British Empire and the 
Australian and New Zealand governments began to consider how they could define their 
nations without Britain. Rather than embracing these changes they largely fought to keep the 
world as it was and continued to draw upon nationalist rhetoric that was consistent with earlier 
in the century. The nationalism promoted in Canberra and Wellington differed in some 
important respects and this reflected both the continuation and the exacerbation of differences 
obvious earlier in the century. The New Zealand government promoted a South Pacific 
regionalism while the Australian government looked to Asia. The New Zealand government was 
an unenthusiastic participant in the Vietnam War because it was reluctant to accept American 
military hegemony and was less concerned about invasion. The Australian government was 
enthusiastic about joining the war in Vietnam and it continued to draw upon the rhetoric of 
populate or perish to both massively increase immigration and justify its staunch support for 
America and its policy of forward defence in Asia. The geographic and demographic differences 
between the two nations point to some important differences that would become even more 
important as successive governments on both sides of the Tasman sought to define a national 
identity without Great Britain or the idea of Britishness. However, the two governments 
responded to these exogenous shocks in similarly conservative ways. Both governments’ 
assimilationist attitudes towards their indigenous inhabitants and immigrant groups reflected 
their commitment to maintaining Anglo-Celtic racial and cultural homogeneity within the 
nation. Their shock and outrage at Britain’s move towards Europe both economically and 
militarily reflected their deep commitment to the British Empire and the British element of the 
national identities they invoked. They began the process of fostering greater regional 
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engagement and began to reflect upon the paradox of their position as European nations on 
the edge of Asia. Furthermore, they recognised that their policies of racial exclusion were 
damaging their reputations in Asia, a region that was becoming more important because of 
communist expansion and the economic opportunities those Asian nations provided to 
Australia and New Zealand. This is evidence of the ongoing similarity of the environment in 
which both governments found themselves and the extent to which the ‘Australasian 
settlement’ influenced the nature of nationalist rhetoric in Australia and New Zealand in the 
1960s. 
Up until the 1960s this settler nationalism had survived a series of challenges and 
successive governments had expressed a remarkable commitment to this ideology. This would 
change in 1972, when two newly elected governments would invoke a new national identity 
intended to address the issues previous governments had so resolutely ignored. 
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Chapter Five 
New Nationalism in Australia and New Zealand in the early 1970s. 
 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the way the Whitlam and Kirk governments used the concept of new 
nationalism to re-forge the national identities of both nations in the 1970s. It compares and 
contrasts the ways in which the new nationalisms constructed by the governments were similar 
and the ways they were different. It considers the decline of the British Empire and the 
rejection of a pan-British racial identity and the attempt by both governments to create a 
credible alternative, by redefining national identities through the transformation of internal and 
external policy based on civic nationalism and progressive values. Analysing the two 
governments’ construction of national identity provides an opportunity to consider the 
perceived moral, racial and geopolitical position of each nation and to assess the way each 
government responded to the changes wrought by Britain’s decline and the decolonisation of 
Asia and the Pacific. This period provides the clearest evidence of the divergence throughout 
the twentieth century based on their different demographic challenges and geopolitical 
perspectives. It explains these differences as both a culmination of trends and also a significant 
turning point, paving the way for the more fundamental divergence that occurred between 
Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s. At the same time, this chapter also provides further 
examples of the common framework in which the two governments operated. The very fact 
that the two governments simultaneously invoked the rhetoric of new nationalism, and 
rejected British settler nationalism at the same time, demonstrates the path dependence that 
continued to push the two governments in a similar direction.  
The year 1972 was a watershed in Australia and New Zealand’s history. The newly 
elected governments embraced changes that had been gathering momentum since World War 
II. The new agenda of the two governments explicitly dealt with the decline of Britain, the need 
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to redefine the position of each nation in its region, each nations’ international reputation, and 
as a result of this, each nations’ national identity. The first section of this chapter analyses the 
way both governments dealt with Britain’s decline and explicitly attempted to promote a post-
British progressive national identity. This new nationalism went beyond the trappings of 
nationhood; it also manifested in a raft of new policies that were intended to revolutionise the 
two nations. They promoted a new moral framework in their internal policies that broke with 
seventy years of established policy. The Australian government advocated the adoption of 
multiculturalism to replace the ‘derivative’ British national identity that had existed in the past. 
The New Zealand government adopted a similar form of multiculturalism that emphasised the 
special relationship between Māori and Pakeha. The two governments stopped defining their 
nations in explicitly racial terms and repudiated the desire for ethnic and cultural homogeneity 
within the nation.  
 Just as important as these internal policies were a range of new external policies that 
were intended to transform the way Australia and New Zealand were perceived in the Asia-
Pacific region and to alter each nations’ geopolitical outlook. The new-left governments 
implemented a ‘moral foreign policy’ to rectify the mistakes of the past, where the antipodean 
governments had subordinated all other interests to maintain good relations with Britain and 
the United States. Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and Prime Minister Norman Kirk reflected on 
the importance of their international reputations and they recognised that the future of both 
nations lay in their immediate regions as much as it was based on great power protection. This 
was both a culmination of tendencies that developed from the 1960s, and earlier, and also a 
fundamental break from previous policies that reflected a realignment in the way the two 
governments framed their nations within the world. Part of this recognition of the importance 
of their region also meant that they recognised they had to change their indigenous and 
immigration policies in order to have the kind of relations they sought. Finally, this raft of new 
policies manifested in the development of a new bilateral relationship between Australia and 
New Zealand as both governments made this bilateralism an important part of the new 
regionalism. The new nationalisms the Australian and New Zealand governments promoted 
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were in part a radical break from past policies, but also the culmination of changes and 
divergences that this thesis has outlined in the previous four chapters. 
The End of Britishness 
In 1972, after twelve years of the National Party’s dominance in New Zealand and two decades 
of Liberal rule in Australia, Labo(u)r governments were elected in both countries using the 
slogan “It’s time”. It had been a tumultuous period. After 1962, it became clear to Australia and 
New Zealand that the preferential trade agreements, which had been the foundation of both 
nations’ economic growth, would not survive Britain’s entry into the EEC.1 Since World War II, 
Australia and New Zealand had become increasingly reliant on the United States for defence 
through the ANZUS agreement. They committed themselves to ‘forward defence’ in an effort to 
contain the Soviet Union and China within Asia.2 The policy of forward defence led the two 
governments to commit military forces to Vietnam without British involvement. Just ten years 
earlier this kind of military campaign would have been unthinkable. 
Despite these developments, the previous conservative governments had attempted to 
maintain the status quo. However, the world had changed and the new-left governments 
argued that Australia and New Zealand had to change as well. This strategy was exemplified by 
the slogan ‘it’s time’. Effective in its simplicity, its vagueness was one of its strengths, because 
different groups of people could project their own expectations and ideals onto it. The Labo(u)r 
parties argued for fresh ideas and leadership; more importantly they championed a different 
understanding of the nation. They emphasised the progressive elements of Australia and New 
Zealand and prioritised human rights, international organisations, racial equality, 
decolonisation and detente. They were both heavily influenced by the new-left social 
movements in the Western world and these movements provided much of the inspiration for 
this new moral framework.3 Both governments linked these ideas to new national characters in 
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Australia and New Zealand. These ideas did not emerge from a vacuum, plucked out of the air 
for an election campaign. Nor were they simply created by the emergent youth movements in 
the Western world in the 1960s and 1970s.4 They emerged as a response to a rapidly changing 
world in which previous understandings of the nation looked increasingly anachronistic.5 The 
new governments sought to respond to and embrace the changing world — by doing this they 
attempted to transform the national identities of Australia and New Zealand. 
The Labo(u)r governments welcomed the space created by the decline of the British 
Empire to explore and promote new identities and opportunities. This attitude was clearly on 
display at the opening of parliaments in Australia and New Zealand in 1973.6 The speeches 
given by the Governors-General outlined each governments’ priorities and objectives. Both 
came to power with a commanding majority and each interpreted its electoral victory as a 
mandate to enact sweeping changes. They claimed to represent a new moral framework that 
would determine government policy based on racial equality, diversity and egalitarianism.7 The 
two governments asserted that both nations would now have a truly independent foreign 
policy and would no longer be subservient to the United States.8 They embarked on a similar 
project, but their manifestos also reflected some interesting differences. Gough Whitlam was 
more focussed on Asia, arguing that Asia was “the region where our future lies”.9 He portrayed 
peace in South-East Asia and the withdrawal of Australian troops as central to Australia’s 
future. Norman Kirk on the other hand emphasised the importance of the South Pacific and 
indicated that nuclear tests in the Pacific were New Zealand’s top foreign policy priority.10 
These new nationalisms were intimately related to a renewed emphasis on regionalism, and 
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while the regionalism of each government overlapped they also had some important 
differences.  
Each government sought to pass legislation that would proclaim their national 
independence by reducing the symbolic status of Britain and the Empire. In doing this they 
attempted to distance Australia and New Zealand from associations of colonial subservience, 
and diminish the significance of Britishness to their national identity.11 In 1973, the New 
Zealand government tried to fill a gap in New Zealand’s national institutions. Minister of 
Internal Affairs Henry May (Western Hutt) made the case for the government: 
It is a fact that all nations feel a need to express their independence and 
nationhood, and the event which Waitangi Day commemorates is very 
clearly connected with New Zealand’s first step towards nationhood.12 
Up until that point New Zealand did not have a holiday that celebrated its national 
independence; all its holidays were either associated with Britain or were primarily concerned 
with religion (apart from Labour Day). The government framed this Bill as a long overdue step 
towards a mature appreciation of New Zealand’s nationhood, pointing out that even Australia 
had a national holiday.13 The opposition agreed that “there is a growing pride in our 
independence, a recognition of our own place in the world” and that identity needed official 
recognition.14 
The Whitlam government also passed legislation in order to enshrine the institutions of 
Australian national identity. The two most significant clauses in the Australian Citizenship Act 
(1973) were that all immigrants receiving citizenship must recite an oath of allegiance to 
Australia and that British and non-British citizens alike would have to undergo the same process 
to receive Australian citizenship.15 Maxwell Oldmeadow (Holt) linked this Bill with Australia’s 
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development as a nation. “The amendments proposed are not violations of early rudimentary 
concepts. They are clear recognition of sociological and national adulthood.”16 The government 
portrayed this legislation as a reflection of reality, the belated recognition of Australia’s 
development. Yet it also challenged a central tenet of Australian national identity which had 
always been based on Britishness.  
 As with all political projects that engage with nationalism there was an underlying 
ambivalence about new nationalism. On one level the left-wing governments framed 
themselves as the representatives of a changed society, simply following the will of the people 
who had been repressed through years of conservative rule. This approach views nations as 
natural and unproblematic entities with an inherent ethos or character. Yet, on another level, 
they also sought to change the nation through progressive legislation, which promoted racial 
equality and downplayed the importance of Britishness. This second strand of government 
policy saw nations as dynamic entities constantly undergoing change and able to adapt to 
changing circumstances. Neither government addressed the tension between their belief that 
they reflected the will of the people while also engaging in policies that would fundamentally 
transform the nation through new cultural institutions, immigration policies and public symbols 
of nationhood. 
The New Zealand government promoted biculturalism through its creation of a national 
holiday and the Australia government encouraged multiculturalism through the Australian 
Citizenship Act. The Australian opposition resisted these ideas by defending older notions of 
racial homogeneity, assimilation and Britishness.17 Governments on both sides of the Tasman 
nevertheless tried to fill what they saw as an intellectual vacuum that for too long had been 
filled with second-rate colonial ideas that had inhibited the development of genuine national 
identities. The rest of this chapter considers a range of new policies that were intended to fill 
that perceived vacuum, to transform Australia and New Zealand. 
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Internal Policy: Biculturalism and Multiculturalism 
The most significant response to the decline of Britain for Australia and New Zealand involved 
the reappraisal of the relationship between race and national identity, and the rise of 
biculturalism and multiculturalism. Throughout the twentieth century Australian and New 
Zealand governments negotiated the relationship between race and nation. Until 1972, all 
governments in both countries had agreed that race and ethnic makeup were essential defining 
factors of national identity. In contrast, the Whitlam and Kirk governments proclaimed the end 
of all forms of racial discrimination in immigration and rejected the idea that ethnicity should 
affect immigration policy.18 This is not to say that race ceased to be an issue in Australia and 
New Zealand; in fact, both countries continued to grapple with the implications and limitations 
of living in multicultural or bicultural societies. However, in 1972 the governments irrevocably 
changed the terms of the debate. They proclaimed that ethnicity would no longer be taken into 
consideration by government policy. This approach was exemplified by the immigration 
department in Australia, which stopped recording the ethnicity of new migrants entering 
Australia, effectively rejecting the idea that the character of a nation was determined by its 
ethnic makeup.19 Instead, they argued that the character of a nation was determined by its 
laws, institutions and culture. This reflected a shift from ethnic nationalism to civic nationalism 
within Australia and New Zealand.20 Officially, ethnicity no longer precluded anyone from 
becoming a ‘real’ Australian or a ‘real’ New Zealander.  
This change had significant implications for the policy of assimilation in both societies. 
Assimilation was based on the principle that non-British immigrants were only desirable if they 
were willing to quickly integrate into ‘mainstream’ society and abandon all remnants of their 
previous cultures, languages and identities. Within this logic western European immigrants 
were highly desirable because they were perceived to be racially and culturally similar and thus 
would integrate easily. For Australia, southern Europeans and Turkish people represented the 
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outer limit of acceptable migrants as these groups apparently tended to retain their own 
cultures and remain distinct from mainstream society. Asian immigrants were almost 
completely undesirable, because they were perceived as too different from the host society 
and thus incapable of assimilating. The underlying assumption behind this policy was that in 
order for a nation to flourish it must have a homogeneous culture and ethnic composition.21 
The new governments repudiated this assumption by disavowing the right of the government 
to determine the racial character of the nation and as such they promoted cultural and racial 
diversity.22 This was a significant rejection of one of the central tenets of settler nationalism in 
both nations. 
 Although this was a radical departure from existing policy it did have clear limitations. 
Neither government conceived of the nation as a post-racial entity; they still recognised the 
significance of Britain and Britishness within each country.23 The New Zealand government still 
referred to New Zealand as a “British society”.24 The difference lay in their perception of the 
capacity of the nation to embrace diversity while remaining united. Previously, governments of 
all political persuasions described the ethnic makeup of each society as sacrosanct, an integral 
feature of the nation that demanded protection from degeneration. In contrast, the new 
governments argued that both nations were robust enough to accommodate ethnic diversity, 
and that other identities could exist alongside British identities without destabilising the state.25 
Labor MP Leonard Keogh (Bowman) described the main purpose of the new legislation: 
The immigration policy of the Government seeks to rid the nation of the 
inconsistencies, inequalities and discrimination that we believe should no 
                                                                
21
Russell McGregor, "Arguing About Assimilation: Aboriginal Policy and Advocacy in Australia," in Frontier, Race, Nation. Henry 
Reynolds and Australian History, ed. Bain Attwood and Tom Griffins (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2009), 25; Tim 
Rowse, Contesting Assimilation(Perth: API Network, 2005). 
22
Sean Brawley, The White Peril : Foreign Relations and Asian Immigration to Australasia and North America 1919-1978(Sydney: 
UNSW Press, 1995), 246. 
23
 The term post-racial is used in this context to signify the shift from a mono-racial to a multiracial perspective, wherein the 
governments professed to be colour blind. While the idea of a post-racial society gained popularity in the 1970s it has never, 
and probably will never, receive mainstream support. This is particularly true for Indigenous politics, which requires recognition 
of the special status of Indigenous peoples within settler societies. Fiona McAllan, "Getting ‘Post Racial’ in the ‘Australian’ State: 
WhatRemains Overlooked in the Premise ‘Getting Beyond Racism’?," Australian Critical Race And Whiteness Studies Association 
7(2011): 3. 
24
 NZPD, vol. 391 (1974): 1842. 
25
Patrick Ongley and David Pearson, "Post-1945 International Migration: New Zealand, Australia and Canada Compared," 
International Migration Review 29, 3 (1995): 772. 
153 
 
longer be allowed to exist when we are seeking to bring people from various 
countries and to welcome them as citizens in their own right.26 
Labor recognised that by 1972 Australia had undergone a profound demographic 
transformation. Within Australia there were significant ethnic minorities and despite the best 
efforts of successive governments these groups continued to retain a distinct identity and 
culture. Whitlam recognised that trying to force non-British people to conform to British norms 
had made these groups defensive and less attached to their new home. This problem was quite 
clear by the early 1970s when a substantial minority of new immigrants returned home after 
living in Australia for a number of years.27 Whitlam argued that the overt vestiges of Britishness 
inhibited non-British immigrants from developing loyalty to Australia.28 Thus, a central element 
of Whitlam’s new nationalism was the creation of a secular and non-racially based form of civic 
national identity focussed upon democracy, progressive values and egalitarianism. He hoped 
that this new approach to nationalism would be more attractive to and inclusive of all 
Australians.  
 There was less immediacy in the New Zealand parliamentary debates as New Zealand 
did not have such an expansive immigration programme and had maintained a less ethnically 
diverse population.29 Despite this, Pacific Islanders were becoming an increasingly visible 
minority after they had immigrated to New Zealand to fill job shortages after World War II.30 
There had been ongoing concern about the position of Pacific Islanders within New Zealand and 
as economic conditions deteriorated certain elements of New Zealand society became 
increasingly resentful of Pacific Island ‘overstayers’; those people who stayed in New Zealand 
after their visas had expired.31 Nonetheless, the Kirk government was more concerned with the 
morality of racial discrimination than with the challenge of ethnic diversity within New Zealand. 
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This was clear when Phillip Amos, the Minister of Island Affairs, introduced the Niue 
Amendment Bill (1973): 
I believe there will be a continual drain of their [Pacific Islanders] population 
to New Zealand and we must recognise that they are New Zealanders and that 
they have complete and free access to New Zealand. This is not a privilege; it 
is a right they enjoy.32 
The government portrayed its policy as in keeping with New Zealand’s record on race relations 
and its appreciation of the pressure coming from decolonising state and international 
institutions.33 Kirk portrayed the new immigration policy as an ethical challenge, which 
reflected the morality of New Zealand society; rather than a response to demographic 
challenges. 34 
 Permeating these debates was the question of the role of Britishness within Australia and 
New Zealand’s national identity. The explicit purpose of new nationalism was to promote a 
sense of distinctive national identity, derived from local experience and with a particular 
historical vision of the nation. In Australia, the Whitlam government attempted to remove the 
symbolism of Britishness in order to prioritise a national identity over a broader pan-British 
identity.35 The Kirk government also moved in this direction, but was not as aggressive as 
Whitlam. Surprisingly, neither Labo(u)r government spent time discussing Britain or British 
identities; in fact they both seemed to avoid the topic. They sought to promote their new 
nationalism as if it existed in a vacuum in which both Australia and New Zealand lacked a 
legitimate national identity.36 On the other hand, the opposition parties in both nations did 
focus on Britain. They framed all of the legislation that promoted this idea of new nationalism 
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as an attack on Britishness in Australia and New Zealand.37 They rejected the idea that Australia 
and New Zealand had no legitimate national identity; instead they argued that both nations had 
a long and proud history as British nations in the South Pacific and that the Labo(u)r 
governments were turning their backs on rich histories by imposing their own progressive 
orthodoxies. They judged that there was significant public support for the old immigration 
policies and concern about the direction the new Labo(u)r governments were taking their 
countries. It is clear that in both New Zealand and Australia the opposition felt that a British 
identity was something which still resonated within the electorate, and that associating the 
government with anti-British sentiment would be to their advantage. Likewise the 
governments’ unwillingness to discuss the role of a British identity reflected their own concerns 
that this would not be well received by the public. Instead, they framed the opposition’s 
statements as “the lonely wail of a bygone age, introverted, subjective, inverted and completely 
negative.”38 While there was genuine support, initially at least, for the new nationalism 
promoted in Australia and New Zealand, both governments had to be careful that they did not 
push the idea of a post-British identity too far. 
 Non-British immigrants were not the only groups challenging the status quo in Australia 
and New Zealand. Indigenous Australians and New Zealanders went through a demographic 
and political resurgence that was impossible to ignore.39 Both Whitlam and Kirk marked 
indigenous grievances as a central platform of their election campaigns and indigenous 
concerns were a prominent issue in both countries during the 1972-75 period.40 Both 
governments introduced landmark legislation that increased the visibility of indigenous groups 
and significantly shifted the symbolic position of indigenous peoples within the settler societies. 
The Australian government introduced a number of Bills, the most important of which was the 
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Racial Discrimination Act (1975). This Act outlawed all forms of racial discrimination, 
undermining a core principle of federal and state policy towards Indigenous Australians, which 
assumed their irreparable racial differences, and in turn justified a range of paternalistic and 
exploitative policies.41 By outlawing these practices the Whitlam government proclaimed the 
equality of Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians.42 This was in stark contrast to the ways 
previous governments had framed indigenous peoples.  
 The Kirk government in New Zealand was also under pressure to address a range of 
Māori grievances. It is important to note that the New Zealand Labour government’s alliance 
with the Ratana movement and its reliance on the four Māori seats meant that Māori had a 
more powerful source of political leverage than Indigenous Australians had.43 The most vital 
issue was the continuing loss of land by Māori communities and the overriding assumption 
within government circles that the purpose of all Māori policy was the complete assimilation of 
Māori within Pakeha society.44 The Kirk government repealed legislation that had caused the 
continuing loss of Māori land and passed the Treaty of Waitangi Act (1975) which created a 
tribunal to hear Māori land claims in order to stop further loss of Māori land.45 However, it 
should be noted that this Act was not authorised to deal with historical claims: this limited its 
capacity to address Māori grievances.46 Both governments sought to bring their Indigenous 
groups closer to the centre of the nation. The Australian government did this by proclaiming 
the equality of Indigenous Australians as genuine citizens within Australian society. The New 
Zealand government passed the Treaty of Waitangi Act (1975) to recognise Māori interests and 
to promote the concept of partnership rather than assimilation.  
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These left-wing governments developed a new relationship between indigenous and 
non-indigenous Australians and New Zealanders that became a central part of their promotion 
of the new nationalisms. The type of partnership each government promoted was indicative of 
a similar agenda in each country, but it also reflected the different position of each indigenous 
group within the nation. The Kirk government ended the policy of integration (largely 
indistinguishable from assimilation) and promoted the idea of biculturalism.47 Kirk recognised 
that Māori had the right to retain their own distinct identity and culture and he argued that it 
was immoral to try to force Māori to ‘Europeanise’. This new perspective was most vividly 
displayed in debates surrounding the Māori Affairs Amendment Bill (1974).48 The opposition 
expressed grave concern about this legislation because it stopped the individualisation of Māori 
land and sought to protect the last of the land still in Māori possession.49 National MP David 
Highet (Remura) argued that: 
I believe that we are now one people in this country and the sooner those of 
European or Māori origin recognise that fact the better. The misgiving felt in 
my electorate is that this Bill could easily drive a wedge between the two 
races.50 
The National Party still subscribed to the idea that New Zealand was one people and one 
nation. Norman Kirk responded that “We are one nation in which all have equal rights, but we 
are two people.”51 Labour MP Gerard Wall (Porirua) exposed the underlying objective behind 
the rhetoric of one people: “the assumption behind all they have said about being one race is 
that we should all be European.”52 A central tenet of settler nationalism in New Zealand was 
exposed for what it was. Moreover, the ground had shifted to such an extent that few 
politicians were willing to defend what had once received bipartisan support. The consequence 
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of this was a significant reassessment of Māori-Pakeha relations and a redefinition of the 
relationship between race and nation within New Zealand.53 While the actual reforms were 
limited, they established the framework for a bicultural nationalism, which would gain 
increasing force as the twentieth century came to an end.54 
 The terms of debate in Australia differed markedly from those in New Zealand. The 
Whitlam government sought to formally establish and promote the equality of Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous Australians. By passing the Racial Discrimination Act (1975) Whitlam started a 
process which had begun in 1967 when the federal government gained the power to legislate 
on indigenous issues.55 Rather than promoting those things which made Indigenous Australians 
different, Whitlam argued that indigenous peoples must be treated the same as all other 
Australians. He argued that only by removing those barriers that had kept Indigenous 
Australians alienated from the rest of society could the massive inequalities be addressed.56 As 
Norman Kirk attempted to enshrine the unique status of Māori within New Zealand, Whitlam 
attempted to portray Indigenous Australians as essentially the same as non-Indigenous 
Australians and thus deserving of equal treatment within society. Moreover, Kirk portrayed 
Labour’s legislation as a continuation of New Zealand’s superior race relations and as such as in 
keeping with New Zealand’s culture. In contrast, Whitlam portrayed Labor’s legislation as a 
disjuncture from Australia’s shameful past. This difference reflects the extent to which 
Indigenous Australians were considered peripheral to the nation in Australia compared with 
Māori in New Zealand.57 This serves to reiterate the importance of demography on the 
construction of nationalism in the two countries. 
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 During the first half of the twentieth century one of the most obvious differences 
between Australia and New Zealand was the differing positions of Indigenous Australians and 
Māori within each society. This difference had reduced by 1972. The Whitlam government 
portrayed the plight of Indigenous Australians as a national shame, a searing indictment of past 
government policies of racism and neglect.58 Whitlam himself made the amelioration of these 
problems a national issue, central to Australia’s standing as a modern and egalitarian nation.59 
In one sense, Indigenous policy in Australia was similar to that of New Zealand, because 
Indigenous Australians were an important element of the Australian government’s rhetoric 
about the Australian nation, as has been the case in New Zealand government rhetoric since 
the nineteenth century. The two governments dealt with issues surrounding racial 
discrimination and ethnic diversity within their own societies in a similar way. At the same time, 
the increasingly divergent demographic trajectories made the two governments focus on 
different issues, and established the basis for the development of bicultural nationalism in New 
Zealand and multicultural nationalism in Australia. 
External policy: An Independent Foreign Policy 
Just as the two governments redefined the relationship between race and nation, they also 
recast their foreign policies by introducing a new moral framework that reflected the ‘real’ 
character of Australian and New Zealand society, as they saw it. This was influenced by a range 
of factors and events, but the two most important events occurred in 1968 and 1969. In 1968, 
Britain declared it would withdraw the vast majority of all troops from ‘east of Suez’; this 
marked the end of Britain’s military presence in Asia.60 Richard Nixon came to power in the 
United States with the pledge of an ‘honourable withdrawal’ from Vietnam. In 1969, he 
established the ‘Guam doctrine’ in which he emphasised that America’s allies must take more 
responsibility for their own security.61 Within the space of two years the strategic environment 
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for Australia and New Zealand had been transformed. Despite the sacrifices made by both 
countries through their countless engagements in foreign conflicts, they faced an increasingly 
unfamiliar international environment, leaving them increasingly isolated. The new governments 
forged a new approach largely determined by these changes. While the oppositions continued 
to advocate close relations with Britain and the US, the Labo(u)r governments sought to make 
the most of the new environment. 
The Whitlam and Kirk governments recognised that much of the rhetoric and policies 
regarding immigration and race relations were deeply resented in Asia and the Pacific and this 
damaged their international reputations. As a result they both adopted a new foreign policy 
that was based on three principles: a new moral framework, an emphasis on regionalism and an 
‘independent foreign policy’ that reflected the ‘real’ interests of these two nations. These 
policies were intended to reflect what they saw as the true identities of both nations and to 
rectify previous governments’ emphasis on great power protection. At the same time, they also 
repudiated another bastion of the Australasian settlement, which was the idea that Australia 
and New Zealand were European nations on the edge of Asia. Instead they sought substantive 
engagement with the region, and to transform a central tenet of their settler nationalisms. 
Both governments explicitly linked their international reputation with their 
responsibilities to Indigenous peoples. The Australian government in particular emphasised the 
interrelationship between Australia’s record on Indigenous relations and its international 
reputation.62 Manfred Cross (Brisbane) argued that the whole world was watching and that for 
too long Australia had lagged behind the rest of the world in this area: 
We have a vast task to which is attached a great deal of urgency, not only in 
the interests of all of those people who live in Australia but also very much in 
the interest of the image which Australia will project in our part of the world 
and in the world generally.63 
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This reflected an abrupt change in policy. Previous governments had always maintained that 
Australia’s treatment of Aborigines was an internal matter, and that the only foreign power 
who had the right to comment on Australia’s behaviour was Britain.64 The New Zealand 
government also placed Māori-Pakeha relations in an international context. This approach was 
more in keeping with the long-standing tradition in New Zealand of extolling its superior race 
relations. Nonetheless, the Kirk government placed renewed emphasis on New Zealand’s 
international reputation. Cedric Marshall (Wanganui) quoted a newspaper arguing “it was time 
that New Zealand with its well-established and deserved reputation for racial harmony and 
cooperation became a party to [the international convention for the elimination of racial 
discrimination].”65 The most significant consequence of both governments’ engagement with 
world opinion was that it reflected the growing importance of the non-Western world. In the 
first half of the century these governments were primarily concerned with Britain’s (and to 
some extent the United States’) opinion of them, but by 1972 the emerging nations in Asia and 
the Pacific represented an important source of opinion. This reflected one of the most 
important transformations enacted in both countries, because it represented a radically 
different perception of the importance of the Asia-Pacific region.66 
 The governments on both sides of the Tasman justified their changes to immigration 
policy in similar ways. Andrea Benvenuti and others have documented the impact of 
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international pressure on the decision to end the White Australia policy.67 There was clear 
evidence that Australia’s overtly racist immigration programme was harming its international 
reputation and this was one of the primary arguments the Whitlam government used to justify 
the adoption of a new policy.68 The government portrayed the opposition as anachronistic, 
outdated and increasingly out of step with international opinion,69 claiming that Australia was 
becoming increasingly isolated because of its racial discrimination, thereby jeopardising its 
national interest.70 Likewise, the Kirk government recognised the new moral climate and the 
immigration review tabled by the Labour government sought to remove all forms of racial 
discrimination.71 The New Zealand government was attuned to international opinion and used 
the threat of international criticism to promote its removal of all racial discrimination.72 This 
shows how much the world had changed by 1972. Throughout so much of their history, Asia 
and the Pacific were important to Australia and New Zealand as simply the battlegrounds on 
which Great Powers sought to exert their influence or as the source of potential Asian 
invasions.73 While the previous conservative governments had tried to limit and deny the 
influence of the non-Western world, the Kirk and Whitlam governments embraced these 
changes. This represented one of the most fundamental transformations of nationalist rhetoric 
in the twentieth century.  
 Although the governments in both Canberra and Wellington faced similar challenges 
and responded to them in similar ways there were differences. While Australia and New 
Zealand both adopted racially based immigration programmes, Australia suffered sustained 
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criticism while New Zealand did not. Sean Brawley argues that this difference reflects an 
important difference in style.74 The Australian government called its immigration policy the 
“White Australia policy” and was unapologetic about its discriminatory character while New 
Zealand did not proclaim its racial discrimination in the same overt manner.75 New Zealand 
officials relied upon ministerial discretion to restrict all non-white immigration, while Australia 
was not so subtle.76 Perhaps just as importantly, Australia’s large size and proximity to Asia 
made it a more attractive destination and thus its immigration policy was more visible.  
In order to address these challenges the governments promoted their new ‘moral’ 
foreign policies. The governments accused the previous governments of being too uncritical of 
the United States, and prioritising American demands over Australia and New Zealand’s 
national interests. This approach was obvious in the new governments’ attitudes towards 
Western involvement in Vietnam. They were adamant in their demands for withdrawal from 
Vietnam, and more significantly, they denied the legitimacy of the military campaign. 
Particularly in Australia, Minister of External Affairs William Morrison (St George) fiercely 
attacked the dubious justifications for intervention in South-East Asia.  
Their memories are conveniently short. Not once did they protest, and now 
they talk of humanitarian principles. These men who plunged Australia into 
war, these men who applauded killing, these men who applauded violence, 
these men who supported the United States invasion of Cambodia and of 
Vietnam.77 
They portrayed the conservatives as having a callous disregard for human life because of their 
desire to maintain good relations with Washington.78 Each government claimed that for the 
first time their nation would be governed by genuine moral principles. Norman Kirk 
summarised this approach succinctly: 
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A moral basis for foreign policy should be established, and Opposition 
members should be considering such a basis. When questions such as the 
Springbok tour, race relations, and the relationship with other countries were 
at issue, then the Government should consider what were in New Zealand’s 
own best standards and not what should be done as a matter of expediency.79 
There is nothing particularly remarkable about a government proclaiming that its foreign policy 
is ethical. What was novel was the admission that a foreign policy based on a superpower 
alliance might conflict with an ethical approach to foreign policy. Neither government intended 
to weaken ANZUS or any other guarantee of US protection, but they rejected the idea that 
great power relations must supersede all other considerations.80 In that sense they were willing 
to make the US alliance contingent in a way that few previous governments would have dared. 
This approach also conflicted with a long-established assumption in Australia and New Zealand 
that ensuring close relations with Britain was not only in each country’s national interest, but it 
was also in the best interests of the world.81 This attitude easily transferred to the United States 
after World War II where few MPs on either side of the chamber publicly doubted the morality 
of United States policy.82 This certainty ended in 1972 and since then foreign policy in both 
countries has taken on a significantly more partisan tone.83 By expounding their new attitudes 
towards foreign policy these governments sought to articulate their own vision for the nation 
and their place within the region and the world. By doing this they broke with a foreign policy 
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tradition that had been in force since the granting of self-government to each antipodean 
nation. 
A form of morality was not the only new direction introduced by the Labo(u)r 
governments. They also showed a far greater concern with regionalism and with developing 
closer relations with countries in the Pacific and South-East Asia and they linked this to their 
promotion of a new nationalism in each country. The previous governments had shown some 
concern for their region and, particularly after Britain’s movement towards Europe, they had 
developed closer relations with countries in the region.84 But their priorities were based upon 
stopping the spread of communism and managing their sphere of influence in the Pacific.85 The 
new governments appreciated the growing influence of what they termed ‘third world’ 
countries in the Asia-Pacific and they sought to create partnerships with these countries. They 
recognised the right of these countries to independence and self-determination in a way that 
previous governments had not.86 
This policy was displayed in relation to Indonesia. Whitlam went to great lengths to 
show the importance of this country to Australia’s future. Although most of the concern 
surrounding Indonesia in Australia reflected age-old concerns about the potential military 
threat that Indonesia posed, Whitlam portrayed it as an important trading partner and 
potential friend in the region: 
We no longer look on the countries of South East Asia as buffer states or as 
some northern military line where a possible future enemy should be held. 
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Rather, we look upon them as countries having a common interest with 
Australia and New Zealand.87 
The Labor government was also at pains to argue the limits to which Australia could exert 
influence on Indonesia, breaking again with past policies.88 Whitlam envisaged Australia as 
enmeshed within the region, without falling into neo-colonial practices.89 
 Policy evolution in New Zealand was more gradual. During the 1960s, the National 
government had reformed New Zealand’s approach to the South Pacific and had allowed 
Samoa to gain independence.90 However, the National government had always subjugated 
these issues in favour of relations with Britain and the United States. The Kirk government 
welcomed the growing strength of the non-aligned movement and fostered closer relations 
with communist and non-communist governments in the Asia-Pacific region.91 In this new world 
order where Britain’s decline was manifest and even the United States was reducing its 
influence in the region, the Kirk government recognised that New Zealand needed closer 
relations with all nations in the region and that these relations must be based on equality 
between states.92 The New Zealand government emphatically denounced the assumption of 
superiority and paternalism that had underwritten New Zealand interactions with the Pacific 
Islands ever since colonisation. 
While both governments promoted the notion of regionalism, the region each 
government advocated was noticeably different and reflected their differing geopolitical 
priorities. The Australian government perceived its region as its immediate neighbours to the 
north, with particular emphasis on Papua New Guinea and Indonesia; while the New Zealand 
government conceived of its region as the South Pacific. This reflects the different geography of 
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each nation and the perceived capacity for each government to project its influence in the 
region.93 The Australian government saw a role for Australia as a middle power within Asia, 
while the New Zealand government focussed upon its capacity as a small nation influencing the 
micro-states in the South Pacific. 
An important part of this new regionalism involved both Australia and New Zealand 
ridding themselves of colonial practices. The two governments promoted independence for 
their colonial possessions and they portrayed this as a sign of a new dynamic in the South 
Pacific.94 Whitlam had caused a stir when he placed Papua New Guinea’s independence on his 
political platform; likewise the Kirk government promoted self-government for Niue and 
Tokelau.95 Both governments criticised the opposition for holding on to outdated colonial 
assumptions by assuming they had the right to continue to make decisions for their 
dependences. Morrison described the Australian government’s transformative approach 
towards Papua New Guinea: 
[L]ess than 4 years ago the then Australian Government regarded self-
governance and independence as a remote possibility … The Labor Party, 
having noted the reluctance of colonial powers to give up their colonies — a 
reluctance which led to wars of national liberation, subversion and bloodshed 
— was determined that the distressing lessons of history should not be 
repeated in Australia’s colony Papua New Guinea.96 
The Labo(u)r governments cast off the remnants of the ‘white man’s burden’ by arguing that it 
was no longer Australia and New Zealand’s place to determine the character of the South 
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Pacific. This approach was indicative of changes that had occurred over the previous ten years 
and the newly limited capacity of Western states to impose their views on the rest of the 
world.97 At the beginning of the twentieth century Australia and New Zealand wholeheartedly 
supported British hegemony in the Pacific, but as Britain declined, both governments shifted 
their support to the United States. Both governments assumed that these great powers were 
fulfilling a moral duty to uplift their native peoples and to keep out less benevolent colonial 
powers.98 Those long-held assumptions had been critically undermined by 1972: the Labo(u)r 
governments saw a new moral purpose in promoting independence and democracy in the 
Pacific, and they linked this to their promotion of anti-racist policies within Australia and New 
Zealand. By granting independence to their protectorates, both nations attempted to redefine 
their relationships with their neighbours and discard their association with colonial dominance.  
Although these governments pursued a similar agenda they operated within different 
geopolitical contexts. In New Zealand, the previous government had made considerable 
progress in granting independence to the Cook Islands.99 There were disagreements over the 
timing and the nature of self-government, but there was bipartisan support for independence. 
The National government, while still tending towards paternalistic policies, recognised that 
New Zealand’s future lay in the Pacific and that good relations with the Pacific Island nations 
were important. More importantly, since the end of World War II, New Zealand increasingly 
considered itself safe from invasion as other colonial powers withdrew and because the Cold 
War was a largely European and Asian affair.100 There was little advantage to retaining the 
Pacific colonies, and granting self-government was in keeping with New Zealand’s self-image as 
a benevolent nation.101 Australia’s experience, however, was different. Successive Australian 
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governments saw Papua New Guinea (PNG) as an important buffer against aggression from Asia 
and assumed that the ‘backwardness’ of the people from PNG meant that they were not ready 
for self-governance.102 Whitlam shattered this complacent approach.103 The Liberals were 
outraged at Whitlam’s suggestion, accusing him of seriously undermining Australia’s national 
interests.104 Eventually, the Liberals came to accept that PNG must be given its independence, 
but the level of concern over that issue reflects underlying insecurities in Australia about its 
proximity to Asia, its need to exert control in the region and the extent to which a fear of 
invasion was still pervasive in many parts of Australia in the 1970s.  
The third significant element of the new foreign policy was the creation a “truly 
independent” foreign policy.105 Both governments framed their policies with reference to the 
Vietnam War.106 They argued that previous governments had been subservient to the United 
States by joining their ill-fated expedition into Vietnam. Rather than working for the ‘national 
interest’, the Labo(u)r governments argued, their predecessors had bent under the force of US 
pressure.107 They wanted to redefine relations with the US by voicing their right to respectfully 
disagree and follow their own path in international affairs. This call for greater independence 
drew upon anti-US sentiment, which had developed in left-wing circles during the Vietnam 
War.108 It also resonated with conservative elements of Australian and New Zealand society 
where opinion regretted the decline of Great Britain and expressed scepticism about the 
capacity of the US to take the place of the Empire.109 The governments of both Whitlam and 
Kirk argued that their countries had for too long submitted to neo-colonial dominance and that 
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it was time for them to strike out and make their own way in the world. They argued that this 
was a necessary step on the road towards true nationhood and that until they had truly 
independent foreign policies they would not possess a key component of a sovereign nation-
state and would not be able to express the will of the people on the global stage. This rhetoric 
and worldview was radically different from the past and it reflected the profound challenges 
Australia and New Zealand faced and the extent to which these new governments undermined 
assumptions that had been in place since 1901. 
Opposition parties in both nations accused their governments of endangering the 
ANZUS Treaty and jeopardising US military protection in the Pacific. The Australian opposition 
accused the Labor government of straying so far from its traditional bearings that it was 
preparing to join the non-aligned movement.110 The New Zealand opposition accused the 
government of valuing third-world nations over Western powers.111 Both governments were 
concerned about this criticism: only a few months into office they both retracted their more 
aggressive statements. They were at pains to re-emphasise the centrality of ANZUS and the US 
alliance and they denied any accusations that they had undermined those defence agreements. 
For instance, Manfred Cross (Brisbane) argued that despite the “increasing nationalism” of the 
era, the Australian government was not about to “cut adrift from previous associations.”112 The 
new governments remained committed to the defence arrangements that had been 
established after World War II. However, they challenged the idea that loyalty to the United 
States overrode all other considerations. This reflected scepticism towards the role the US 
would play in the region and a greater confidence in the security of Australia and New Zealand 
within the region.113 
The left-wing governments argued that this period represented the end of old 
certainties. ANZUS was still important to both countries and was still the core of each country’s 
defence policies, but the guarantees of protection from Britain were long gone and the 
                                                                
110
 APD, House, vol. 93 (1975): 70. 
111
 NZPD, vol.384 (1973): 2598. 
112
 APD, House, vol.82 (1973): 334.  
113
Hocking.; Peter Mayell, "Beyond the ‘Outer Crescent’: The Mackinder Century in New Zealand Geopolitics," The Geographical 
Journal 170, 4 (2004): 372. 
171 
 
fickleness of American foreign policy was also evident. The colonial powers had left Asia and 
the Pacific, leaving behind a range of post-colonial nation-states.114 The Australian and New 
Zealand governments had come to terms with the limits of Western power in the region. 
Norman Kirk quoted from a new report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
The Vietnam conflict … marked the end of an era. By its close, it had become 
plain that military intervention by great powers in the affairs and on the 
territory of smaller nations is no longer acceptable to world opinion.115 
The range of new policy objectives and approaches reflected this changed environment. These 
governments expressed a willingness to be interdependent with non-Western governments in 
the region. More importantly, forward defence had come to an end and both governments 
were less willing to impose their influence on the region.116 
By altering their foreign policy the new governments attempted to redefine their 
geopolitical position. Specifically, they proclaimed that the future of each nation lay in their 
immediate region and that it was no longer feasible to remain aloof, as European nations on 
the edge of Asia. Instead, the two governments linked their new nationalism with foreign 
policy. By changing the way Australia and New Zealand interacted with the world they also 
sought to change the character of each nation by using rhetoric that was fundamentally 
different from that used throughout the twentieth century. This illustrates the importance of 
this moment and the extent to which the world view the governments promoted was 
revolutionary.  
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The resilience of Australasia  
This chapter has argued that the decline of Britain, among other things, heavily 
influenced the new nationalism espoused by the Australian and New Zealand governments. The 
effect of Britain’s decline was contradictory, with both nations becoming simultaneously more 
inward looking and more engaged with the rest of the world. Britain’s decline also forced 
Australia and New Zealand to pay attention to each other. Until this time their foreign policies 
were preoccupied with maintaining good relations with Britain and the United States.117 
However, as both nations began to search for new allies they became reacquainted with old 
ones. Australia and New Zealand were still predominantly Anglo-Celtic countries, democratic 
and at the bottom of the world. Thus, both governments saw the advantage of combining 
resources in order to increase their international influence.118 There has been a surprising 
consensus between the two governments that the best way to achieve this objective has been 
to promote closer bilateral relations. This has been so successful that by 2013 Australia and 
New Zealand have one of the closest bilateral relationship of any two sovereign nations in the 
world.119 When this process began in the early 1970s both governments passed legislation to 
promote trade, increase economic co-operation and develop closer governmental relations.120 
Furthermore, the nations faced similar challenges and attempted to strengthen their influence 
by coordinating their responses to a range of international issues. Yet as both nations started 
paying more attention to one another their differences also became more obvious, and the 
increasingly different geopolitical reality of each nation caused frustration and disagreements 
on both sides of the Tasman. 
Another noticeable change in the parliamentary debates in Australia and New Zealand 
between 1972-5 was that Britain was conspicuous by its absence. The Whitlam and Kirk 
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governments accepted Britain’s withdrawal from the region; in fact they often portrayed it as 
an important and inevitable step on the path to full independence.121 Even though the 
opposition in both parliaments had largely accepted the decline of Britain, they fought to 
protect British institutions in Australia and New Zealand even as they recognised that the world 
had changed. A certain amount of protest at Britain’s official entry into the EEC in 1972 seemed 
likely, but this did not happen because it was no longer such an important issue. The United 
Kingdom’s share of exports to New Zealand declined from 25.3% in 1965 to 14.8% in 1973 and 
continued to decline; Australia’s disengagement was even more stark.122 There was much 
disagreement about what (if anything) should or could replace Great Britain, but those 
economic indicators vividly illustrate how far Australia and New Zealand moved away from 
Britain in a relatively short time. 
This pushed Australia and New Zealand together. This period consolidated the process 
that began in 1961 when Britain first attempted to join the European Economic Community. As 
outlined in the previous chapter Australia and New Zealand fiercely resisted Britain’s 
withdrawal from its imperial commitments. However, by the early 1970s it was clear that 
Britain’s decline was not temporary, the world had changed irreversibly, and Australia and New 
Zealand would have to come to terms with this new reality. This chapter has outlined a number 
of ways in which the two governments responded to this situation. One of the most important 
responses was the rediscovery of each other. The development of close bilateral relations was a 
direct response to Britain’s decline. In 1965, Australia and New Zealand signed the New Zealand 
Australia Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to promote trade between the two countries, then in 
the 1970s. Australian politicians in particular began to promote the idea of a single market.123 
The Minister for Trade, Jim Cairns (Lalor), argued that:  
[T]here are great advantages to be obtained from the gradual development of 
an economic framework in which two individual markets, comprising 13 
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million people in Australia and 3 million people in New Zealand, blend into a 
closely related market of 16 million people.124 
Aspiring to create a single economy was a leap forward from the 1960s. It reflected a growing 
awareness of the interdependence of Australia and New Zealand and the advantages of acting 
in concert. Politicians in both countries placed this new relationship firmly within the context of 
a post-British world. They agreed that this new insecure economic environment meant the two 
nations had no choice but to work together.125 
 This further illustrates the changes occurring in both countries and the ways in which 
the two governments invoked political identities to transform their attitudes towards the 
world. These issues become even more important in the final two chapters of this thesis. The 
last two chapters will consider the tensions between solidarity with ‘the West’ against the new 
ethical framework that rejected racial discrimination and promoted integration with the non-
Western world, and the contradictory implications of this for the developing bilateral 
relationship between Australia and New Zealand. These are two central issues that framed the 
political rhetoric in these two countries and typified how the governments in the 1980s would 
continue the process of defining post-British national identities in Australia and New Zealand.  
Conclusion 
By the 1970s the way the two governments constructed their imagined communities were 
different in several ways. Australia’s increasing ethnic diversity meant that the government 
emphasised multiculturalism; there was not the same urgency in New Zealand. In comparison 
with Australia, New Zealand’s increasing sense of security at the bottom of the world made it 
less obsessed with great power protection. Indigenous peoples occupied a different position 
within the imagination of each nation. On a more general level the similarities between the two 
nations still outweighed the differences. Both governments faced the decline of Britain and 
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they attempted to redefine the position of each nation within the region and the world as a 
response to this. Just as previous national identities had emphasised the concept of a European 
nation on the edge of Asia, the new identities reflected the governments’ desire to engage with 
the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, the repudiation of racially defined identities meant that both 
immigrant nations would come to adopt increasingly pluralistic cultural and political identities. 
The differences described in this chapter are significant because they are a 
manifestation of a series of differences that have developed since 1901, and because they form 
the basis of a greater divergence between the two countries in the 1980s. This is not to suggest 
that Australia and New Zealand were suddenly fundamentally different nations. Instead, this 
period provides further evidence of the similar internal and external forces affecting the two 
governments. The Kirk and Whitlam governments both embarked on similar projects to renew 
the nation and realign each nation’s approach to the world. The next chapter analyses the 
consequences of this when, in 1984, they manifested in the ANZUS crisis. 
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Chapter Six 
The ANZUS Crisis 
 
Introduction 
The foreign policy consensus that had existed between Canberra and Wellington throughout 
most of their history was broken in the 1980s.1 In 1984 the new Labour government in New 
Zealand proclaimed its intention to ban all nuclear powered vessels from entering New 
Zealand’s waters before passing legislation to enact this policy in 1986. The US navy could then 
no longer enter New Zealand’s ports because the US was unwilling to confirm whether any of 
its vessels were nuclear capable. The US government prevailed upon New Zealand to change its 
policies so that military co-operation between the two nations could continue but the New 
Zealand government was resolute. This resulted in New Zealand’s exclusion from the military 
dimensions of the ANZUS agreement. This crisis illustrated the increasingly distinct foreign 
policy perspectives of the New Zealand and Australian governments. The Australian 
government continued to rely upon a realist interpretation of foreign policy objectives that 
prioritised US protection over all other concerns, while New Zealand emphasised an 
internationalist approach to foreign policy by prioritising moral conduct and international co-
operation ahead of the US alliance.2 Both governments described their foreign polices as a 
reflection of the national identity of each nation and the differences in the construction of 
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national identity reflected increasingly distinct geopolitical outlooks. This chapter analyses the 
relationship between foreign policy and national identity in the rhetoric of the two 
governments and considers the extent to which their worldviews had diverged.  
New Zealand’s exclusion from ANZUS was unexpected and traumatic for both the 
Australian and New Zealand governments. Within the space of six months the newly elected 
Labour government had fundamentally reframed New Zealand’s foreign policy position and as a 
result altered New Zealand’s relations with the US.3 Thirty years later Australian and New 
Zealand governments are still dealing with the consequences of those events. At the time both 
governments viewed the New Zealand government’s uncompromising attitude towards nuclear 
warships as a dramatic break with the past.4 This was to a large extent true, although it was also 
the culmination of a process that had begun in the 1960s. New Zealand’s ambivalent 
involvement with the Vietnam War and increasing concern over nuclear testing in the Pacific 
was evidence of greater emphasis on regional issues and less of an obsession with relations 
with Britain and the United States.5 Successive governments invoked the idea that New 
Zealand’s position at the bottom of the world, left it largely insulated from great power 
conflicts and less threatened by the possibility of invasion. They linked this geopolitical vision to 
New Zealand’s national identity and its distinctiveness as a moral actor on the global stage. 
Earlier in the century, these ideas were important but they had to balance with the more real 
politik concerns that had traditionally dominated New Zealand governments’ strategic thinking. 
However, in 1984 the New Zealand government changed the terms of the debate by insisting 
that it would not receive nuclear armed ships in its waters. This reflected a new willingness to 
sacrifice the realist preoccupation with American military protection in order to promote New 
Zealand’s internationalist concerns with global disarmament.  
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There is a substantial literature on the ANZUS crisis. A number of articles were written 
during the event and in the immediate aftermath as New Zealand sought to come to terms with 
and justify New Zealand’s drastic change of direction. Most of the existing literature takes a 
realist approach to this issue. Authors such as Michael Templeton, who defended the 
government’s approach, commended the government for recognising the importance of 
nuclear disarmament and bringing into place an independent foreign policy in New Zealand.6 
For example, Jim Rolfe argued that “This close relationship [ANZUS] started as a result of 
military fears and was disrupted by military differences.”7 Other scholars such as Ramesh 
Thakur invoked similar language to denounce the government. They argued that the moral and 
theoretical foundations of the Lange government’s foreign policy were weak and contradictory, 
and that this policy, based on idealism, was not a valid basis for a nation’s foreign policy.8 These 
articles were concerned with whether the government’s policy was in New Zealand’s interest. 
More recent literature has marshalled post-structuralist theory in order to assess the 
motivations and meaning of the new foreign policy.9 Dalby argues that “what is at stake in the 
still ongoing debate in Aotearoa is at least as much about New Zealand’s identity as a political 
community as it is about alliance structures or nuclear weapons.”10 “External threats are 
socially constructed as both the antithesis to, and constitutive of internal identity … The very 
exercise of discursively constructing ‘foreign’ threats organizes ‘domestic’ society in ways” that 
justify the delineation of ‘us’ and ‘them’.11 This engagement with geopolitical theory neatly 
dovetails into this thesis’s approach to analysing foreign policy in New Zealand and Australia. By 
providing a comparison of the Australian and New Zealand governments’ approaches to this 
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crisis, this chapter shows the centrality of geopolitical, and hence nationalist, discourses in the 
construction of foreign policy during this period and thus contributes to this ongoing debate 
from a firmly trans-Tasman perspective. At the same time, it provides evidence for the 
geopolitical divergence between Australia and New Zealand that was visible from the start of 
the century, but only came to prominence because of the dramatic changes in the world and in 
the antipodean nations themselves.  
The Australian and New Zealand governments debated foreign policy in late 1984 and 
early 1985. The two governments were largely preoccupied with defending their policies 
towards ANZUS while the conservative oppositions in both countries tried to score political 
points because of the disruption of the ANZUS Treaty. Unsurprisingly, the two governments put 
forward differing foreign policies, but more importantly these differences were communicated 
through and enforced by contrasting geopolitical visions of the world. The New Zealand 
government considered the greatest threat to New Zealand’s security to be nuclear weapons. 
This over-rode traditional concerns about Soviet expansionism and the threat of Asian invasion. 
Francis O’Flynn (Island Bay) argued that “the control of nuclear weapons is the greatest 
problem concerning the world today.”12 More importantly, it reflected the idea that New 
Zealand could have an influence on the international arena as an exemplar of moral foreign 
policy that would influence and encourage other nations towards better behaviours.13 The 
government used the fact that New Zealand was a small country to argue that its most effective 
role would be as an example of good behaviour. This is interesting considering that politicians 
in New Zealand for most of the twentieth century cited the fact that New Zealand was a small 
country as a reason to subordinate all other interests in order to maintain its military alliances 
with Britain and the US.  
 In Australia the government continued to emphasise the centrality of the relationship 
with the United States to ensure military protection and to contain and nullify the role of the 
Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region. During a review of Australia’s defence capabilities Bill 
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Morrison (St George) articulated a “firm and unequivocal reaffirmation of the alliance as 
fundamental to Australia's national security and foreign and defence policies”, pointing out that 
“although the Treaty was drawn up a generation ago … in very different circumstances” it 
remained “valid and appropriate today”.14 Morality and idealism played a much smaller role in 
the Australian rhetoric. The government also argued that Australia could have a large influence 
on the region and the world as a middle power, an idea that was largely absent in the New 
Zealand government’s rhetoric. It is interesting that during the mid-1980s both Australia and 
New Zealand elected Labo(u)r governments. Unlike 1972 though, only one government came to 
power with a platform for a fundamentally different foreign policy. The Australian Minister of 
Defence, Bill Hayden, went so far as to argue: “The condition of the defence forces in this 
country is a reflection of a long term rundown of quite malicious neglect on the part of the 
Opposition during the several years it was in government.”15 The governments in New Zealand 
and Australia had different geopolitical visions and this was a major reason why their foreign 
policies diverged to such a profound extent.16 
 The events surrounding the ANZUS crisis highlight the direct link between foreign policy, 
geopolitical identities and national identities. Governments on both sides of the Tasman related 
their approach to foreign policy to their construction of national identities.17 Foreign policy was 
not just a rational response to the challenges each nation faced in the global arena, nor was it 
simply the advancement and protection of each country’s national interest.18 Instead, they 
portrayed foreign policy as an expression of national identity. Prime Minister Bob Hawke made 
this clear in his discussion of the ANZUS crisis: 
We are not, and we will not be, in the business of attempting to bully New 
Zealand. It is a reflection upon the integrity of the Opposition that it would 
seek to do so. The national security interests of this country demand that we 
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maintain an effective bilateral defence relationship with New Zealand 
because, unfortunately, there are signs of potential increases in instability in 
the South Pacific region.19 
It is important to analyse the foreign policy of each government in order to understand the 
construction of national identity. Likewise it is important to consider the effect that geopolitical 
position can have on the direction of foreign policies. This chapter explores the inter-
relationship between this process. 
 This was evident as the Labour government moved to readjust New Zealand’s foreign 
policy; it was both backward and forward looking. The government drew upon New Zealand’s 
recent history, primarily its increasingly South Pacific-focused regionalism, the growth of anti-
nuclear sentiment in New Zealand, and the idea that since the 1960s New Zealand was no 
longer threatened by invasion.20 The government portrayed the ban on all nuclear ships as a 
logical extension of previous governments’ policies that reflected New Zealand’s geopolitical 
position. At the same time, Social Credit MP Gary Knapp (East Coast Bays) framed the new 
direction as an opportunity to forge new ground for New Zealand and to regain its position at 
the forefront of the progressive world:  
As a small nation, remote from the centres of East-West confrontation, the 
declaration of New Zealand and its ports, territorial waters, and air space as a 
nuclear free zone is a significant and powerful message to the superpowers ... 
It is a message that expresses the profound desire of a small nation for the 
nuclear superpowers to step back from the collision course of global 
genocide.21 
This rhetoric drew upon a particular image of New Zealand society, which the government 
claimed to represent. The same was true for the Australian government. Prime Minister Hawke 
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directly linked foreign policy to national identity and the promotion of the national interest and 
criticised the opposition for not doing the same thing:  
Can this really be in the national interest? The answer is obvious. What 
Robinson is saying and what the people of Australia are saying is that the way 
in which the Leader of the Opposition is going on is manifestly against the 
interests of this country.22 
Hawke justified the correctness of his approach to foreign policy by portraying it as a natural 
extension of the national identity of the Australia nation.23 This shows the interrelationship 
between foreign policy and the construction of nationalism. 
This thesis has analysed the development of regionalism in Australia and New Zealand 
over the twentieth century and while both governments have placed increasing emphasis on 
regionalism, the content of each country’s regionalism was different. Specifically, Australian 
governments have always been preoccupied with Asia while New Zealand governments have 
focused on the South Pacific.24 This difference was most overtly expressed in the mid-1980s. 
David Lange was unequivocal about New Zealand’s position as a South Pacific nation: 
The Government’s foreign policy objectives are straightforward. First, it will 
secure New Zealand’s interests and will reflect New Zealand’s place as an 
independent nation in the South Pacific, and second, it will provide for New 
Zealand’s security and defence through the promotion of stability in the 
region.25 
This idea emerged throughout the twentieth century in New Zealand, but it was most firmly 
and consistently argued at this time as the government sought to redefine New Zealand’s 
position in the world. Australia’s engagement with Asia continued to be ambivalent, and they 
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did not use the same imagery of an Asian identity in the same way the New Zealand 
government talked about New Zealand’s South Pacific identity. However, the Australian 
government did argue that Australia’s economic future lay in Asia and that Australia must 
engage with this region. Bill Morrison (St George) made this point in his discussion of the Joint 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence: “This report flows from the recognition by the 
Committee that no other part of the world promises to be of more consistent importance to 
Australia than the region of South and South East Asia.”26 Both governments expressed an 
increasing commitment to regional engagement, but the Australian government framed itself 
as a middle power in the Asia-Pacific region, while the New Zealand government emphasised 
New Zealand’s position as a small but important South Pacific nation.  
 Although regionalism was important in both nations the governments in Canberra and 
Wellington did not place the same emphasis on the concept. The New Zealand government 
placed central importance on New Zealand’s role as a regional player, and its position as a 
South Pacific nation was an important justification for the need to ban nuclear weapons. To the 
great consternation of the opposition, the Labour government was willing to sacrifice New 
Zealand’s position within ANZUS in order to pursue its nuclear-free policies in the Pacific.27 
Lange argued that “Many [people] believe the nuclear arms race to be the greatest single threat 
to their security.”28 The Australian government adopted the opposite approach. It was 
supportive of a nuclear-free Pacific in principle; however, it was unwilling to compromise 
Australia’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States.29 The government was at great pains to 
reassure the public and opposition that ANZUS remained the backbone of Australia’s defence 
even if New Zealand chose to withdraw from its obligations.30 
Both Australia and New Zealand emphasised regionalism as the British Empire declined, 
with governments on both sides of the Tasman following similar policies in the 1960s and 
1970s. In 1984 however, the New Zealand government proclaimed its “true independence” 
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from superpower influence, while the Australian government continued to rely upon United 
States for defence.31 The New Zealand government drew upon similar rhetoric to that of the 
1970s — about freeing itself from colonial dominance and disassociating New Zealand from its 
colonial legacy, while the Australian Labor government did not use the rhetoric of the Whitlam 
government.32 
This is an important difference that derives from the broader structural differences this 
thesis has outlined, but the Australian Labor government was also deeply affected by the legacy 
of the Whitlam dismissal. Members of the Whitlam government had been critical of the United 
States and this is considered to have been one of the issues that undermined support for that 
Labor government.33 Hawke made a point of distancing himself from those polices and adopted 
a policy of ‘consensus’ that reflected a desire to have close relations with the United States and 
not allow this to become an issue the opposition could attack them on.34 The Whitlam dismissal 
hung over the Hawke government and this meant that it took a much more conciliatory 
approach to foreign policy than the New Zealand Labour government, which did not have the 
same legacy. During the crisis the opposition repeatedly questioned the government’s 
commitment to ANZUS. Liberal MP Peter White argued that “[t]he problem is that Australia has 
now become an unreliable ally, and not only in American eyes.”35 The Minster for Defence Kim 
Beazely made the case that:  
To suggest that something has occurred which in any way, shape or form 
places Australian security in jeopardy flies directly in the face not only of the 
advice of this Government, solidly backed up by evidence, but also it flies in 
the face of statements made by the United States.36 
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Beazley emphatically affirmed his government’s commitment to the United States and by 
implication distanced it from the Whitlam government’s approach. These political 
considerations in Australia were an important reason why there was such a divergence in 
foreign policy between Australia and New Zealand. 
At the same time, this difference was also a manifestation of the different geopolitical 
outlooks of the two governments and the greater flexibility the New Zealand government had 
because of the perception that New Zealand was not directly threatened due to its geographic 
isolation. In contrast, the Australian government argued that Australia had no choice but to 
maintain ANZUS even at the expense of other, more idealistic, principles that inform Australian 
foreign policy, because of the external challenges Australia faced.  
 The New Zealand government’s shift towards non-alignment reflected a shift from 
realism to idealism.37 David Lange expressed an increasingly internationalist perspective 
towards foreign policy, which emphasised the role of morality, international institutions, and 
international co-operation: 
There is the strongly held view amongst the New Zealand public about the 
value of international co-operation in defence and other matters. That view 
acknowledges the advantages of collective international agreements. Those 
elements in public opinion — the desire to exclude nuclear weapons and the 
understanding of the merits of international co-operation — are absolutely in 
accord with the government’s assessment of the widest interests of New 
Zealand.38 
The Australian government maintained a realist approach and Minister for Defence Kim Beazley 
(Swan) outlined this approach in response to criticism from the opposition:  
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From both our point of view and that of the relevant United States officials, 
that relationship remains unimpaired. It has been well protected by this 
Government. It is this Government which has pursued a consistent policy on 
South East Asia; it is this Government which has a concept of a regional 
arrangement which will ensure our national security and economic interests 
in the future.39 
Beazley emphasised the balance of power and ‘tangible’ elements of foreign policy. The New 
Zealand government framed its role as a moral actor whose example could influence world 
events and argued that that moralism came directly from the national character of the New 
Zealand nation. In contrast, the more pragmatic Australian government concentrated on the 
tangible role Australia could play as an ally of the United States and this too flowed directly 
from Australia’s character as a predominantly white liberal-democratic nation on the edge of 
Asia. 
Another aspect of this difference was reflected in the two governments’ attitudes 
towards the Cold War. The Australian government took a much harder line towards the Cold 
War and continued to draw upon Cold War warrior rhetoric.40 This perspective saw the world 
divided into two camps and Australia was compelled to support America at all costs in order to 
keep the Soviet Union at bay. The New Zealand government, by contrast, expressed an 
increasingly different attitude toward the international environment. The Minister for Defence 
Frank O’Flynn (Island Bay) argued that “because we are a long way removed from the tensions 
of the rest of the world” New Zealand had more strategic flexibility and was not compelled to 
maintain good relations with the United States at the expense of other foreign and defence 
policy considerations.41 This marked a significant shift in New Zealand foreign policy that had 
previously mirrored Australia’s. The New Zealand government’s foreign policy rhetoric 
emphasised the power of the non-aligned movement and increasingly advocated New 
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Zealand’s position as a non-aligned country, standing apart from Cold War conflicts.42 This 
divergence was indicative of the different world-views the two Labo(u)r governments 
presented to their electorates.  
While this chapter has considered all of the differences between Australian and New 
Zealand foreign policy, it is important to keep these developments in perspective. Most 
importantly, the New Zealand government did not intend to leave ANZUS when it banned 
nuclear powered ships from its waters. In fact, during the early part of the debates over this 
issue the government reiterated that “Labour Governments have always sought good relations 
with the United States of America” and it was confident that it would be able to negotiate a 
compromise with the American government.43 The government maintained this position for 
good reason; the US alliance was still popular in New Zealand at that time.44 A clear majority of 
New Zealanders wanted to remain within the ANZUS framework.45 However, a majority of 
people also supported the banning of nuclear ships in New Zealand. The government was in the 
unenviable position of trying to placate the left-wing of the Labour Party, which had become 
increasingly radicalised during the long reign of Robert Muldoon, while also maintaining good 
relations with the US and Australia.46 In the end the government was not able to do both and 
the nuclear issue trumped New Zealand’s traditional alliance with the US.  
There was nothing inevitable about New Zealand’s nuclear stance and it only gained 
such support because Minister for Health and Local Government Michael Bassett (Te Atatu) and 
others from the government framed New Zealand’s foreign policy stance as an expression of 
national independence:  
Since 14 July, New Zealand has known a sense of nationhood; it has a 
Government that reflects a mature assessment of New Zealand’s best 
interests, uncluttered by nineteenth century thinking and preoccupation with 
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a fawning survival mentality that has passed for foreign policy so often in the 
past.47 
Moreover, the government linked this concept with the idea that New Zealand was at the 
forefront of progressive legislation, which was in turn a reflection of New Zealand’s 
exceptionalism.48 Ironically, the government that advocated the most internationalist foreign 
policy did so by invoking strongly nationalist rhetoric.  
Throughout the 1980s the National Party did not support the ban on nuclear ships and 
during the parliamentary debates it invoked language that was almost identical to the 
opposition in Australia. Arguably, it was the French who embedded the nuclear fear policy with 
such virulence that it has received bipartisan support since 1990. They did this by bombing the 
Rainbow Warrior in July 1985. This event hardened public opinion against nuclear weapons and 
impacted upon the way New Zealanders viewed the world.49 There was particular bitterness 
towards the US for not condemning the bombings and this seemed to confirm the 
undesirability of an alliance with a country that seemed unwilling to take New Zealand into 
account or come to its aid. Since 1985, the nuclear issue has been one of the most powerful 
creation myths of New Zealand’s development as a mature nation, and is often used as 
evidence of New Zealand’s willingness to develop its own policies despite the bullying of 
Western powers.50 Thus, the New Zealand government used the nuclear issue as evidence of 
New Zealand’s exceptionalism and independence, but this occurred because of a specific 
circumstance that was by no means inevitable.  
 It is also important to note that, unlike the American government, the Australian 
government largely resisted criticising the New Zealand government.51 While the Australian 
government worked to change New Zealand’s policy behind the scenes, publicly they respected 
New Zealand’s right to develop its own policies. They left criticism of New Zealand to the 
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opposition who spent a considerable amount of time criticising New Zealand’s lack of realism 
and betrayal of the Western alliance.52 Furthermore, there was a large and active anti-nuclear 
movement in Australia at that time and while it did not have the same influence as the anti-
nuclear movement had in New Zealand, it was still significant.53 The Australian Labor Party 
largely agreed with the goals of the New Zealand Labour Party, but they disagreed about the 
best policy to achieve those goals. It is important to keep the differences between Canberra 
and Wellington in perspective, ensuring they do not overshadow certain similarities that 
continued through this tumultuous period.  
Furthermore, this divergence in strategic perspective had a somewhat counter-intuitive 
effect. Rather than pushing the two nations apart, Australia became New Zealand’s most 
important strategic partner and the two nations have developed even closer bilateral relations 
from this period. It is worth quoting Phillipa Mein Smith’s interpretation at length: 
Thus the nuclear free idea, while it annoyed Australia, propelled New Zealand 
closer to its neighbour. The defence imbroglio boosted the success of the CER 
[Closer Economic Relations] agreement, while affirming New Zealand identity 
as not Australian. Correspondingly, Canberra decided after lively debate that 
Australia’s interests would be best served by strengthening the defence 
relationship with New Zealand ... [However] while they shared solidarity of 
kinship and purpose, New Zealanders had a different idea of what constituted 
the Pacific, and historically felt less exposed to threats that, real and 
imagined, appeared from Southeast Asia. 54 
Both governments, but particularly the New Zealand government, became even more aware of 
the importance of the trans-Tasman relationship. Australia had replaced Britain and the United 
States as the larger state with which New Zealand’s fate was tied. Rhetorically, they confirmed 
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this relationship by the familiar language invoking ANZAC sacrifice, similar liberal-democratic 
institutions and cultural (if not overtly ethnic) similarities. The continuing emphasis on the 
promotion of regionalism in both countries also emphasised the importance of the trans-
Tasman relationship.55 In fact, the resilience of bilateral relations between Australia and New 
Zealand during this period, when it is quite conceivable that the relationship could have been 
seriously damaged, is further evidence of both governments’ commitment to the maintenance 
of Australasia, despite the countervailing influences.  
On a more general level, the two governments faced the same set of challenges as two 
predominately Anglo-Celtic nations on the edge of the Asia-Pacific region trying to define a 
place for themselves in the world, balancing the historic and strategic pull of the United States 
with developing closer economic relations with Asia and the Pacific. The governments adopted 
different policies with different priorities, but both were intended to address the same 
challenges and were fundamentally related to the ongoing attempts to redefine each nation’s 
place within the region and the world. They both linked this policy to the construction of 
national identity. Both governments framed their responses to this crisis as the natural 
outcome of the national identity of each nation. Kim Beazley (Swan) during a review of defence 
policy argued that: 
Australians have a right to expect that their nation is able to defend itself. 
That is at the core of nationhood, and it has long been an Australian aspiration 
... The ability to defend itself is the absolute minimum that any self-respecting 
country should contribute to an alliance. Australia can scarcely pretend to 
contribute to the defence of broader Western interests if it cannot even 
defend itself.56 
For New Zealand, the Minister for Overseas Trade and Marketing, Mike Moore argued that:  
                                                                
55
David J. McCraw, "New Zealand's Foreign Policy Under National and Labour Governments: Variations on the "Small State" 
Theme?," Pacific Affairs, 67, 1 (1994), 19; McCraw, 99. 
56
Minister for Defence, APD, House, (3 June, 1986, Hansard online, 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;adv%3Dyes;orderBy%3D_fragment_number,doc_date-
rev;query%3DDataset%3Ahansardr,hansardr80;resCount%3DDefault): 4419. Accessed on: 10/02/2013. 
191 
 
Many New Zealanders have come to me and said how proud they are once 
again to be New Zealanders. The Prime Minister has helped rebuild New 
Zealand’s pride in itself and its sense of destiny ... A new spirit is abroad in 
New Zealand. We have once again become a nation.57  
These quotations illustrate important points of difference, yet they also underline the similar 
challenges each government faced and the way both governments marshalled similar rhetorical 
strategies to justify their position. 
 This thesis has considered the extent to which Australian and New Zealand governments 
have moved away from notions of a pan-British racial identity and towards a post-racial region-
focussed national identity. This process was caused by the decline of the importance of Great 
Britain and the rise of the idea that the Asia-Pacific region is home. This raises questions about 
where the trans-Tasman relationship fits within this process. Was the strengthening of relations 
between the two nations in the late twentieth century a part of the development of 
regionalism or was it the last remnant of a bygone era; the final monument to the power of the 
British Imperial idea? Both governments justified the bilateral relationship through rhetoric that 
described a common culture, a shared history, similar democratic institutions, shared military 
sacrifice and economic inter-dependence. This rhetoric facilitated the development of an 
incredibly close bilateral relationship. The similarities with this rhetoric and the rhetoric that 
described the British Empire were quite clear, and this indicates that, on some level, the trans-
Tasman relationship is a relic of a previous era, a friendly reminder of a familial world that has 
long since ceased to exist. There is however, an important difference. Relations with Britain 
involved a disavowal of geography and the promotion of the idea that both countries were 
European nations on the edge of the Pacific. The trans-Tasman relationship, on the other hand, 
reflects an acceptance of the Asian and South-Pacific future of both nations and the need to 
foster greater regional development. Within this context the bilateral relationship draws upon 
rhetoric that both yearns for the familiar past, while also advocating a bold and different future 
for each nation.  
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Conclusion 
The ANZUS crisis reflected important differences that had developed between Australia and 
New Zealand over the course of the twentieth century. It was by far the most significant 
divergence of foreign policy in the two countries’ histories. In this sense it was the culmination 
of differences that had existed since 1901, but until this time had been subsumed. The New 
Zealand government communicated a vision of New Zealand’s position in the world that 
contrasted with the Australian government’s perspective. This reflected fundamental 
differences in the geopolitical outlook of the two governments and they used nationalist 
rhetoric to buttress their positions. The New Zealand government drew upon the popular image 
of their nation as a morally superior and progressive society to justify its radical reappraisal of 
its foreign policy, while the Australian government drew upon long-standing assumptions about 
Australia’s position within the world and the essential need for a great and powerful friend to 
ensure its security. This was reflected in the nationalist rhetoric in both parliaments. The 
differences were pronounced and highly significant and it has been one of the central aims of 
this thesis to explain this development, because it reflected such a fundamental difference 
between the two nations who, for so long, had such similar foreign policies and geopolitical 
rhetoric. However, it should also be noted that this crisis did not damage relations between the 
two countries; instead from the 1980s onwards the two governments drew even more closely 
together, and New Zealand has come to rely upon Australia for defence. Furthermore, both 
governments’ rhetoric surrounding foreign policy and their position within the world is 
indicative of the same challenges that both countries face as largely ethnically European 
nations on the edge of the Pacific, trying to define a place for themselves within the Asia-Pacific 
region after the decline of Great Britain. Even at this moment of greatest divergence, the 
nationalist rhetoric of two governments contained many similarities.  
The ANZUS crisis was in many ways the manifestation of a process, begun in 1901, that 
has been traced in the preceding chapters. Alongside these geopolitical challenges were other 
changes. By the late 1980s, both governments were promoting identities that were intended to 
reconcile the internal changes that had taken place in the years since World War II. This 
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redefining of Australian and New Zealand national identities culminated in large scale 
celebrations in 1988 in Australia and 1990 in New Zealand. The last chapter in this thesis offers 
an opportunity to interrogate the limits to which their nationalist discourses had diverged. 
194 
 
Chapter Seven 
Celebrating the Nation 1988 and 1990 
 
Introduction  
In 1988, Australia celebrated two hundred years of British settlement, and in 1990, New 
Zealand celebrated the 150th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. Through 
these events both governments promoted a form of national identity intended to address a 
range of challenges that emerged in the second half of the twentieth century. As has been 
demonstrated throughout this thesis, the two governments faced very different demographic 
situations. Likewise, the different geopolitical perspectives of the two governments were 
apparent in their attitudes towards foreign policy and through the Australian government’s 
focus on Asia in comparison to the New Zealand government portraying itself as a South Pacific 
nation. This indicates important differences in the construction of national identity in the two 
countries. These differences had previously been peripheral, but had become significant points 
of divergence between the two nations. However, both governments also invoked similar ideas 
and strategies through their disavowal of a larger British identity, promotion of a new form of 
civic identity, their emphasis on the development of regional engagement, and the inclusion of 
diversity as a central tenet of national identity. These two settler governments described 
national identities that were on one level more distinct than they had ever been, while also 
drawing upon ideas and concerns that reflected their ongoing similarities and the ongoing 
power of the transnational environment in which they operated. 
The historiography of these events differs wildly in Australia and New Zealand. New 
Zealand’s 150th anniversary is relatively understudied. Eric Pawson provides a useful overview 
of the event, while Paul Buchanan critiques the myth of New Zealand’s superior race relations 
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and describes the reality as part of a wider colonial process occurring in other settler societies.1 
There is a much more substantial literature on Australia’s bicentennial. There were a number of 
articles printed in 1988. Most notable were the articles that highlighted the problematic nature 
of this sort of large-scale national celebration.2 Authors such as Stephen Castles pointed to the 
dangers of trying to define and glorify the nation and the extent to which these celebrations 
were intended to draw upon assumptions of white hegemony despite the official proclamations 
that Australia was a multicultural society. Peter Spearritt pointed to the underlying global 
capitalist forces that underwrote this national celebration.3 Lyn Spillman offers an alternative 
view by comparing the Bicentenary with the American Bicentennial.4 There has been no 
comparative analysis of the Australian and New Zealand celebrations, and this chapter provides 
a new way to analyse and compare the rhetoric in the two events. Furthermore, while most 
authors are caught up with the motives and limitations of biculturalism and multiculturalism as 
political projects, this chapter places this latest attempt at national celebration and definition 
into historical context by analysing these events as part of a wider set of processes that have 
been shaping Australia and New Zealand since 1901.  
Australia’s Bicentenary and New Zealand’s sesquicentenary came at a significant time in 
both nations’ histories. By the late 1980s, demographic and political changes had undermined 
many of the tenets of national identity that had been dominant since British colonisation. The 
notion of a pan-British identity was no longer relevant to the discourse surrounding national 
identity in Australia and New Zealand. Likewise, it was no longer acceptable to discuss the 
maintenance of racial homogeneity and the strength of the British race.5 Biculturalism and 
multiculturalism had firmly supplanted aspirations for racial homogeneity and both 
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governments sought to promote unity through diversity, rather than uniformity.6 Because so 
many of the central pillars of national identity had lost their power and both societies were 
attempting to come to grips with this new reality, the governments used these anniversaries to 
articulate their own updated visions of their nations.  
Differences  
Nationalist rhetoric in general and national celebrations in particular rely on a narrative that 
frames the nation in a particular way. This narrative in turn is based on symbols that are the 
foundation of the narrative.7 The bicentenary of the ‘settlement’ of Australia and the 150th 
anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi were two such symbols. Both governments 
used these symbols to construct an image of the nation in the past and the future. However, 
the symbolic events each government sought to remember contained a fundamental 
difference. Australia commemorated the first moment of colonisation and Indigenous 
dispossession, while New Zealand commemorated the signing of a treaty between the British 
and Māori. From the outset, the Australian and New Zealand governments grappled with 
different symbolic material. The New Zealand government portrayed the signing of the treaty 
as the first step in New Zealand’s journey towards partnership and biculturalism, whereas the 
Australian government used an event that was not only problematic, but could no longer be 
celebrated without provoking considerable protest.8 
 This is not to say that the Australian and New Zealand governments were compelled to 
commemorate the anniversaries. Australia has a number of events in its history that also 
signified the ‘creation’ of the nation, most obviously the federation of the colonies in 1901, or 
perhaps the extension of citizenship to Indigenous Australians in 1967. Moreover, while the 
governments chose to spend the time and money on this anniversary, they could just as easily 
have redirected those resources elsewhere. Māori activists contested the New Zealand 
                                                                
6
Helen Robinson, "Making a New Zealand day: The creation and context of a national holiday," New Zealand Journal of History, 
46, 1 (2012), 37; For Australia, Brahm provides a good overview of this issue. Geoffrey Brahm Levey, "The Political Theories of 
Australian Multiculturalism," The University of New South Wales Law Journal, 24, 3 (2001), 870. 
7
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism(London: Verso, 2006), 224. 
8
Leanne White, "The Bicentenary of Australia: Celebration of a Nation," in National Days/National Ways: Historical, Political, 
and Religious Celebrations around the World, ed. Linda Fuller (London: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 32. 
197 
 
government’s decision to commemorate the signing of the treaty: one of the central arguments 
they employed was that New Zealand did not have particularly good race relations and that the 
colonial government was just as oppressive as other settler states.9 
 On the other hand, both governments were constrained by the symbolic repertoire at 
their disposal. This constraint represented the different demographic and historical legacies 
each government inherited and these differences drew upon the themes addressed throughout 
this thesis that were expressed in their most stark form at this time. As a result of these 
differences the New Zealand government was able to construct a more coherent message than 
the Australian government. The symbolism of the signing of the treaty neatly dovetailed into 
the language of partnership and biculturalism as promoted by the fourth Labour government. 
Moreover, the treaty, while often misused and ignored, was a positive and co-operative act, 
which confirmed the most consistently used images of New Zealand as a society with superior 
race relations.10 Although Māori challenged this complacent attitude it was also in their interest 
to promote the idea of partnership because the treaty guaranteed Māori considerable 
autonomy if not tino rangitiritanga.11 Thus, the treaty had powerful symbolism for both Māori 
and Pakeha.  
The landing of the first British ship in Australia was a more problematic event. On the 
one hand, it symbolised the dispossession of Indigenous Australians; on the other, it was largely 
irrelevant to the ever-growing number of non-British minorities living in Australia.12 The landing 
signified Britain’s intention to assert its dominance over the Australian continent. At its best, 
the event ignored the role of Indigenous and non-British people within Australia; at its worst it 
celebrated their dispossession and marginalisation. The government could no longer draw upon 
the bravery and strength of the British who first entered Australia, nor could it portray 
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Australia’s history as an important part of Britain’s civilising mission. The importance of the 
British Empire in Australia was more of an embarrassment than a point of pride.13 Thus, the 
Australian Bicentenary Association (ABA) was trying to celebrate an event that had been 
stripped of most of the meaning that had once made it worth celebrating.14 
 This predicament led the ABA to employ an interesting approach to the commemoration 
of 1788. Rather than a narrow focus on the events surrounding 1788, it tried to celebrate all 
aspects of Australian history and culture at the same time. The Chairman John Reid outlined 
their approach:  
The celebrations will only be successful if they come from the people and 
involve the people of Australia directly in the preparation and carrying out of 
each community’s own projects. Centralised direction does not sit 
comfortably with the Australian character.15 
It took this argument so far as to argue that rather than waiting for 2001 to celebrate the 
hundredth anniversary of Federation it should bring that celebration forward to 1988.16 While 
this idea may seem strange, it made sense within the logic employed by the ABA. It wanted to 
treat the actual day as a vessel that all Australians could fill with their own meaning. This was 
reflected in the way the ABA used history. Lyn Spillman’s work on the Bicentenary illustrates 
that:  
For Australians, on the other hand, the power of ‘founding moment’ 
formulations had evaporated ... Australian organizers [sic] introduced 
historical allusions only casually; for them, the reference to history seemed 
just a part of the cultural task of celebration.17 
The need to combine a narrative of multiculturalism with the beginning of the colonisation of 
Australia meant that it employed history as a milieu of events throughout Australia’s past 
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where hypothetically everything, or nothing, could be celebrated, rendering the Bicentenary 
largely ahistorical. This lack of a clear story reduced the coherence of the message promoted by 
the Australian government.18 Thus, there was a much clearer divide between the rhetoric 
surrounding Australia’s exceptionalism and its inclusiveness, whereas in New Zealand the two 
were largely inseparable.  
The difference at this time between multiculturalism in Australia and biculturalism in 
New Zealand reflected the starkly different position of indigenous and immigrant groups in the 
two countries. The promotional material used by the two governments clearly showed their 
different priorities. The ABA magazine provided a two-page summary of Australia’s history, 
which told the story of Australia as the history of a multicultural society, where even the Eureka 
Rebellion was cast as a multi-ethnic event and one of the many precursors to Australia’s 
multicultural society.19 The New Zealand government told their national story as a history of 
partnership between Māori and Pakeha, and while it acknowledged that Māori were not always 
treated well, they were always portrayed as a central part of New Zealand’s story.20 Through its 
emphasis on Waitangi and Māori, the organisation that managed New Zealand’s 
sesquicentenary, the New Zealand 1990 Commission, inevitably sidelined other minority 
groups. Likewise the ABA diminished the importance of Indigenous Australians by portraying 
them as one of many waves of immigrants and as just another minority. This reflected the 
different historical experiences of the two nations and the different demographic and political 
challenges each nation faced.  
When comparing this construction of national identity in the late 1980s with 
representations from earlier in the century, the most striking difference is the transformative 
influence of these new conceptions of national identity. Although the Australian and New 
Zealand governments employed the terms biculturalism and multiculturalism from the 1970s 
onwards, they were still largely peripheral, while Britishness and the notions of progress and 
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civilisation were still the dominant signifiers of national identity.21 By the 1980s however, the 
governments placed multiculturalism and biculturalism at the heart of their conception of 
national identity. Both governments promoted this new form of civic nationalism, 
hypothetically premised on inclusion, the acceptance of diversity, and loyalty to the political 
institutions of the state.22 However, this idea of civic nationalism was stronger in Australia than 
New Zealand, as the New Zealand government’s emphasis on the two main ethnic groups 
retained elements of an ethnic national identity. Nonetheless, both governments promoted a 
form of cultural national identity that was significantly different from those espoused in both 
countries throughout most of the twentieth century.  
After a change of Directors in 1985, the ABA adopted what they saw as a more 
accessible approach. This included embracing the ‘ocker’ as an important element of Australia’s 
heritage and an expression of Australia’s unique identity. The ‘Bush Yarns’ section of the 
Bicentennial Magazine included many examples of this approach, including what was 
presumably a fictional discussion between two Aussie blokes: 
Gavin McGargle, from up near Starpost, suddenly broke the silence. “Y’know, 
this Bicentenary business has really got me thinking about history, me family 
an’ all that sorta stuff.” Roly Mudflap, who’d spent most of the last half an 
hour trying to get a moth floating legs-up in the dying froth of his beer to sink 
nodded sagely.23 
This self-conscious ockerness contrasted with earlier publications that were much more 
conservative and relied more heavily on the narrative of progress from settlement, to colony 
and then nation through hard work and by overcoming a series of challenges.24 The ABA used 
this ockerness to express Australia’s unique national identity and the laconic laid-back attitude 
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was portrayed as something particularly Australian.25 It was also a way of owning and 
transforming the concept of the ‘cultural cringe’ into something positive and stripping it of its 
derogatory connotations. New Zealand’s own cultural cringe was clearly on display during this 
celebration, but the 1990 commission did not endorse or draw upon New Zealand’s own 
colonial taint or attempt to turn it into something positive. Instead, the New Zealand 
government tried to fill that void by emphasising New Zealand’s exceptionalism and civility.26 
These celebrations highlighted an ongoing paradox of Australian nationalism. In 
comparison with New Zealand, the Australian government drew upon more nativist and ocker 
notions of the ‘Australian story’, while also taking a more conservative approach that 
emphasised the whiggish development of Australia as a nation. At the same time, it also 
adopted a more substantial civic nationalism and its post-British multiculturalism was more 
broadly pluralist than the New Zealand government’s engagement with biculturalism.27 This 
paradox reflected two countervailing trends in Australian nationalism over the twentieth 
century. This thesis has shown that Australia’s exposed geopolitical position created greater 
uncertainty and pushed successive Australian governments to defend ‘White Australia’. 
Simultaneously, from the middle of the century that anxiety also pushed Australian 
governments to adopt an expansive immigration programme that radically reshaped the 
demographic makeup of Australia. After 1972, the realities of this demographic transformation 
pushed Australian governments to adopt a multicultural nationalism that had become orthodox 
by 1988. These two strands explain why, in comparison with New Zealand, the Australian 
nationalism promoted in 1988 was both more conservative and more pluralist.  
Just as these celebrations highlighted long-term trends in Australia, the New Zealand 
government also drew upon many themes that this thesis has tracked over the twentieth 
century. New Zealand governments often drew upon the notion of New Zealand as an almost 
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utopian society.28 Perhaps the most striking difference in the imagery of the two celebrations 
was the New Zealand government’s reliance, through the 1990 Commission, on the image of a 
clean, green society with unique natural landscape that reflected New Zealand’s 
exceptionalism:  
If you wish to understand the character of a people, the behaviour of a 
society, you must look to its geography ... We must continue to treasure both 
the values we have learned from our land, and that glorious natural heritage 
of sparkling climate, empty spaces, clean air, [and] transparent seas and 
rivers.29 
This rhetoric was a consistent theme that successive New Zealand governments used 
throughout the century: they portrayed New Zealand as an ideal and superior society. The 1990 
Commission cited New Zealand’s record of leading the world in progressive legislation as 
further evidence of New Zealand’s uniqueness.30 The role of progressive legislation was also 
apparent in the Australian celebration, but it had a much smaller role then in New Zealand. 
Again, the importance of the superiority of the Dominion was much more pronounced in the 
nationalist rhetoric in New Zealand as a small nation than in Australia, which had larger 
aspirations. This was an important difference in 1901 and it was even more pronounced by 
1990. 
 Another important part of this exceptionalism was New Zealand’s race relations. The 
rhetoric was much less overt, and there was less certainty than earlier in the century, but the 
government continued to portray New Zealand’s record on race relations as unique and an 
important signifier of New Zealand’s unique national character.31 This continued to stand in 
contrast with the Australian government who, while not ignoring the indigenous element of 
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their history to the same degree, did not portray their race relations as a direct reflection of the 
character of the Australian nation. 
As with previous decades, the two governments also viewed the position of their 
nations differently. The Australian government recognised its economic future lay with Asia and 
placed considerable emphasis on Australia’s Asian future and the importance of developing 
greater knowledge of Asia. Prime Minister Bob Hawke outlined the challenges Australia faced:  
There is … potential, which we must strive to avoid, for cultural 
misunderstandings. If we are to succeed in selling services to Asia, or 
anywhere else in the world, we will need to bridge those social and linguistic 
gaps.32 
Likewise, the New Zealand government built upon an increasingly powerful conception of South 
Pacific regionalism, representing New Zealand as an important player within the South Pacific. 
Roderic Alleys’ description of New Zealand’s search for a national identity makes this point 
clearly: 
New Zealand [has undertaken a] continuing and uneasy search for a sense of 
true national identity. That quest has always been complicated by facts of 
geography; contrary to what some seemed to believe, New Zealand was not 
anchored just off Britain somewhere in the English Channel … By now [the 
1970s onwards] an increasing number of countries in the South Pacific were 
independent, meaning New Zealand adopted a far more active and positive 
role to promote co-operation in the region where we know we naturally 
belong.33 
This was evidence of the abandonment of the notion of each nation as a British outpost on the 
edge of Asia or a part of Europe transplanted to the antipodes. While this rhetoric had gained 
currency from the 1970s onwards, during the late 1980s it was expressed in its most emphatic 
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terms. This notion of regionalism blended geostrategic interests with the national identity and 
character of each nation in a way that had been reserved for Australia and New Zealand’s 
special relationship with Britain in the past.  
This difference went beyond the geographic position of each country. Through their 
nationalist rhetoric, the New Zealand government emphatically asserted New Zealand’s 
position as a nation of the South Pacific.34 It defined the government’s geopolitical priorities 
and was linked to the New Zealand government’s image of New Zealand as a bicultural nation. 
The Māori component of New Zealand created further impetus towards, and evidence of, New 
Zealand’s ‘South Pacificness’.35 The Australian government’s engagement with Asia was more 
ambivalent. The Hawke government did not describe Australia as an Asian nation. 
Multiculturalism was intended to ensure an inclusive and forward-looking national identity and 
it was in part intended to allow for greater engagement with Asia, but it did not promote an 
actively Asian identity.36 As Hawke’s comment in the previous paragraph illustrates, 
engagement with Asia was more about economics and mutual understanding than fostering an 
Asian identity. This demonstrates how entrenched this point of difference had become by the 
end of the 1980s. For most of the twentieth century, the idea that both nations were European 
outposts on the edge of Asia and the Pacific went virtually unchallenged.37 By the 1980s, that 
consensus had broken down and as a result, underlying differences in demography and 
geographic outlook led the two governments to frame their nations and the world around them 
in substantially different ways.  
These large-scale national celebrations confirmed the rapid divergence in geopolitical 
outlook, a difference that had become apparent in the New Zealand government’s decision in 
1984 to ban nuclear powered vessels from New Zealand’s territorial waters. By 1990, the 
sinking of the Rainbow Warrior had entrenched the anti-nuclear issue as central to New 
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Zealand’s identity.38 The government used New Zealand’s stance as an example of its principled 
approach to foreign policy that was made possible by New Zealand’s benign environment, and 
perhaps more importantly, portrayed this policy as a natural extension of New Zealand’s 
national character.39 This reflected a revolution in New Zealand’s foreign policy. This change 
was so profound because of the consistency with which previous governments had maintained 
the foreign policy consensus. At the same time though this new approach drew upon rhetoric 
that framed New Zealand as far removed from conflicts and emphasised New Zealand’s 
tradition as a moral actor in the international arena.  
The continuity of the Australian government’s foreign policy priorities contrasted with 
New Zealand’s. The Australian government invoked a realist approach to foreign policy that 
continued to value great power protection above all other issues. As Kim Beazley (Minister for 
Defence) makes clear in his discussion of Australia’s defence policy in 1987: 
Inherent in the defence paper and in the Government's implementation of 
defence self-reliance is the linking of practical defence policy with our allies, 
and our role in the region as a military power. Australia-United States of 
America co-operation is important to basic elements of an effective and 
efficient system of Australian defence.40 
The seeds of this difference in perspective were apparent in 1901 as the Australian government 
expressed far greater concern about its geographic vulnerability, and continued through to the 
Vietnam War, where the Australian government was a more enthusiastic supporter of the US. 
At the same time, until the 1980s other issues subsumed these differences and pushed the two 
governments to adopt largely similar policies and rhetoric. The decline of Britain, the 
decolonisation of Asia and the Pacific and the rise of the US had created a profoundly different 
world in which both governments were forced to realign themselves and articulate a new vision 
for themselves and their nations. In doing this, these differences, which had previously been 
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peripheral, became central to each government’s nationalism, and to the geopolitical priorities 
that were an important part of that rhetoric.  
There were other specific differences in the celebrations on either side of the Tasman, 
and these reflect important differences that had developed between the two nations over the 
century. The festivities in Australia were generally more conservative than those in New 
Zealand. The ABA spent more time and resources on historical re-enactments and, particularly 
before the change in management in 1986, the ABA promoted an unproblematic narrative of 
Australian progress.41 In order to draw upon what it considered the most resonant historical 
events, they relied upon the act of colonisation as the beginning of the Australian nation and 
used the theme of progress and economic development as the driving force of Australia’s 
fruition as a nation.42 These themes left little room for any consideration of the ideological 
constraints of such a triumphalist vision of Australian history.43 It reaffirmed the centrality of 
the role of British immigrants as the central actors in Australia’s story and left little room for 
Indigenous and non-British groups to play anything other than bit parts, adding colour and 
novelty to the main events.44 The re-enactment of the tall ships entering Sydney harbour 
demonstrated this. The ABA recognised that a full re-enactment of Phillip entering the harbour 
would be too contentious.45 Nonetheless, they largely ignored the fact that it was grossly 
inappropriate to ask Indigenous Australians to celebrate their own dispossession. This is 
indicative of strong conservative elements in the government-sponsored nationalism that, 
despite the many changes, still invoked whiteness and colonial progress as the primary 
signifiers of the Australian character and experience. This lack of insight in Australia was not 
apparent in New Zealand, where the official organisers addressed these issues much more 
explicitly. 
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In fact, the 1990 Commission in New Zealand publicly reflected upon the problematic 
nature of national celebrations. Its official literature included articles that addressed Māori 
grievances and articles that made the case for the validity of the celebration of the 150th 
anniversary of the Treaty of Waitangi.46 It recognised that colonisation created winners and 
losers and that Māori had legitimate reasons for not wanting to celebrate New Zealand’s 
colonisation. Michael Basset, Chairman of the 1990 Commission, made this clear in his launch 
of the events. “1990 is a year of celebration, reflection and dedication. There are many aspects 
of our history we can be proud of; some we may wish to undo, but never can.”47 Moreover, the 
head of the Waitangi Tribunal also discussed the relationship between biculturalism and 
multiculturalism, which included a rather frank admission of the limits of multiculturalism in 
New Zealand: 
I rejoice in the multicultural character of our country. We all do. We are so 
much part of one another now that we have no other option. But the Treaty is 
primarily about the protection of Māori culture. No other.48 
These speeches showed a more nuanced understanding of the political nature of history than 
was the case with the ABA. In comparison with Australia, the New Zealand government’s 
nationalism was more self-reflexive and included less instances of the sort of assertions about 
the character of the nation that were commonplace in both countries earlier in the century. 
This difference between the Australian and New Zealand governments’ appreciation of 
the potential for conflict and controversy caused differing public responses: the celebrations in 
Australia were met with large-scale protests, while New Zealand was largely unaffected. Māori 
had a prominent place in New Zealand’s national celebrations and as a result there was much 
debate, but little open opposition, to the events in 1990.49 In Australia on the other hand, 
Indigenous groups felt the story told by the ABA largely ignored their perspectives, and they 
therefore engaged in some of the largest protests in Australia’s history, rejecting the very terms 
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of the Bicentenary. Rather than a year of celebration, they called for a year of mourning and 
they challenged the legitimacy of the national identity the Australian government so proudly 
proclaimed.50 Perhaps more than anything else, this reflected the profoundly different position 
of indigenous groups in the nationalisms the Australian and New Zealand governments 
promoted. Despite the changes that had disrupted so many elements of nationalist rhetoric in 
Australia and New Zealand, this difference remained consistent from 1901 until the end of the 
1980s.  
Similarities 
These two national celebrations provided further evidence of the differences that had 
developed over the twentieth century, but these celebrations also drew upon a number of 
themes that point to important ongoing similarities. Conceptions of regionalism are a good 
example of this: both governments drew upon new geopolitical identities to reinforce their 
post-British nationalisms and an important part of this new identity emphasised regional 
engagement.51 This period reflected their most enthusiastic adoption of regionalist rhetoric, the 
culmination of tendencies that had been apparent since 1901. As the two governments 
articulated visions of their place in the world they both tried to define a new home for their 
nations both as a part of, and removed from, the non-Western world.52 This illustrates the 
similarities of context faced by governments on both sides of the Tasman.  
There was within the objectives of both these national celebrations a pervading sense 
that Australia and New Zealand lacked coherent national identities, or at the very least that 
they lacked an understanding of their nation’s past and therefore the position of their nation in 
the world.53 The ABA claimed it was starting a conversation that was well overdue. As the 
Deputy Chairman, Wendy McCarthy, put it: “Australia’s Bicentennial celebrations offered an 
opportunity to help in a national stock-take, to be part of looking at our past, our present and 
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our future”.54 This is despite that fact that commentators had been calling Australians 
introspective “navel gazers” since the 1960s.55 The idea that Australia lacked a legitimate 
national identity was an idea that the organisers of the Bicentennial both repeatedly rejected 
and continually re-examined. They rejected it through the constant reiteration of Australia’s 
past and the clear narrative that led from Australia’s past to its present circumstance. Yet the 
consistent drive to disseminate this nationalist narrative and “continue the national 
conversation” reflected an ambivalence and uncertainty about the national traditions that the 
ABA was both reinforcing and creating.56 
 Similarly, in New Zealand the government treated the 150th anniversary of the signing of 
the Treaty of Waitangi as an opportunity to foster dialogue and promote the centrality of the 
treaty as the foundation of the nation. The narrative constructed for the celebration affirmed 
the centrality of the Māori-Pakeha relationship in New Zealand’s history, while also framing 
New Zealand’s history as a procession of events that led to the new rhetoric of partnership. The 
narrative was given substance by the decision made by the Lange government to empower the 
Waitangi Tribunal to address historical grievances.57 The documents and speeches created by 
the New Zealand 1990 Commission drew from familiar notions of superior race relations and a 
utopian vision of colonisation, while also introducing ideas that would have been considered 
treasonous twenty years before. They recognised the right of Māori to limited autonomy and 
that the treaty made powerful provisions for Māori self-management, issues that governments 
had largely ignored in the past.58 Furthermore, the New Zealand 1990 Commission argued that 
the treaty was the means by which Pakeha could claim to belong to New Zealand. The rhetoric 
surrounding the colonisation of New Zealand had shifted dramatically by the late 1980s. The 
1990 Commission and the government were attempting to formulate a new national identity, 
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one that would continue to bind citizens to the state without drawing upon outdated notions of 
racialism, Britishness, colonial subservience and the ‘white man’s burden’. The extent to which 
either the Australian or New Zealand governments enacted policies that reflected this new 
approach is debateable, but it is undeniable that by the late 1980s the rhetoric surrounding 
national identity in both countries had fundamentally changed.  
The most important manifestation of this new approach was the downgraded status of 
Britain’s role in both countries’ histories and the diminished status of both nations’ attachment 
to a pan-British identity. The ABA and the 1990 Commission both paid little attention to the role 
of Britain in both countries’ pasts; instead they emphasised the independent development of 
each nation. There was little recognition or discussion of the power of the British Empire 
beyond discussions of each nations’ contribution to the two world wars. Particularly in 
Australia, the government framed the British Empire as the coloniser of the continent and the 
primary perpetrator of injustices. Britain was ‘othered’ in both national narratives as they 
sought to emphasise the uniqueness and independence of the young nations. The ABA used the 
royal family to add colour, and they gave the impression that Britain had almost no impact on 
Australia’s development. Likewise in New Zealand, the rhetoric heavily emphasised New 
Zealand’s development as an independent nation, producing a similar historical amnesia over 
Britain’s influence on New Zealand. While it was never explicitly stated, this search for a new 
identity sought to fill the void created by the terminal decline of the British Empire.59 Neither 
the governments nor their organisational bodies however, chose to reflect openly upon this 
challenge, because to do so would be to admit to a colonial heritage that was increasingly 
unattractive and a reaffirmation of a cultural cringe that both governments were still trying to 
eliminate. This transformation is quite remarkable considering that before the 1970s 
governments in both countries found it hard to recognise the extent of Britain’s decline or 
reflect upon the problematic implication of their attachment to British identities. Yet by the 
1980s, the two governments created national celebrations that downplayed Britain’s role and 
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completely ignored the power that British identities had in both countries through most of their 
histories.  
Despite important differences in demography and geopolitics New Zealand and 
Australia were still two settler nations on the edge of the Asia-Pacific region, who both faced 
challenges from Indigenous and immigrant groups, and whose governments expressed a similar 
set of concerns and preoccupations. For example, despite the obvious differences between 
multiculturalism and biculturalism, both policies reflected a desire to redefine the parameters 
of national identity. Similarly, both policies were adopted because previously held assumptions 
about racial homogeneity and assimilation had become completely unacceptable. Both 
governments expressed their determination to maintain the sovereignty of the white settler 
state against any potential challenges, and they used biculturalism and multiculturalism as 
vehicles to pursue that end.60 
Britishness was ever present, but also invisible in these events. Each government’s 
commemoration involved relationships between the British government and Australia and New 
Zealand’s Indigenous inhabitants. They occurred long before any of the colonies had received 
self-government, and at the time the events were conceived of primarily as British triumphs. 
The events were only significant to the nation-states of Australia and New Zealand because 
they were seen as a part of ‘the nation’s history’; this reflected an ideological position that 
assumed the nation’s perennial existence from ancient to modern times.61 Thus, the New 
Zealand government portrayed the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi as the cornerstone of the 
New Zealand nation, even though New Zealand as a nation did not exist at the time, and even 
though the treaty was largely ignored throughout most of New Zealand’s short history.62 
Likewise, the Australian government reinterpreted the invasion of Australia by British forces 
and convicts in 1788 as the first step along Australia’s natural and inevitable path towards the 
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creation of a multicultural society. Both governments used their British history to reinforce its 
historical legacy, while distancing themselves from Britain’s integral role in the creation of both 
antipodean nations.  
This need for such discursive flexibility was a result of both governments’ self-conscious 
attempts at removing the imperial yoke. In the past, the boundary between British and 
Australian and New Zealand national identity was inexact.63 This meant that there was no need 
to draw a distinction between the role of Britain and the role of the local government. Using 
this logic it was easy to show the progression from British colony to self-government and 
independence, as it was a manifestation of the onward advance of British civilisation.64 
However, as the governments in the 1980s attempted to draw concrete distinctions between 
British and Australian and New Zealand history and identity, they struggled to replace 
Britishness with something equally as tangible and coherent.65 The countless discussions and 
publications surrounding both national celebrations rarely explicitly addressed the problematic 
role of Britishness. However, this issue was a subterranean fault within each government’s 
attempt to articulate a coherent national vision, and it threatened to rupture the new facade of 
cohesiveness both governments were struggling to instil.  
The governments on both sides of the Tasman in the late 1980s had a different 
conception of race to their predecessors. They portrayed ethnic and cultural diversity as a 
defining characteristic of Australian and New Zealand society. The commemorations went to 
considerable lengths to include a diverse range of groups within the celebrations, framing the 
successful inclusion of these groups within the nation as evidence of each nation’s 
exceptionalism.66 This was particularly the case in Australia, because this was an important 
element of the narrative of Australia as a multicultural society.67 Both governments hailed the 
success of each nation at being particularly inclusive and diverse, and this was held up as 
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evidence of the ‘unique’ nature of each nation’s character. The most significant aspect of this 
rhetorical strategy was that it framed diversity as a central element of national belonging and a 
defining characteristic in both nations. This contrasted with previous governments who had 
framed these ethnic issues as peripheral to the central concerns of the nation, namely the 
assimilation of these diverse groups into mainstream society, in order to maintain the core 
British character of the nation.68 The Australian and New Zealand governments of the 1980s 
professed a very different attitude toward national identity, wherein even the act of attending 
these national celebrations served to foster and promote national identity.69 This contrasted 
with previous governments, who saw national identity as set in stone by racial character and by 
all encompassing national traditions that defined the boundaries of the nation-state.  
These developments in Australia and New Zealand have spawned a wealth of literature 
in both countries assessing the extent and nature of these post-racial policies. Scholars on both 
sides of the Tasman have outlined the limits to these new developments.70 In fact, one of the 
most often-used criticisms was that neither country has in fact moved beyond the notion of a 
core Anglo-Celtic culture and national identity and that both sets of policies seek to marginalise 
and contain alternative identities, rather than encouraging their development.71 This critique 
can be applied to the national celebrations in both countries. Most of the material produced in 
Canberra and Wellington dealt with Anglo-Celtic experiences and histories, which served to 
conflate the experiences of Anglo-Celtics with the experiences of the nation. Of course the 
centrality of British immigrants to each nation’s history perhaps made this both necessary and 
inevitable. Nevertheless, it reflected the continuing reliance on a narrative of colonial progress, 
which cast all other groups in peripheral roles. The ABA emphasised the role of explorers and 
early settlers who ‘opened up the bush’ for white settlement.72 It portrayed their experiences 
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as heroic endeavours that were an example for modern Australians to follow.73 This reflected 
an almost complete lack of understanding of alternative readings of Australia’s colonial past. 
New Zealand’s 1990 Commission did not focus upon the sanctification of early settlers and 
showed a greater appreciation for Māori perspectives towards colonialism.74 However, this 
material was largely contained in sections created to specifically deal with Māori-Pakeha 
relations. Much of the other material focussed on agricultural development, sporting 
achievements, New Zealand’s natural beauty and ‘number eight wire’ practicality.75 Most of 
these issues did not receive the same bicultural approach; in fact, they mainly drew upon 
national myths that could have come from the early twentieth century. They focussed on the 
settlers’ practicality and rugged individualism, their egalitarianism and on New Zealand’s 
exceptionalism as a social laboratory.76 These non-racial components of New Zealand’s 
celebrations indicated the ongoing strength of the older notions of New Zealand’s 
exceptionalism, which still revolved around the achievements of New Zealand’s white settlers. 
This implicitly marginalised Māori and other non-white groups from a large amount of what 
was considered worth celebrating, which in turn reinforced the dominance of Pakeha historical 
experience on the character of the nation.  
 There is substantial evidence that suggests that the construction of national identity in 
Australia and New Zealand had not moved nearly as far from the notion of British racial identity 
as their rhetoric would suggest. It is important to keep a sense of perspective here however, 
particularly for those who argue that present rhetoric is essentially the same as that used 
during earlier periods of Australia and New Zealand’s history.77 This thesis demonstrates that 
there were clear differences between the way national identities were articulated in the early 
twentieth century compared to the late 1980s. While the rhetoric may still fall back on the 
notion of a homogenous core culture, both governments disavowed the use of a single race as a 
                                                                
73
"In the Footsteps of Burke and Wills." 
74
Stead, "Identities," 52. 
75
 At least seventy percent of the material focused on these other themes with no bicultural perspective at all. 
76
 For example, Pill Gifford, "Sport and Recreation," New Zealand 1990: Official Souvenir Publication 1989, 67. 
77
Dominic O'Sullivan, Beyond Biculturalism: The Politics of an Indigenous Minority(Wellington: Huia Publishers, 2007); Laksiri 
Jayasuriya, Jan Gothard, and David Walker, Legacies of white Australia: race, culture and nation(Crawley, WA: University of 
Western Australia Press, 2003). 
215 
 
determinate of national identity. Moreover, they promoted a civic over an ethnic nationalism, 
which was more inclusive and accepting of difference compared with the past.78 This has 
created greater rhetorical space for the development of multiculturalism and biculturalism. 
While certain parameters confine those changes, they still represent a substantial redefinition 
of national identity in both countries.  
Conclusion 
The enunciation of bicultural and multicultural national identities in Australia and New Zealand 
reflected a considerable divergence in ethnic relations in the two countries. The two 
governments’ promotion of a new national identity reflected the different position of 
indigenous and new immigrant groups. This was the culmination of tendencies that were 
apparent from the start of the twentieth century that had become much more pronounced as 
the British Empire declined and successive governments were forced to adopt a nationalism 
divorced from Britishness. Similarly, the Australian government’s Asia-focussed regionalism and 
continued reliance on the United States contrasted with the New Zealand government’s South 
Pacific regionalism and emphasis on internationalism. This reflected the different geopolitical 
priorities of the two governments, the foundations of which were apparent in 1901, and which 
became more pronounced as the world changed. This period illustrates some important 
differences in the nationalism the two governments promoted and this thesis as a whole has 
placed that development into its historical context. This chapter also points to important 
similarities that survived this divergence, because on a more general level, the promotion of 
civic national identities by the Australian and New Zealand governments is evidence of the 
similarities of the challenges each government faced. Both governments were trying to foster a 
post-British identity that emphasised regional engagement and civic belonging instead of racial 
boundaries. They paid lip-service to the end of Anglo-Celtic hegemony in Australia and New 
Zealand and placed less emphasis on the maintenance of a core-culture, but this was largely 
symbolic. Critics argued that these policies were intended to contain, rather than facilitate, 
greater ethnic diversity and pluralism. Nonetheless, the two governments promoted national 
                                                                
78
Smits, 88. 
216 
 
identities that marked a significant divergence from the previously dominant monolithic 
notions of national identity in each country. The parallel development of this similar rhetorical 
arsenal by the two governments is indicative of the similar challenges both governments faced 
as settler societies on the edge of the Asia-Pacific region, attempting to establish a place for 
themselves within a rapidly changing and decolonised world. In fact, because the nationalist 
rhetoric in each country had diverged in such important and fundamental ways, it makes the 
ongoing similarities in the governments’ nationalisms even more remarkable.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis demonstrates that comparing political rhetoric is a useful way to analyse the 
histories of Australia and New Zealand. During each episode nationalist rhetoric in the two 
countries addressed some of the most important issues facing the two countries. Therefore, 
this approach offers an effective way to analyse some of the major changes that affected 
Australia and New Zealand throughout the century. By taking a comparative approach this 
thesis offers a new perspective on issues that are too often viewed in isolation. The aggregate 
of these chapters provides a longitudinal analysis of political rhetoric in Australia and New 
Zealand and how this was reflected in changing conceptions of national identities. This longer 
timeframe places each case study into its historical context and provides a more complex 
understanding of the political rhetoric that each generation of politicians invoked. By taking this 
approach, this thesis builds upon the work of Curran, Ward, Belich and others to show the 
power of Britishness in the nationalist rhetoric of successive governments until the 1960s. This 
nationalism constructed a world view that framed both nations as European outposts on the 
edge of Asia. By examining the foreign policies of successive governments the thesis analyses 
the world views each government inherited, promoted and tried to alter. The nationalisms of 
the antipodean governments after the 1960s must be understood as a response to the rise and 
fall of the British Empire and the consequent fall of British settler nationalism in both nations. In 
the first half of the century the geographic and demographic differences between Australia and 
New Zealand were largely subsumed into a British-centric world view. After the decline of the 
Empire these differences became much more important and they shaped the responses of the 
two governments to these challenges. However, simultaneously, governments in both New 
Zealand and Australia continued to face a similar set of challenges and the political rhetoric 
from the 1970s showed this.  
From 1901, the New Zealand and Australian governments responded to a variety of 
internal and external challenges and marshalled nationalist rhetoric to justify their positions 
and define the challenges each nation faced. From this time onwards successive New Zealand 
governments defined their nation as a small superior society, with unique race relations that 
218 
 
could influence the world through its moral exceptionalism. Australian governments defined 
Australia as an aspirant middle power, with the potential for greater influence in the world 
through close relations with super powers and they expressed greater concern about racial 
conflict. At the same time, there was a remarkable similarity in the issues that preoccupied the 
two governments. During the first half of the century, this similarity was expressed through a 
British settler nationalism that defined the world in similar ways and defined the identities of 
each nation along largely similar lines. As the British Empire declined these antipodean 
governments invoked post-British national identities that reflected the differences within the 
two societies. Yet they continued to be preoccupied with similar issues and both promoted 
ambivalent national identities that in some ways disavowed the ethnocentric rhetoric of the 
past, while also drawing upon similar narratives of progress and exceptionalism as superior 
white settler societies.  
When the six Australian states federated and created a unified nation in 1901 Richard 
Seddon’s government chose to keep New Zealand out of the Federation. The nationalist 
rhetoric of the two governments indicated differences that would develop throughout the 
century. The most obvious of these was the different position of indigenous groups: where the 
New Zealand government showed greater concern with Maori issues and portrayed Maori as a 
part of the nation, Indigenous Australians were largely ignored in the Australian Parliament. 
This different attitude towards their indigenous populations also manifested in different 
attitudes towards the Pacific. The Seddon government portrayed the South Pacific as New 
Zealand’s potential sphere of influence and as an opportunity for New Zealand to extend its 
superior race relations into the Pacific, while the Australian government took a harder line 
towards the negative impact of racial mixing and viewed Papua and New Guinea as a buffer 
zone against invasion. These issues reflected important underlying differences in race relations, 
ethnic make-up and size. This shaped the different demographic and geopolitical challenges the 
two nations faced and the rhetoric the governments used reflected these different concerns. At 
the same time, the two governments portrayed themselves as British societies and defined 
their place in the world in relation to the British Empire. Their nationalisms defined themselves 
as European nations on the edge of Asia, occupied with the maintenance of the British 
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character of their nations through immigration restrictions and enthusiastic contribution to the 
British Empire.  
World War One provided clear evidence of the pervasiveness of British settler 
nationalism in Australia and New Zealand. The war pushed the governments to enthusiastically 
affirm the Britishness of their nations. They used the war as an opportunity to proclaim the 
uniqueness of their nations as the ultimate manifestation of the British genius and used the 
military exploits of the Anzacs as proof of the superiority of each Dominion. Ironically, the 
nationalisms they espoused were almost identical and what each government saw as the 
unique characteristics of their nation was in fact part of a wider imperial discourse. There were, 
however, some differences. The Australian government portrayed its indigenous peoples 
differently and was much more pro-US than New Zealand and the conscription controversy in 
Australia created a different domestic context. This reflected significant underlying differences 
that would exert an ongoing influence on the political rhetoric in the two nations. However, 
during this period a similar British settler nationalism pervaded.  
Unlike during the First World War, the Second World War challenged the status quo in 
significant ways. The reduced power of Britain was obvious to both Australia and New Zealand, 
and as a result both governments moved to use the United States to fill the void left behind by 
Britain. They did this so that they would not have to fundamentally alter their attitudes towards 
their non-white neighbours or their attitudes towards racial discrimination. The rise of Japan 
and decolonisation in Asia illustrated the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region and this 
made it clear that both governments would have to, on some level, engage with their region. 
The governments responded to the war in different ways. The Australian government decided 
to bring its troops back to Australia, while the New Zealand government left its troops in the 
European theatre. This indicated developing differences in the geopolitical outlook of the two 
governments that reflected their different size, proximity to Asia and aspirations for the role 
they could play in the world. As a result of these differences the Australian government 
adopted an expansive post-war immigration programme that would have profound 
demographic implications. Despite these important differences, the two antipodean 
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governments continued to define their nations as British. They both relied upon assimilation 
and immigration restrictions to maintain Anglo-Celtic ethnic and cultural hegemony. They also 
defined their nations as European while trying to ignore and insulate themselves from their 
Asian and Pacific Island neighbours, instead of defining a place for themselves as a part of the 
non-Western world.  
Throughout the first half of the century successive governments in both countries built 
up an ideological edifice that was both deeply entrenched and increasingly under siege by the 
1960s. Britain’s economic and military decline undermined the central foundation of the settler 
nationalisms in both countries. It was a testament to the deeply-rooted nature of that 
nationalism that despite the changes throughout the 1960s both governments resisted their 
implications. Instead, in order to maintain the Australasian settlement, they shifted their 
reliance from Britain to the United States to an even greater extent. During the 1960s, the 
demographic transformation of Australia manifested in an increasingly diverse population in 
comparison with New Zealand. Australia’s proximity to Asia, and loftier aspirations, meant that 
the government took a more interventionist attitude towards Asia and continued to use 
nationalist rhetoric to justify its heavy military reliance on the United States. The New Zealand 
government had a more circumspect attitude towards the United States and began to define 
itself as a South Pacific nation, largely removed from military threats.  
The year 1972 offered another example of the ongoing importance of the trans-Tasman 
world. Australia and New Zealand both elected left-wing governments on the same platform of 
‘new nationalism’. Where previous governments had maintained the status quo these two 
governments addressed these issues directly: this was a radical break with the past. They both 
promoted a post-British, progressive, ‘independent’ national identity. They embraced the 
decolonisation of Asia and the Pacific and defined the future of each nation as a part of the 
Asia-Pacific region. An important part of these new policies involved the disavowal of racial 
discrimination and the promotion of a more inclusive civic nationalism. They explicitly tried to 
fill the ideological gap created by Britain’s decline. Through this process they continued to 
express different priorities. Where the Whitlam government looked to Asia and promoted 
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multiculturalism, the Kirk government defined New Zealand as a South Pacific nation and 
promoted an early form of biculturalism. This indicates the ways in which Australia and New 
Zealand had diverged, but it also shows the continued interchange of ideas and the similarity of 
the nation-building projects undertaken by each government.  
The ANZUS crisis in 1984 was the clearest example of the divergence in geostrategic 
perspectives between Australia and New Zealand, evidenced by government descriptions of the 
character of their nations and their nations’ position within the world. This was the culmination 
of trends that had been apparent since 1901. The Australian government continued to value its 
relations with the US over all other considerations, and through this tried to project its 
influence as a middle power in the Asia-Pacific region. The New Zealand government rejected 
ANZUS in order to disseminate its anti-nuclear message. By doing this it prioritised 
internationalist principles over realist calculations and expressed confidence in the protection 
provided by its distance from areas of conflict. The two governments developed and justified 
their policies by drawing upon nationalist rhetoric that portrayed their foreign policies as a 
natural extension of the character of their nations. Rather than souring the relations between 
the two governments this meant Australia became New Zealand’s most important ally, leading 
to further bilateral integration between the two nations. 
By the end of the 1980s the nationalist and geopolitical rhetoric of the two governments 
had diverged in fundamental ways. The geopolitical differences were obvious after 1984 and 
Australia’s increasing ethnic diversity entrenched multiculturalism as the ‘replacement’ to 
Britishness, while the New Zealand government defined New Zealand as a morally superior 
bicultural nation. Their nationalist rhetoric had substantially diverged. However, a comparison 
of the two national celebrations in 1988 and 1990 points to ongoing similarities in their 
nationalisms. The two governments continued to define a place for themselves in the post-
imperial world. They both adopted an ambivalent civic nationalism that was, in some ways, very 
different from the rhetoric in the past, but was also premised on the ongoing hegemony of an 
Anglo-Celtic culture and political institutions within each nation.  
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This thesis demonstrates how nationalist ideologies shape the way a government views 
itself, the nation and the world around it. It considers the constant tension between those 
dominant ideologies and the external and internal changes that challenge those assumptions. 
There is always tension between those ideologies and the real world challenges governments 
face. This causes governments to oscillate between making those changes conform to their 
world view, and changing their worldview to conform to changes in the world. The persistence 
of Britishness in Australia and New Zealand until at least the 1970s marks the resilience of a 
form of nationalism that dominated political rhetoric in Australia and New Zealand far beyond 
the point when it could achieve its original purpose. At the same time, despite the power of 
British settler nationalism in Australia and New Zealand, governments eventually recognised 
the end of the formal British Empire and accepted the implications of the rise of the non-
Western powers. As a result of these changes later governments invoked a new nationalism 
that fundamentally repudiated many elements of the old nationalism that had been in place 
since 1901. What started off as recognition of hard realities about the world were incorporated 
into nationalist rhetoric to such an extent that governments eventually framed these changes 
as a natural part of the world and justified their new policies by presenting them as a natural 
extension of the character of the nation. It was through this process that New Zealand 
governments began to describe New Zealand as a South Pacific nation and Australian 
governments described Australia’s ‘Asian future’.  
 The nationalist rhetoric used by governments in Canberra and Wellington was 
interlinked with their policy objectives, because they used nationalism to justify their political 
programmes. This was just as true for the Australian government in 1901 when it banned 
Pacific Island labourers from the sugar cane industry as it was when the Kirk government 
created the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975. They portrayed their policies as a natural extension of 
each country’s traditions and as the articulation of the omnipresent ‘national character’ of each 
nation. Both policies were portrayed as the fulfilment of each nation’s destiny that would keep 
the nation on the right path. This went beyond issues that were directly related to national 
identity. The Australian and New Zealand governments cast Britain’s application to join the EEC 
as a narrative about familial loyalty and the future of each nation. Likewise, the two 
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governments framed their responses to the ANZUS crisis as natural extensions of the character 
of each nation. This illustrates the importance of analysing nationalist rhetoric, because these 
governments’ nationalist rhetoric were explicitly linked to the main challenges the governments 
faced.  
By analysing the nationalist rhetoric in the two parliaments it is possible to trace the fall 
of the British Empire by the way the governments constructed and defined themselves. The 
changing attitudes towards indigenous groups and the different position of non-British 
immigrants were clearly marked out in this rhetoric, as were the changes in the ways successive 
governments viewed their nation’s position within the world. The pervasiveness of Britishness 
in the rhetoric of both governments in the first half of the century was a major reason why they 
had such remarkably similar policies, because it was indicative of the similar ideologies through 
which they understood their nations and the world they lived in. At the same time, their 
different attitudes towards race relations — and the political rhetoric that justified this — were 
mirrored in a range of different policies. This illustrates the usefulness of examining nationalist 
rhetoric to consider major developments in Australian and New Zealand history.  
The other major contribution that this thesis makes to the Australian and New Zealand 
historiography is that it highlights the importance of placing issues in a transnational and 
comparative context. National historiographies tend to be insulated from broader issues and 
patterns. This thesis shows the importance of placing what are often considered national issues 
into a wider context. The primary purpose of this approach is to create a broader framework 
and undertake a wider comparative analysis of Australia and New Zealand. On this basis alone 
this thesis makes an important contribution to the emergent trans-Tasman literature. However, 
by considering issues in a comparative perspective this thesis also adds more depth to major 
events in their own national context. Each chapter provides examples of this process, but the 
First World War is a particularly good case in point. At that time each government invoked a 
nationalism that was seen as a particular manifestation of the nation. The war provided all the 
evidence either government needed to proclaim the distinct and unique experience and 
consequent character of the Australian and New Zealand nations. These governments 
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genuinely believed in their own distinctiveness and the historiography in each country has 
largely mirrored that narrative, yet a comparative approach points to the remarkable degree of 
similarity in the rhetoric each government used, illustrating the impact of the wider imperial 
environment in which each government operated. Similarly, particularly from the Australian 
perspective, the governments elected in 1972 were viewed as unique and nascent responses to 
domestic and internal challenges. Yet, the two Labo(u)r governments were so closely connected 
that they used the same slogan in their winning election campaigns to summarise their 
revolutionary policies. These are just two of the many examples developed in this thesis that 
show the value of adopting a comparative and transnational approach to the analysis of 
nationalist rhetoric in Australia and New Zealand.  
The development of nationalist rhetoric in Australia and New Zealand diverged while 
maintaining similarities within a broader framework. By the late 1980s, the Australian and New 
Zealand governments invoked geopolitical rhetoric that was indicative of the different 
geographic positions of each nation, and the different challenges and ways of looking at the 
world that came with those perspectives. Throughout the twentieth century the New Zealand 
government emphasised its indigenous relations and used that as evidence of the nation’s 
exceptionalism, while Australian governments tended to downplay indigenous issues. Likewise, 
the different ethnic makeup of the two countries had ongoing influences on the nationalisms 
used by the governments, from the larger Irish population in Australia during World War I to 
the new waves of southern European immigrants after World War II. These differences created 
both differing political contexts, and demographic challenges, which Canberra and Wellington 
responded to in their political rhetoric. Yet this thesis also highlights the extensive similarities in 
the nationalisms the two governments promoted. This was clear in the first half of the century 
when they framed their nations as superior British settler societies, enmeshed within the 
Empire and symbolically insulated from their non-white neighbours. As the British Empire 
declined later in the century both governments had to come to terms with how this challenged 
the power of British settler nationalism, and as a result the two governments embarked upon a 
similar journey of national renewal. In order to address the changes in the world the Australian 
and New Zealand governments promoted civic over ethnic nationalisms that repudiated racial 
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discrimination and were intended to redefine each nation as a part of the Asia-Pacific region. 
They even shared a similar ambivalence about redefining themselves. The two governments 
promoted regional engagement and multiculturalism and biculturalism respectively, while also 
falling back on familiar assumptions of Anglo-Celtic cultural and ethnic dominance and, 
particularly for Australia, still being largely preoccupied with relations with the Western world 
over all other concerns. With this in mind it is clear that the political rhetoric in Australia and 
New Zealand charts the major changes that have influenced both nations over the twentieth 
century.  
The nationalist rhetoric in Australia and New Zealand reflected differences that were 
apparent in 1901 and shaped how governments in both countries viewed their nations and the 
world. This process explains why there were such important differences in the nationalist 
rhetoric in Australia and New Zealand by the end of the 1980s. At the same time, this thesis 
demonstrates that, on a more basic level, successive governments have been concerned with 
similar issues and that the important points of divergence make the ongoing similarities even 
more significant. Therefore, during the twentieth century, the nationalist rhetoric in Australia 
and New Zealand diverged within a common framework.  
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